General Assembly First Committee
Disarmament and International Security

Regulating AI in Military Operations

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Contents

Introduction....1
Background Examples....2
Current Situation....3
Role of the United Nations....4
Landmark UN Resolutions....5
Country and Bloc Positions....6
Implications for Debate....10
Some Proposals for Action....10
Bibliography....12

Introduction

AI already is widely used by both civilian and military users. For both, it greatly accelerates competitiveness and rapid decision making. For both its effects are transformational. For both, refusing to use Ai would be irresponsible. How to ensure its civilian effects are beneficial, but and its military effects do not cause greater hard when war occurs? How to maximize peaceful benefits, and positive effects for the use of violence, while minimizing military dangers?

While the UN General Assembly adopted multiple resolutions related to the peaceful uses of AI, it only began considering the subject of AI in the military domain at its seventy-ninth session 2024. Previously, such discussions had taken place in several plurilateral groups outside the UN.

States have increasingly integrated artificial intelligence (AI) into the military domain, including weapons, other means and methods of warfare, and systems that support military operations. This integration raises significant questions for international peace and security, particularly in arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. The international community faces the challenge of understanding these developments and managing their implications while ensuring that military applications of AI comply with international law[1].

On 24 December 2024, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/79/239, recognizing the need to develop a shared understanding of military AI's potential effects, harness its benefits, and minimize its risks. The resolution acknowledges opportunities to support compliance with international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians and civilian objects during armed conflict. At the same time, it identifies humanitarian, legal, security, technological, and ethical concerns, including the risks of arms races, miscalculation, and conflict escalation. It also emphasizes safeguards concerning human judgment and control over the use of force[2].

The resolution further recognizes the need to narrow digital and AI divides between and within developed and developing countries through international cooperation and capacity-building[3]. For the First Committee, these interconnected issues raise a central question: How can states promote responsible military applications of AI while preserving human responsibility, addressing

[1] Resolution A/RES/79/239
[2] Resolution A/RES/79/239
[3] Resolution A/RES/79/239

unequal capabilities, and reducing risks to international peace and security?

Background Examples

Military AI applications extend beyond weapons to include planning, logistics, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), and data analysis. To explain this range, Sarah Grand-Clément organizes military tasks into four functional areas: command and control, information management, logistics, and training. These areas cover decision-making and planning, the processing and distribution of information, the movement and supply of personnel and equipment, and the preparation of military personnel[4]. They provide a framework for understanding where AI may support an operation.

The following examples illustrate different applications. They should be understood as capabilities discussed in the sources, rather than evidence that every military has adopted them[5].

Intelligence-Data Processing

AI can support the processing of information through image geolocation, data classification, and pattern recognition. Grand-Clément identifies these as capabilities relevant to cleaning, filtering, and combining information collected through ISR. For example, geolocation helps establish where an image was taken, while pattern recognition can help identify relevant features in visual, written, or audio information[6]. These functions can contribute to the information available to military decision-makers. However, processing information is different from establishing that an assessment is correct or deciding whether a target should be attacked[7].

Collateral-Damage Estimation and Risk Mitigation

Information about civilian activity may help military personnel assess the possible effects of an operation. Under collateral-damage estimation and risk mitigation, Grand-Clément identifies the calculation of basic civilian patterns of life, including broad behavioral patterns and traffic trends[8]. This illustrates how AI-supported information may inform assessments before force is used. However, the existence of this capability does not establish that its assessments are always accurate or that its use has reduced civilian casualties[9]. The example concerns support for military assessment, not a guarantee of civilian protection.

Autonomous Weapon Systems

Autonomous weapon systems introduce a different relationship between technology and the use of force. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), these systems can select and engage targets without further human intervention after initial activation. They use sensor information and generalized target profiles to trigger an application of force, rather than requiring a person to select the specific target at that moment[10]. This raises questions about human judgment and control retained over an attack. Although the system performs autonomous functions, humans remain responsible for fulfilling international humanitarian law obligations[11]. Autonomous weapons do not necessarily use AI, so the two categories should not be treated as interchangeable[12].

[4] Grand-Clément, pp. 12–13
[5] Grand-Clément, p. 14
[6] Grand-Clément, p. 17
[7] Grand-Clément, pp. 27–28, for the limitations of data, transparency, and human control.
[8] Grand-Clément, p. 16
[9] Grand-Clément, pp. 14, 27
[10] ICRC, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Selected Issues
[11] ICRC, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Selected Issues
[12] ICRC, Frequently Asked Questions: Autonomous Weapon Systems

Current Situation

Military applications of artificial intelligence offer potential advantages, but they also raise difficult questions about how military decisions are made and controlled. Resolution A/RES/79/239 brought greater attention to these questions by requesting the UN Secretary-General to seek views on the opportunities and challenges posed by military AI, with a particular focus on applications other than lethal autonomous weapons systems[13]. This broader focus matters because AI can influence an operation before any weapon is used, through the information, assessments, and recommendations available to military personnel[14].

Potential benefits and their limits

AI can help military personnel process large amounts of information, identify patterns, and compare possible courses of action. Grand-Clément explains that these capabilities could improve planning, situational awareness, and speed of analysis. They may also support logistics, equipment maintenance, personnel efficiency, and safety[15]. However, these are potential benefits rather than guaranteed outcomes. Their value depends on the quality of the system, the information available to it, and the conditions in which it operates. Faster analysis does not necessarily mean a more accurate assessment or a better decision.[16]

Data quality and reliability

One of the main challenges is that AI depends on data that may be incomplete, fragmented, outdated, or poorly managed. A system trained on limited information may struggle when conditions differ from those represented in its training data. During an operation, changes on the ground may also occur faster than information can be collected and updated. As a result, a technically functioning system may still produce an assessment that does not reflect the situation facing military personnel. Grand-Clément therefore treats data quality as a wider organizational problem, not simply a weakness of an algorithm[17].

Reliability also depends on protecting systems against manipulation. False or deliberately poisoned data can distort analysis, while adversarial attacks can exploit weaknesses in a system. Large language models present an additional concern because they may produce plausible but incorrect information[18]. These limitations make verification important, particularly when an output could influence decisions affecting human life. The ICRC's recent recommendations emphasize reliable data, rigorous testing, and the ability of users to challenge AI outputs[19].

Human judgment and responsibility

Another concern is whether users can understand and critically assess an AI system's recommendations. Some systems provide outputs without a clear explanation of how they reached them. This makes it harder to identify mistakes or challenge an assessment[20]. Keeping a person involved does not fully address the problem if that person lacks the information, training, or time needed to evaluate the result. The ICRC warns that users may end up approving AI-generated outputs rather than exercising independent judgment[21].

The legal question is therefore not simply whether AI should be permitted in military operations. Resolution A/RES/79/239 affirms that international law applies to military AI throughout its life cycle[22]. The challenge is ensuring compliance in practice. In its 2025 submission to the Secretary-General, the ICRC argues that AI decision-support systems should assist human

[13] Resolution A/RES/79/239
[14] Grand-Clément, pp. 9–10, 25
[15] Grand-Clément, pp. 25–26
[16] Grand-Clément, pp. 30–31
[17] Grand-Clément, p. 27
[18] Grand-Clément, pp. 28–29
[19] ICRC, "Frequently asked questions: AI decision-support systems in armed conflict" (2026)
[20] Grand-Clément, pp. 27–28
[21] The ICRC decision-support FAQ (2026)
[22] Resolution A/RES/79/239

decision-making rather than displace it. It emphasizes preserving human judgment, conducting legal reviews, training users, and maintaining accountability. These are the ICRC's recommendations, not measures that all states have agreed to adopt[23].

Overreliance and operational tempo

Heavy reliance on AI may also change how military personnel approach their work. Users may concentrate on information a system can process while overlooking context that does not fit easily into its inputs. Over time, delegating planning and analysis could weaken the skills personnel need when technology fails or becomes unavailable. Grand-Clément presents these as potential risks, while acknowledging that their effects depend on how AI is introduced and used[24].

Speed creates a related tension. Faster analysis may be useful, but a faster operational tempo could leave less opportunity to question recommendations. This does not mean that AI inevitably removes human control. Grand-Clément stresses that the effect depends on the operational context and the roles people retain. The issue is whether speed supports informed judgment or makes meaningful scrutiny more difficult[25].

Coordination and remaining uncertainty

Joint operations create further difficulties because participating forces may use different datasets, algorithms, and standards. Their systems may produce different recommendations, while their governments may disagree about acceptable uses of AI. Coordination therefore requires more than technical compatibility; it also requires a shared approach to how outputs are assessed and used. The wider consequences remain uncertain, including for applications considered relatively low risk. Assessing military AI requires attention to how individual systems influence later decisions and the operation as a whole[26].

Role of the United Nations

The United Nations addresses military AI through several institutions and processes, each with a different role. Its work provides a forum for states to discuss the opportunities and risks of these technologies and consider possible international responses. Although discussions on military AI predate 2024, the General Assembly adopted its first resolution specifically addressing AI in the military domain during its seventy-ninth session. This marked an important step toward considering military applications beyond lethal autonomous weapons systems[27].



On the recommendation of the First Committee, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 79/239, entitled "Artificial intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security," on 24 December 2024. The resolution addresses the opportunities and challenges associated with military AI, affirms the applicability of international law throughout its life cycle, and encourages states to consider responsible approaches to its use. It also requested a Secretary-General's report informed by the views of states and other stakeholders, including international and regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, civil society, industry, and the scientific community[28].

[23] ICRC, "Artificial intelligence in the military domain: ICRC submits recommendations to UN Secretary-General" (2025)
[24] Grand-Clément, p. 29
[25] Grand-Clément, pp. 29–31
[26] Grand-Clément, pp. 30–32
[27] UNODA, "Artificial intelligence in the military domain,"
[28] Resolution A/RES/79/239

A separate but related process takes place under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems continued its work through two five-day sessions, held on 3–7 March and 1–5 September 2025. Its mandate was to consider and formulate, by consensus, elements of a possible instrument, without predetermining its nature, alongside other possible measures. This process focuses on lethal autonomous weapons systems, while the broader military AI agenda also addresses applications outside those systems[29].

The Secretary-General and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs also support these discussions through reporting and access to information. Pursuant to Resolution 79/239, the Secretary-General submitted report A/80/78 on military AI's implications for international peace and security, focusing specifically on areas other than lethal autonomous weapons systems. The report draws on submissions from states and other stakeholders, which are also made available through UNODA's documents library. These materials provide a basis for further discussion of different concerns and priorities[30].

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) contributes through research and dialogue. Its publications help explain military AI applications, their limitations, and questions surrounding governance and responsible use. This research can support delegates as they assess policy options. However, UNIDIR publications should be distinguished from negotiated UN decisions: Grand-Clément's report, for example, specifies that its views are the author's responsibility and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations or UNIDIR[31].

Landmark UN Resolutions

The General Assembly has addressed this issue through resolutions on both lethal autonomous weapons systems and the broader military use of AI. These documents provide a basis for further discussion, but their requests for reporting and consultation should not be confused with the adoption of a binding treaty.

Resolution 78/241: Lethal autonomous weapons systems

Adopted on 22 December 2023, Resolution 78/241 requested the Secretary-General to collect views on the challenges raised by lethal autonomous weapons systems, including humanitarian, legal, security, technological, and ethical concerns. It also called for consideration of the role of humans in the use of force. By requesting a report reflecting the full range of views, the resolution created a basis for further discussion among Member States rather than prescribing a single regulatory approach[32].

Resolution 79/62: Lethal autonomous weapons systems

Adopted on 2 December 2024, Resolution 79/62 continued this discussion by mandating open informal consultations to consider the Secretary-General's report and improve understanding of the issues involved. These consultations took place on 12–13 May 2025. Their significance was to provide an additional opportunity for states and other participants to discuss concerns and possible responses. The consultations complemented the ongoing work of the Group of Governmental Experts under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons; they did not themselves establish a treaty-negotiating mandate[33].

[29] UNODA's GGE meeting
[30] UNODA, "Artificial intelligence in the military domain
[31] Grand-Clément, *Artificial Intelligence Beyond Weapons*, p. 2
[32] UNGA. 2023. *Lethal autonomous weapons systems*, A/RES/78/241 (2023)
[33] UNGA. 2024. *Lethal autonomous weapons systems*, A/RES/79/62 (2024)

Resolution 79/239: Artificial intelligence in the military domain

Adopted on 24 December 2024, Resolution 79/239 broadened the General Assembly's attention beyond autonomous weapons. It affirms that international law applies throughout the life cycle of military AI and encourages states to address its opportunities and challenges. It also recognizes the need to bridge differences in countries' capacities regarding responsible military AI. Importantly, it requested a Secretary-General's report focusing on applications other than lethal autonomous weapons systems. This wider scope makes the resolution particularly relevant to AI-supported analysis, planning, and other military functions discussed in this brief[34].

Country and Bloc Positions

States differ over whether or how military AI should be regulated, which safeguards are necessary, and whether existing international law needs to be supplemented by new rules. The positions below distinguish the broader military AI debate from the more specific question of autonomous weapons. They draw primarily on official submissions and statements from 2025.

The African Union (AU): promotes the sovereign equality, development and security of its 55 Member States in the international system. AU resolutions tend to stress general principles, relevant to all of its Member States. It occasionally gets involved in regional conflicts, even authorizing peacekeeping missions, but not consistently.

Member States of the African Union are committed to the UN's Sustainable Development Goals and the African Union's Agenda 2063, their 'blueprint and master plan for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future.'[35] They generally see issues before the UN in terms of those priorities. Also important are the anti-colonial priorities of the Non-Aligned Movement. African countries generally welcome foreign development assistance, but increasingly demand sovereign national control over specific projects, a demand that often creates tension with world-be donors, who have their own priorities, especially regarding democratization and accountability.

Above all, the member states of the AU work to ensure African voices are an important part of all UN decisions.[36] Like the Arab League, the African Union leaves actual policy-making up to its Member States. On most issues, each state's parallel membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (below) also can be a reliable guide to their positions.

Arab League: Because of sharp differences among its 22 Member States, the Arab League tends to act cautiously. Member States tend to be strongly committed to multilateral diplomacy, but restrained by divisive national interests.[37]

There are sharp disagreements between Islamist and more secular governments, between Shi'ite dominated Iraq and Sunni dominated countries, and disputes over influence such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.[38] On controversial issues the Arab League is likely to leave policy-making up to each of its Member States.

The biggest exception is any issue relevant to Palestine, on which it is more unified, especially regarding criticism of Israel. Arab League states are likely to see debate on almost any issue in terms relevant to their support for Palestine. On

[34] UNGA. 2024. *Artificial intelligence in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security*, A/RES/79/239 (2024).
[35] 'Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want', African Union, n.d. https://au.int/en/agenda2063/overview; and 'Agenda 2063', Wikipedia, n.d. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agenda_2063
[36] Mogomotsi Magome, 'African leaders press United Nations for permanent seats on Security Council', Associated Press, 24 September 2026, https://apnews.com/article/africa-unga-security-council-reforms-9d29a10a8caf40a4876e2738446d2ee8
[37] 'Algeria's quixotic approach to foreign policy', London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2025, https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/2025/03/algerias-quixotic-approach-to-foreign-policy/
[38] 'Saudi Arabian media steps up attacks on UAE as Gulf rift deepens". Financial Times. 21 January 2026, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20260122-saudi-media-escalates-attacks-on-uae-as-gulf-rift-deepens/

most other issues, each state's parallel membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (below) can be a more reliable guide to their national positions.

China's official policy supports a "people-centered" approach to AI, arguing that humans must remain responsible and that relevant weapon systems must remain under human control. Its April 2025 submission calls for risk assessments, testing, personnel training, and domestic legal and ethical frameworks. It also emphasizes the UN's role and favors international governance based on broad participation and consensus.

At the same time, China argues that regulation should not obstruct innovation or peaceful technological uses. Its security concerns include arms racing, miscalculation, and efforts by major powers to secure absolute military advantage. China therefore presents military AI governance as both a technological issue and a question of international security and cooperation[39].

While others are reducing their reliance on the UN, China is increasing its UN engagement. The great appeal is the UN Charter's emphasis on national sovereign equality, which China sees as supporting its authority at home, and facilitating working with other countries as legal equals.[40] China supports goals established by the UN and international institutions.[41] In the UN, China emphasizes solidary with the Global South and the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement.[42] China stresses the UN as a tool for increasing its influence over global values, a key element in its campaign to make the world more like China itself.

China's UN policy is not without concerns. It fears the UN will be used to create precedents for international action in the domestic affairs of Member States, precedents that could be used against it. As a Chinese UN diplomat said in another context, 'China's continuing and vehement insistence on respect for other nations' sovereignty is not only a cornerstone of its foreign policy but a foundational ethos for the government of a nation that has traditionally struggled to maintain control...'[43]

China examines all proposals to be certain they cannot infringe its sovereignty. It rejects proposals that limit its freedom of action. China defends the sovereignty of all countries, fearful that any chip in the wall of state sovereignty and control could create a precedent that might someday be used against China.

European Union: For the 27 Member States of the EU, multilateral politics is primarily about universal values, ideas that apply to all states equally. EU Member States can be expected to stress an approach that serves the entire international community, not the interests of any particular state, with all countries working toward agreed goals and standards. It often is the most visionary group in the UN system. The EU also is the most generous funder of global development projects, offering grants or subsidized, low-interest loans for major initiatives.

But even the European Union is not as generous as it used to be. Aid money is going down, as it switches funding to defense against Russia. And European aid is highly conditional, to ensure it is spent as planned, efficiently, without fraud. Many EU donor states also make their aid conditional on national goals, like strengthening democracy, rule of law, respect for minorities and female equality.

[39] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, *Opportunities and Challenges Posed to International Peace and Security by the Application of AI in the Military Domain* (21 April 2025)
[40] 'Xi says China always a trustworthy partner of UN', *Xinhua*, 1 September 2025, http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2025-09/01/c_1120831.htm
[41] Wen Sheng, 'China leads global efforts to realize UN sustainable development goals for 2030', *Global Times*, 27 June 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202306/1293251.shtml
[42] 'China calls for more Global South voices to be heard at United Nations', Reuters, 17 June 2026, https://www.internazionale.it/ultime-notizie-reuters/2026/06/17/china-calls-for-more-global-south-voices-to-be-heard-at-united-nations
[43] Ted Anthony, 'China, at UN, warns against 'expansion of the battlefield' in the Ukraine war', *Associated Press*, 28 September 2024, https://apnews.com/article/china-united-nations-general-assembly-51ea58a6cd821656382f06ad0b3b93bc

EU member states are committed to multilateral decision-making, but will work for their distinct national interests. For example, they opposed a UN declaration on international collaboration for pandemic response, because its language on vaccinations threatened to undermine the copyrights of European pharmaceutical firms.[44] Unlike the United States, the EU supported the multilateral goals, but it insisted that intellectual property rights be respected.

India's 2025 submission gives particular attention to evaluating whether military AI is trustworthy. It describes a developing framework based on five principles: reliability and robustness, safety and security, transparency, fairness, and privacy. The framework addresses trustworthiness across the AI life cycle and uses checklists, mathematical measures, and practical methods to evaluate compliance. This makes testing and assessment a concrete element of India's contribution to the debate. However, the framework alone does not establish India's position on every proposed international restriction. Delegates should distinguish its technical approach to trustworthy AI from any separate position on a binding instrument for autonomous weapons[45].

Non-Aligned Movement: The 120 Member States and 18 Observer states of the NAM, the UN's dominant voting bloc, are primarily interested in issues that serve their needs as developing economies and post-colonial states. They seek to reduce poverty and demand faster economic development. The NAM generally supports universal values, such as Chinese or EU efforts to create global standards on these issues. Most are post-colonial states, demanding compensation for past colonial rule.

Where the NAM departs from the EU and other advocates of multilateral action, is on funding and national control. Although many of its members are not poor—its membership includes wealthy oil exporters—the NAM routinely demands that any proposal for action come with increases in foreign aid from wealthier Western countries.

While the NAM welcomes foreign assistance, they can resist the oversight and control that normally comes with it. Such oversight—whether to ensure program goals, to prevent fraud, or support democratization—is seen by some MAN members as a threat to their independence. This sets up a confrontation, a diplomatic challenge, as sides struggle to advance their goals.

The Russian Federation can be unpredictable in UN bodies. Its primary goal in all UN fora is insulating Russian freedom of action in its war with Ukraine, the *Special Military Operation*, to ensure other issues cannot become a wedge allowing discussion of the war or its effects.

Russia's general goal at the UN is defeating the West: Europe, Japan, the United States and other English-speaking democracies. In the words of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 'The Western minority, which dominated for 500 years thanks to others' resources, continues to try to maintain its privileges and impose its own rules on everyone else.' Quoting President Vladimir Putin, he said 'the dictatorship of one hegemon is spiraling out of control – it's dangerous for everyone else'.[46]

Russia usually votes with the Non-Aligned Movement. It can rely on support from socialist countries like Belarus, Cuba, Eritrea, Mali, Nicaragua and sometimes Vietnam. South Africa and African countries that depend on Russian military help also are sympathetic. On particular issues the Russian Federation can work with China, Iran and North Korea.[47] Under the

[44] Apoorva Mandavilli, 'U.S. Rejects U.N. declaration on preparing for future pandemics', New York Times, 25 September 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/25/us/politics/us-rejects-un-declaration-on-preparing-for-pandemics.html

[45] Government of India, *UNSG Submission: AI in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security*, revised submission (2025)

[46] Russian Federation. His Excellency Sergey Lavrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 26 September 2026, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/russian-federation

[47] 'General Assembly debates Russian Federation's Security Council veto of European amendments seeking 'Just' Peace in Ukraine', *United Nations*, 6 March 2025, https://press.un.org/en/2025/ga12677.doc.htm

leadership of President Trump, the United States cooperates with Russia, albeit unpredictably.[48]

Ukraine: Ukraine presents military AI as a means of strengthening its defensive capabilities while acknowledging substantial risks. In its submission responding to Resolution 79/239, it identifies concerns about arms racing, cyber interference, excessive reliance on AI, and the loss of human control over critical processes. It also warns that the rushed integration of insufficiently developed systems, particularly those with flawed target-identification capabilities, may increase civilian harm. Ukraine has participated in international responsible-AI initiatives and co-sponsored Resolution 79/239. Its position illustrates that support for developing military AI can coexist with demands for safeguards, legal compliance, and continued human control[49].

The United States favors what it calls 'practical measures', including testing, personnel training, oversight, and accountability, supported by its Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy. However, it opposes restrictions it considers premature or overly broad and rejects establishing a new UN regulatory process for military AI[50].

Current US policy strives to minimize the role of the UN in almost all matters, including AI. Cutting UN budgets is a prominent American goal on any issue.[51] Expect American diplomats to emphasize reducing the cost and impact of any UN initiative. The US votes against resolutions unless they clearly serve the policies of President Trump. The ideal UN initiative, for the US, allows Member States to do as they please.

Under President Trump, the United States rejects core values of the UN Charter, stressing instead the maximization of American power. In the President's words, 'The United Nations has great, great potential. I've said that for many years, but it must stop imposing the far left agenda of globalist bureaucrats who nobody ever elected.'[52] It gets international support from conservative governments in countries like Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador and Israel, and sometimes from dependent countries like Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine.

A major US goal is defeating initiatives it associates with Diversity, Equality and Inclusion (DEI, or *wokeness*), usually meaning support for previously marginalized social groups, like women, ethnic and gender minorities.[53] U.S. officials at the UN also oppose resolutions that could help marginalized groups. This approach is especially relevant to AI investment, which the Trump administration advocates, but warns of a take-over by woke values.[54]

American UN diplomacy often is personal, seeking to enhance the wealth of President Donald Trump, his family and friends. The US often prefers working with authoritarian leaders who can be more responsive than democracies. A real estate deal with the President's family, involving land in a host country, might bring American support on other issues.[55] Regardless of the topic, American leaders welcome money-making

[48] James Landale and Patrick Jackson, 'US sides with Russia in UN resolutions on Ukraine', *BBC News*, 25 February 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c7435pnle0go
[49] Ukraine, *Submission in connection with Resolution 79/239* (2025)
[50] United States of America, *Submission pursuant to Resolution 79/239* (2025)
[51] Amy Mackinnon, Waltz vows to take Trump's chainsaw to the United Nations', *Politico*, 15 June 2025, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/15/mike-waltz-un-ambassador-hearing-00454617
[52] United States of America. His Excellency Donald Trump, President. New York: United Nations, 22 September 2026, https://gadebate.un.org/en/81/united-states-america
[53] Carter Sherman, 'Trump administration to block aid from subsidizing DEI and trans rights overseas', Guardian, 22 January 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/jan/22/trump-foreign-aid-dei-trans-rights
[54] Sarah Davis, 'US only country to oppose UN resolution correcting Africa's size on world maps', The Hill, 5 September 2026, https://thehill.com/policy/international/6072979-us-opposes-un-map-resolution-africa/
[55] Isaac Stanley-Becker, 'The Trump family sparks a revolution in Albania', The Atlantic, 23 July 2026, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/2026/07/trump-kushner-flamingo-revolution-albania/688030/

opportunities through real estate, cryptocurrency and control over oil and mining.[56]

Implications for Debate

These positions suggest possible cooperation on testing, training, legal compliance, and human responsibility. The more difficult question is how to translate those objectives into international measures without either weakening safeguards or restricting legitimate applications. Delegates should therefore distinguish agreement on broad principles from agreement on precise obligations, legal form, and negotiating procedures.

Some Proposals for Action

The Member States of the UN General Assembly are free to choose any path of action—or non-action—that they prefer. As sovereign states, they are not bound by the precedence of past UN resolutions, or even by their own votes. But they are limited by the UN's preference for consensus decisions when possible, and a majority vote when necessary. Unlike resolutions of the Security Council, General Assembly resolutions are not enforceable. A Member State that votes against a GA resolution is likely to ignore it even if it passes.

Delegates at ODUMUNC 50 can consider several approaches to regulating military AI. These options are not mutually exclusive: states could support practical safeguards while continuing discussions on additional international rules. The challenge is to identify measures that address humanitarian and security risks, remain workable in military operations, and attract sufficient international support.

Strengthen human oversight: Delegates could recommend safeguards to ensure that AI supports rather than replaces human judgment. These could include training personnel to assess recommendations critically, identifying decisions that require human authorization, and ensuring that users have sufficient time and information to question system outputs. The ICRC warns that the speed and scale of AI-generated recommendations can encourage users to approve them without adequate scrutiny. Any proposal should therefore explain what effective oversight requires, rather than simply call for a human to remain involved[57].

Establish common testing and review practices: Another option is to develop shared expectations for evaluating military AI before deployment and throughout its use. These could address data quality, performance under changing conditions, resistance to manipulation, and the circumstances requiring renewed assessment after a system is modified. The objective would be to identify limitations before they affect operations. Delegates would need to consider who conducts these assessments, what evidence should be retained, and how common practices could accommodate different applications. UNIDIR's roadmap provides a basis for considering risk management and governance across the military AI life cycle[58].

Promote transparency and confidence-building: States could exchange information about national policies, oversight procedures, and approaches to managing military AI risks. Delegates might also consider voluntary channels for discussing incidents or unexpected system behavior. Such measures could support trust without requiring states to disclose sensitive operational details. However, proposals should specify what information would be shared and how confidentiality would be protected. UNIDIR identifies confidence-building and international

[56] Anatoly Kurmanaev, Tyler Pager and Rebecca R. Ruiz, 'Trump brought Venezuelan gold to the U.S., but refiners won't touch it', New York Times, 28 September 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/28/world/americas/venezuela-gold-trump.html

[57] ICRC, "UN Security Council: We cannot let AI be deployed on the battlefield without oversight and regulation" (26 September 2025)

[58] UNIDIR, *Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: An Evidence-Based Road Map for Future Policy Action* (2025)

cooperation as important components of future policy action[59].

Consider additional international rules: Delegates could discuss whether existing legal obligations should be supplemented by more specific commitments. They should distinguish rules concerning autonomous weapons from measures addressing other military AI applications. Options might include political commitments, technical standards, or recommendations for further negotiations. Disagreement over legal form should not prevent discussion of concrete safeguards. The ICRC has called for structured international discussions on military AI, while UNIDIR's roadmap offers options for advancing governance.

Support capacity-building and inclusive participation: Finally, delegates could recommend technical assistance, training, and opportunities to exchange expertise. These measures could help states assess military AI risks and participate more effectively in international discussions. A workable proposal should identify who would provide assistance, how it would be funded, and how developing countries would help determine its priorities. UNIDIR's roadmap emphasizes capacity-building and inclusive cooperation as part of a broader governance approach.

[59] The same UNIDIR roadmap (2025)

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