



Promoting peaceful use of civilian nuclear power

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Introduction

The world stands at a crossroads. Energy, something we once took for granted, has become one of the most urgent and divisive challenges of our time. Every nation is trying to balance two competing truths: the hunger for economic growth and the moral imperative to protect our planet. Somewhere between those two lies nuclear power clean, powerful, and controversial.

Unlike fossil fuels, civilian nuclear energy produces vast amounts of electricity without releasing the greenhouse gases that are destroying the climate. In 2020 alone, it helped the United States, for example, to avoid more than 471 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions the equivalent of taking one hundred million cars off the road (U.S. Department of Energy, 2021).

Yet, nuclear energy remains haunted by its own paradox. It promises salvation from climate disaster, but it carries memories of the disaster at

Chernobyl in 1986, Fukushima in 2011, and the long shadow of the atomic bomb. Its potential to light up cities exists alongside its capacity to devastate them.



France's Saint-Laurent nuclear facilities, with two 900 MW civilian nuclear power reactors, on the left, and their cooling towers on the right. Source: Saint-Laurent Nuclear Power Plant, *Wikimedia*, 2022.

The same nuclear technology that can be used to generate civilian electricity also can enrich highly pure produce fissile plutonium and uranium, suitable for nuclear weapons. The great riddle of nuclear energy is how to promote nuclear power, while not inadvertently facilitating nuclear weapons proliferation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created to manage that dilemma.

The basic tools of the IAEA are *Safeguards* and *Verification*. *Safeguards* are agreements, pledging countries to use their civilian nuclear facilities only for that purpose. *Verification* involves cameras and inspections, required by safeguard agreements, to ensure timely warning of suspicious activity. Safeguards and verification are negotiated between nuclear technology importers, their exports, and the IAEA.

As the world's energy demand continues to soar, this tension has become impossible to ignore. Do we embrace nuclear power as a cornerstone of sustainable growth or shy away from it out of fear and mistrust?

This ODUMUNC issue brief examines that dilemma. It traces the evolution of nuclear energy from its Cold War origins to its modern role in clean energy transitions, explores the latest technological innovations that might make it safer and more efficient, and evaluates the role of international institutions especially International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to manage the risk and help ensure that this immense power remains a tool for peace, not destruction.

At stake is more than energy policy. It's a question of global cooperation, technological responsibility, and what kind of future humanity is willing to build when faced with both opportunity and danger in the same atom.




Iran's Bushehr civilian nuclear power reactor, on the Persian Gulf, 1,200 km (746 miles) south of Tehran. *Source:* 'Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant temporarily shutdown - state TV', *Reuters*, 20 June 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-bushehr-nuclear-power-plant-temporarily-shutdown-state-tv-2021-06-20/>

Background

The global commitment to expanding access to peaceful nuclear power and technologies is

rooted in a fundamental nexus of twenty-first-century challenges: the critical need for sustainable energy, the urgency of climate action, and the persistent requirements of international security and non-proliferation. This environment demands a “both-and” approach, balancing the monumental benefits of nuclear technology against its inherent safety and security risks (IAEA., 2024a; Stott & Kirsten, 2023).




Showing the extraordinary efficiency of nuclear power. A reactor is not very large, compared to the power it generates. Typical civilian light-water nuclear reactor vessel. The Pennsylvania Shippingport Atomic Power Station in 1956, *Wikimedia*, 2007.

At the foundation of this issue lies the reality of global energy poverty and the pursuit of sustainable development goals (SDGs). Energy is central to the UN SDGs and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change because ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy can unlock opportunities for billions through economic growth, job creation, and improved health and education (United Nations, 2015).

Currently, over two billion people still rely on traditional biomass for cooking, and projections indicate that 670 million people will continue to lack access to electricity in 2030,

with most of these individuals residing in Sub-Saharan Africa (IEA, 2023).

To address this deficit while meeting global climate targets, there is an increasing need for clean, affordable energy sources, particularly for baseload power plants. Nuclear power is recognized as a low-carbon energy source and is considered an indispensable tool for achieving the SDGs. Together, nuclear and hydropower provide about 75% of the world's low-carbon electricity, and nuclear energy offers zero-carbon baseload power that can support energy-intensive activities such as desalination and advanced technologies like artificial intelligence (IAEA, 2024b; World Nuclear Association, 2023).



Countries with the largest nuclear power production capacity. Source: 'Five countries account for 71% of the world's nuclear generation capacity', US Energy Information Administration, 2025, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65904>

However, the expansion of nuclear energy is inextricably linked to international security concerns due to the technology's dual-use potential. Historically, the development of nuclear weapons programs in several states, including India and North Korea, originated from their civilian nuclear energy initiatives (Scheinman, 2015). The ongoing concern is that malign or ambitious states may pursue energy programs with hidden intentions for nuclear weapons, especially within contexts of weak international controls (Fukuyama & Rinne, 2021).

To mitigate this existential risk, the international community established multilateral frameworks centered on the IAEA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The IAEA was founded in 1957 following U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech, works to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy while inhibiting its military use (Eisenhower, 1953; IAEA, 2024a).

The NPT was negotiated in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. It remains the cornerstone of global non-proliferation efforts, aiming to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and requiring all non-nuclear powers to negotiate safeguards agreements with the IAEA (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2020). Within these frameworks, the central mission is the implementation of the 3S concept: nuclear safety, security, and safeguards. Each aspect reinforces the others for instance, strong physical protection (security) also reduces the risk of diversion (safeguards) and accidents (safety) (IAEA, 2024a).

For countries, particularly developing nations, considering nuclear energy program, the path is long and resource-intensive, often requiring 10 to 15 years to develop the necessary infrastructure and construct the first nuclear power plant. This commitment involves substantial investment and careful planning to establish legal and regulatory frameworks, human resources, and physical infrastructure such as electrical grids and waste management facilities.

The IAEA's *Milestones Approach* serves as the main management framework to guide member states through this process, covering 19 different infrastructure issues across three phases. Phase 1 requires countries to conduct comprehensive studies to enable a knowledgeable governmental decision on whether to commit to a nuclear power program (IAEA, 2024b).

Ultimately, the background of this issue is characterized by the tension between the

necessity of low-carbon, baseload energy for development and climate goals and the persistent challenge of ensuring that nuclear technology is used responsibly and securely. While challenges persist including geopolitical divisions regarding resource allocation within the IAEA and public apprehension about safety and waste management the global consensus, reflected in recent international declarations to triple nuclear energy capacity by 2050, underlines a renewed commitment to advancing peaceful nuclear technologies under the highest standards of safety, sustainability, and non-proliferation (IAEA, 2024c; World Nuclear Association, 2023).


Current Situation

For over half a century, nuclear energy has quietly carried much of the world's climate burden. These technologies have prevented billions of tons of carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere. Yet, for all that progress, nuclear power now stands at a precarious point both indispensable and distrusted.

In much of the developed world, the story is one of retreat. Reactors built in the 1970s and 80s are aging out, and new projects are bogged down by cost overruns, lawsuits, and fear. Whole nations Germany, Austria, even Italy have turned away completely, choosing public reassurance over long-term energy security. The International Energy Agency (2019) has warned that this withdrawal could have real consequences: if nuclear power continues to fade, the world could lose one of its most reliable low-carbon energy sources, forcing an even heavier dependence on natural gas and coal. It's quiet but dangerous trade stability for popularity.

The IEA's advice is blunt: act now or face the cost later. Governments, it argues, must keep existing plants alive, incentivize new construction, and invest in safer, smaller, and smarter designs that restore public trust. The

choice is not between nuclear and renewable it's between maintaining a balanced, stable grid or risking a future of rolling blackouts and broken climate pledges (IEA, 2019).




Cumulative CO2 emissions avoided by global nuclear power in selected countries, 1971-2018.
Source: The International Energy Agency (IEA), 2019.

As of 2023, civilian nuclear power generates around 10% of global electricity, with roughly 440 reactors operating across more than 30 countries (World Nuclear Association, 2025). That number might sound modest, but it represents an enormous share of the world's consistent, carbon-free baseload energy. And after a long period of stagnation, something interesting almost paradoxical is happening nuclear power is being rediscovered. The same governments that once promised to phase it out are now quietly reconsidering. With fossil fuel prices climbing and geopolitical tensions tightening around oil and gas supplies, nuclear power is beginning to look less like a luxury and more like a necessity.

The next wave of reactors tells a different story than the old concrete giants of the Cold War. Nations like Canada, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are investing in small modular reactors (SMRs) compact systems

designed for flexibility, safety, and cost-efficiency. Others, like China and Russia, are pushing forward with advanced Generation IV technologies that promise not only better safety margins but also the ability to recycle spent fuel. These innovations suggest a future where nuclear energy might finally overcome its stigma, offering clean power without the ghosts of Chernobyl and Fukushima (IAEA, 2024).

And yet, politics remain thorny. The same reactors that light up cities can, in theory, produce the fissile material for bombs. That dual nature, peaceful and perilous, keeps nuclear energy locked in a kind of moral limbo. Countries like France and South Korea proudly fold nuclear into their climate strategies, but others view it as an unacceptable risk. Germany calls it outdated. Austria calls it immoral. The result is a fractured global landscape one half racing toward nuclear revival, the other retreating into renewables and caution (World Nuclear Association, 2025).



Source: IEA

Nowhere is this tension more visible than in the case of Iran. For decades, Tehran has insisted its nuclear program is aimed solely at peaceful development, energy independence, scientific progress, and even medical research. Yet, the international community, led by the International Atomic Energy Agency, has documented evidence suggesting activities that could have military dimensions (IAEA, 2023; Fitzpatrick, 2022). Iran's program sits precisely at the fault line between trust and fear the same line that defines the nuclear debate itself. To some, Iran's

ambition reflects the right of every sovereign state to pursue clean energy. To others, it's proof that the promise of "peaceful use" is never entirely innocent.

That ambiguity haunts nuclear energy everywhere. Every reactor that hums with clean power also carries the potential for destruction. Every promise of progress depends on global cooperation that is fragile, imperfect, and deeply political. The world needs nuclear power more than ever the climate crisis makes that painfully clear, yet the world also fears it more than ever. What we're watching, in real time, is an uneasy reckoning: can humanity embrace the atom without succumbing to it?

Country and Bloc Positions

China has reimagined nuclear power as the cornerstone of a low-carbon industrial strategy. With more than 55 operational reactors and 20 under construction, it is now the fastest-growing nuclear energy producer in the world (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2024). Beijing's ambitions extend beyond energy security.

Under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), nuclear cooperation has become a vehicle for projecting influence, offering turnkey reactor packages to countries from Pakistan and Bangladesh to Kenya.

China's model state financing, rapid construction, and tight technology control differs sharply from the Western emphasis on transparency and competitive bidding. At home, nuclear power is part of a broader effort to cut coal dependence and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.

Yet internationally, its dual identity as both a civil power and an opaque one-party state raises persistent concerns about standards, safeguards, and intellectual property protection.

In the IAEA, China support exports of civilian nuclear power. It usually requires strict IAEA safeguards to prevent misuse. It generally accepts international limits on exports of nuclear fuel-cycle (plutonium and uranium creation) technology that could help nuclear bomb breakouts. But China also made the greatest exception of any exporter (besides North Korea and Pakistan), helping Pakistan develop a complete nuclear fuel infrastructure.

Beijing's growing self-confidence in exporting reactors mirrors its broader geopolitical rise: nuclear power as both an energy source and a symbol of modern Chinese capability.

European Union (EU): For most of the 27 Member States of the EU, nuclear power is an essential source of civilian electricity. The EU works closely with the IAEA to ensure the safety of nuclear energy. Although some of its members, like Germany, are ambivalent, the EU works closely with the IAEA to promote civilian nuclear energy exports. The EU leads global efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguard agreements with importing countries, and verification procedures to ensure civilian nuclear technology cannot be used militarily.

France: France's nuclear story is one of endurance. Since the 1970s oil shocks, the country has treated nuclear energy not as an option but as a national identity. Today, roughly 70% of French electricity comes from nuclear plants the highest share in the world (World Nuclear Association, 2025).

That legacy has made Paris both a defender and an exporter of nuclear technology, led by Électricité de France (EDF) and Framatome. Under President Macron, France has reversed earlier plans to reduce nuclear reliance and committed to building at least six new EPR2 reactors by 2035. It also spearheads the EU's "pro-nuclear" coalition, alongside Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Finland, arguing that Europe cannot achieve carbon neutrality without nuclear energy.

France's advocacy faces pushback from other EU countries like Austria and Germany, which continue to see nuclear power as antithetical to environmental progress. That intra-European tension weakens the EU's collective voice in global energy diplomacy, leaving France to act as nuclear Europe's de facto ambassador.

Germany: After Japan's Fukushima disaster in 2011, Berlin doubled down on its *Energiewende*, a full nuclear phase-out paired with a massive investment in renewable energy, especially wind power, as well as natural gas. Closing its nuclear power plants was the most important demand of the Green Party, then part of the ruling coalition.

In April 2023, Germany became the first country to end its use of nuclear power, and shut down its last three reactors, ending six decades of nuclear generation (German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, 2024).



The cooling tower of a closed German civilian power reaction is destroyed in 2019. 'Germany is closing all its nuclear power plants', *CNN*, 30 November 2019, <https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/30/europe/germany-nuclear-waste-grm-intl>

The German move always was controversial. Critics argue that the exit made Germany more dependent on coal and imported gas, undermining its climate goals and energy security. The energy crisis following Russia's invasion of Ukraine reignited the debate, forcing

temporary reactor life extensions and prompting quiet admissions among policymakers that the transition may have been too abrupt. For Germany, the anti-nuclear stance was moral as much as technical a belief that technological progress must be bound by democratic accountability and environmental precaution.

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Germany ended its reliance on Russian natural gas. Instead it now gets most of its energy from Middle Eastern gas and some from local wind power. Germany is considering creation of new civilian nuclear reactors, but remains uncertain.

Ghana: Among Africa's aspiring nuclear states, Ghana has emerged as the most methodical and internationally respected. Guided by the IAEA's Milestones Approach, it successfully completed Phase 1 and moved into preparatory Phase 2, signaling readiness for infrastructure development (IAEA, 2023). The establishment of the Ghana Nuclear Regulatory Authority (GNRA) and the Ghana Nuclear Power Programme Organisation (GNPPO) has created an institutional model admired by other developing states.

Ghana's approach is patient, transparent, and anchored in human capacity building shows that nuclear development can align with responsible governance. It has turned what might have been a risky ambition into a symbol of technological confidence across the African Union.

In the IAEA, Ghana leads efforts to ensure all countries use their nuclear power exclusively for civilian purpose. It opposes demands by some other developing countries that suppliers export complete nuclear fuel cycles, the ability to create fissile plutonium and uranium, which would enable nuclear proliferation.

India is a leading voice in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It strongly advocates civilian nuclear power. It demands that supplier countries respect developing countries right to nuclear energy. But it accepts limits one exports of nuclear fuel cycle (plutonium and uranium

creating) technology and accepts IAEA safeguards to prevent misuse of civilian facilities.

Its nuclear program is large and growing, neither fully inside the global non-proliferation framework nor outside of it. Excluded from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India built its civilian program largely independently, guided by the principle of "strategic autonomy." Today it operates 23 reactors with plans to expand nuclear power's share of electricity generation from 3% to about 10% by 2031 (Department of Atomic Energy, India, 2024). Its three-stage program from pressurized heavy-water reactors to fast breeder and thorium-based systems reflects long-term scientific ambition.

The 2008 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement legitimized India's access to global technology markets without forcing disarmament concessions, a diplomatic coup that continues to shape South Asia's energy politics. For New Delhi, nuclear power is not merely an energy source but a statement of sovereignty a declaration that it will pursue modernity on its own terms, bound by global norms but not defined by them.

Iran is a strong advocate of civilian nuclear power, demanding that all countries be allowed full access to civilian nuclear technology. It is very critical of efforts by nuclear supplier countries to restrict access to civilian nuclear power, and insists that recipient countries—like itself—are best positioned to judge how to control the risks of military use.

Tehran insists that all its nuclear activities are aimed solely at civilian electrical energy generation and nuclear medical research production under IAEA safeguards. But widespread suspicion that it has the ability to build nuclear weapons at will have fueled great controversy, culminating in the twelve-day June 2025 United States. The war destroyed many of the uranium fabrication facilities associated with its military nuclear weapons program, but left its civilian facilities.

Previously suspicion of Iran's latent weapons capability led to negotiation in 2015 of The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), an international agreement that curtailed Iran's uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. President Trump withdrew the U.S. from the agreement in 2018, and Iran gradually withdrew, leaving the agreement in disarray.

Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, built with Russian assistance, provides a modest share of its electricity, yet its symbolic importance is immense a reminder to regional rivals that technological mastery confers leverage. For much of the Middle East, Iran's example embodies the central tension of the nuclear age: the fine line between peaceful power and nuclear weapons.

Japan's return to nuclear energy is cautious but inevitable. After the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in 2011, nearly all the country's nuclear reactors were shut down. Yet a decade later, rising energy costs and climate commitments have forced reconsideration.

The current government aims to restart up to two-thirds of the country's reactors and extend operating lifespans beyond 60 years (Japan Atomic Energy Agency, 2024). Safety reforms are among the strictest in the world, with new oversight by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). The policy shift is pragmatic: Japan imports nearly 90% of its energy, and nuclear power offers a domestic, carbon-free alternative.

Still, the emotional and political scars of Fukushima run deep, keeping the nuclear debate fraught and fragile. In the IAEA, Japan leads efforts to ensure all countries use their nuclear power exclusively for civilian purpose. It opposes demands by some other developing countries that suppliers export complete nuclear fuel cycles, the ability to create fissile plutonium and uranium, which would enable nuclear proliferation.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): The 120 member states of the Non-Aligned Movement, mostly post-colonial developing countries, insist

they have full rights to exploit civilian nuclear power. Virtually all are parties to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which assures their rights to civilian nuclear energy in exchange for giving up interest in military applications. The NAM countries mostly accept IAEA Safeguards on their nuclear facilities, to ensure they are compliant with the NPT. In exchange, they demand easier and cheaper access to nuclear facilities

An important split in the NAM concerns how much nuclear technology. Some hardliners, led by India and Pakistan, insist on access to all civilian technology, include the full nuclear fuel cycle, the ability to generate their own fissile nuclear plutonium and uranium for their civilian reactors. Others, led by Argentina, Brazil and Indonesia, accept that this is too provocative and would lead to the spread of nuclear weapons.

Russian Federation: Russia sees nuclear power not just as an energy asset but as a diplomatic weapon. Its state corporation, Rosatom, functions as an arm of foreign policy an enterprise that builds dependency as much as it builds reactors. Rosatom currently manages over \$130 billion in foreign orders, spanning projects like the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in Turkey and El Dabaa in Egypt (World Nuclear Association, 2025). Each project is bundled with Russian financing, long-term fuel supply, and even training programs that tie host countries into Moscow's orbit for decades.

Domestically, nuclear power provides about 20% of Russia's electricity, but its strategic importance far exceeds that figure. In the wake of Western sanctions, Rosatom remains one of the few Russian firms with sustained global reach. Nuclear exports thus serve both as soft power and as a sanctions-proof economic lifeline. Moscow's approach deliberately blurs the line between commerce and coercion, presenting itself as a reliable partner while embedding long-term strategic leverage across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

In the IAEA, the Russian Federation is a strong advocate of exports of civilian nuclear



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power. But it also requires strict IAEA safeguards to prevent misuse. It accepts international limits on exports of nuclear fuel-cycle (plutonium and uranium creation) technology that could help nuclear bomb breakouts.

The United States remains the world's largest producer of nuclear electricity, yet its relationship with the atom has grown ambivalent. It no longer is a major exporter.

At home, nuclear power supplies roughly 20% of total electricity and nearly half of all carbon-free energy (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2024). The Biden administration's climate strategy explicitly ties national decarbonization goals to a "nuclear revival," aiming to triple capacity by 2050 through advanced small modular reactors (SMRs) and life-extensions for existing plants. Still, the reality beneath that optimism is more uneven. High construction costs, aging infrastructure, and political resistance at the state level have slowed progress.

Internationally, Washington's influence now rests as much on policy as on persuasion. Through the Department of Energy and the State Department's "Nuclear Fuels Working Group," the U.S. promotes what it calls "responsible nuclear leadership," combining export controls with financing for clean-energy cooperation. Yet it faces an uncomfortable truth: as Russia and China race ahead in building and exporting reactors, America's dominance in the civil nuclear marketplace and the norms that come with it has visibly eroded.

Some Possible Proposals for Action

As sovereign states, the members of the IAEA are free to develop the proposals they believe best serve their individual needs. In practice, the cooperate on major issues like safeguards

agreements and on-site verification procedures, to ensure misuse for military purposes is impossible, or detected early.

Focus IAEA attention on specific countries suspected of misusing civilian nuclear technology for military purposes.

For many Western and like-minded countries, this means focusing most on Iran. India, North Korea and Pakistan, countries that have nuclear weapons programs, but are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and their military programs currently are outside the IAEA. For many NAM member states, the focus of attention is Israel. But other countries might be identified as a special source of risk.

The IAEA could agree on new mandatory safeguard agreements for these countries, possibly conditional on complete openness to inspections and verification of all nuclear facilities, including military facilities. It could demand all Member States cease nuclear cooperation of all forms. But it has to be careful that its actions do not push target countries to do exactly what others fear most.

Create a new global fund to facilitate nuclear exports and imports. For NAM Member States especially, the high cost of nuclear energy is a barrier they cannot overcome alone. China has been helpful with loans as part of its Belt and Road program for global infrastructure development.

But NAM countries say more is needed. The IAEA could ask exports to better subsidize nuclear exports. It also could call on the World Bank to finance nuclear energy at lower interest rates.

But this will face criticism from countries with economies reliant on fossil fuel exports, gas and oil. They can be expected to oppose such initiatives, as unfairly favoring a particular sector, and abandoning international economic neutrality.

Strengthen IAEA Technical Cooperation Programs: Expand funding for IAEA's *Peaceful*



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Uses Initiative to help developing nations (especially in Africa and Asia) build safe nuclear infrastructure through training, technology transfer, and capacity development.

Enhance Global Nuclear Safety and Security Standards: Encourage all member states to adopt and implement the IAEA's *3S Framework* (Safety, Security, Safeguards) through peer reviews, transparent reporting, and harmonized regulatory frameworks.

Support Innovation in Nuclear Technology: Promote international collaboration on *Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)* and *Generation IV* systems by creating shared research hubs and financing mechanisms under UN and World Bank partnerships.

Establish a Global Nuclear Waste Management Compact: Create a UN-backed mechanism for shared research, storage, and recycling of spent nuclear fuel to reduce waste-related risks and build public confidence in long-term sustainability.

Integrate Nuclear Power into Global Climate and Development Agendas: Global development through the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (the SDGs) is opaque on energy issues. Sustainable Development Goal 7 (SDG 7) calls for 'affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all' by 2030. But it only speaks of 'energy' and 'renewable energy'.

The IAEA could tell the UN to recognize nuclear energy as a critical component of the SDG 7 implementation, urging countries to include nuclear expansion in their energy development planning.

But this will face criticism from countries with economies reliant on fossil fuel exports, gas and oil. They can be expected to oppose such initiatives, as unfairly favoring a particular sector, and abandoning international economic neutrality.

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