Introduction

Colombia is a state newly freed from the mire of the longest standing armed conflict in the western hemisphere, but this peace rests at a sharp edge. The Colombian civil conflict, with its roots planted firmly beginning in the late 1940s, raged from the mid 1960s, with brief intervals of ceasefire, until 2016. In its wake well over 200,000 people died, millions were displaced, and kidnappings numbered in the tens of thousands. Drugs and terror reigned, both in Bogota and in Casa Verde.

After several failed attempts and a rejected referendum, a peace deal between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist-Leninist guerilla revolutionary group and the main armed group opposing the Colombian government, was signed in 2016 and ratified through the legislature. The deal ended the conflict between the two groups, but many Colombians reject the deal (as the country narrowly did in the 2016 referendum) because they feel the deal was too sympathetic to the rebels, and allows for political participation of FARC’s political wing. One of these staunch rejecters of the deal is the newly elected President Iván Duque. This political shakeup, from President Juan Manuel Santos the author and face of the peace deal with FARC to a vocal member of the “no” camp for the deal, tosses the status of this peace into uncertainty.

This crisis simulation comprises the many stakeholders and voices both international and domestic invested in the Colombian Peace Process as a series of hypothetical meetings considering the Peace Process itself, and changes to it. In the following brief information on the process itself, FARC, and the current political climate of Colombia will be discussed to give each delegate the information needed to properly assume their role in these deliberations.

Brief History of the Colombian Conflict

La Violencia (1946-1958)

The Colombian Civil Conflict has its roots with the conclusion of the different period of conflict, known as La Violencia. Beginning in 1946, La Violencia was a period of violent conflict between the two most powerful political parties in Colombia at the time, the Liberals and Conservatives. Growing wealth inequality and oligarchic control over power within the country came to a climax in the Presidential campaign of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the leader of the leftist wing of the Liberal Party. After losing an election in 1946, Gaitán’s popularity grew to exponential levels among the poor, and was seemingly set to ride a populist wave to the presidency in the next election. However, he was
assassinated in 1948 while attending a Pan-American Conference hosted in Bogotá. His murder sparked a riot dubbed *Bogotazo*, leaving 3,000 dead by its end, and dropping the first blood in *La Violencia*. From the initiating riot, *La Violencia* raged for an entire decade, rife with political murders and extrajudicial killings, until its end in 1958 in a power sharing agreement between the liberal and conservative factions.

The agreement, deliberated in Spain on neutral ground, decided to split the national congress evenly between the factions and create the presidency as a rotating position to alternate between liberal and conservative factions every four years. This created the two parties as a single institution, named the National Front, which exercised sole power over the government. While this agreement ended *La Violencia*, it firmly set the foundation for the conflict to follow.

As a result of the power sharing agreement and splitting the government evenly between the two factions, all other groups were entirely excluded from politics. Large segments of society, laborers, students, a newer middle class, leftists, and the impoverished masses, were shut out of legitimate political participation. This exclusion, when coupled with the fact that an entire generation was raised during the horrors of *La Violencia*, set the foundation for political radicalization and marginalization that culminated in the flourishing of revolutionary-left groups in general, and specifically the conflict waged by FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) from the mid-1960s onward.

**Colombian Conflict (1964 - Present)**

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, FARC) formed in 1964 with a contingency of experienced guerrillas who operated with radical leftist groups in support of the Liberal faction during *La Violencia*. FARC established itself through a series of “Guerrilla Conferences” in the Southern Colombian departments (provinces) in the Amazon Jungle. Through these conferences the FARC leadership created its ideological backbone, organized its armed forces, and established itself as a self-proclaimed protector of the peasant class of Colombia championing land reform, anti-imperialism, and wealth redistribution as its main rallying calls. These foundations paved the way for FARC to continuously recruit from the peasant class of Colombia, particularly from the growers of the coca leaf, known as *cocaleros*.

---

From this staunchly radicalized and geographically isolated support base, FARC grew to a serious contender for political dominance in Colombia. From these foundations FARC revolutionaries were able to operate, not just in the Cold War with the support of the USSR and Cuba, but well into the 21st century. Three factors allowed for the movement’s longevity: economic independence allowing FARC’s ability to finance itself (through how this was achieved was often in breach of human rights), the constant state of crisis in Colombia, and, as stated previously, the continual support of the particularly radicalized and marginalized Colombian peasantry. Other communist insurgencies came into existence during this conflict, including the ELN, M-19, and the Popular Liberation Army, though FARC was the largest, most organized, and the most impactful of any of the active anti-government forces in Colombia.

Ideologically, FARC is very much an animal of its place and time. Based on Marxism-Leninism, the FARC’s ideology originated as a classic communist movement, beginning during a time where several other Marxist-Leninist insurgencies operated in Northern Latin America, and the Cuban Revolution was still fresh in American minds. With its emergence in the 1960s the movement was originally based on this Cuban uprising, but overtime FARC became uniquely South American. One of the pillars FARC’s identity is a dedication to Bolivarianism. The titular hero of Bolivarianism, Simon Bolivar, is similar to this ideology only in the important aspect of pan-Americanism; otherwise the two are distinct. Modern Bolivarianists, and likewise FARC, are advocates of anti-imperialism (especially United States imperialism), egalitarianism in wealth and resource distribution, and grassroots participation in the political process of South America’s poor.

The concept of Bolivarianism ideologically links FARC to several nearby states, principally Venezuela (the Bolivarian Republic of) and Ecuador. Both states have had tense relationships with Colombia as a result, with the 2008 diplomatic crisis destabilizing the region after the Colombian government killed a FARC executive officer in an operation conducted in Ecuador without the permission of the Ecuadorian government, and allegedly finding computer files linking the Ecuadorian government to the FARC insurgents there. This uniquely South American approach to socialism, and in FARC’s case communism, defines the insurgent group.

FARC’s greatest strength was largely owed to its prime locations in the jungles of Southern Columbia. Their isolation in the Amazon allowed for FARC to set up flourishing illicit trades to finance themselves after they could no longer count on assistance from the Soviet Union or the Cuban Government. FARC accomplished this through three main activities: narcotics trafficking, ransoms from kidnapping, and the levying of taxes from poor cocaleros as protection for their farming efforts. Beginning with the blossoming of the narcotics industry in Colombia, FARC became involved originally with the narcotics trade through protection of the cocaleros, their traditional support base, in Colombia’s south. This original involvement was partially by virtue of sticking with FARC’s constituents, but the money soon became a driving factor of its own. The direct trafficking of drugs became FARC’s main money-making activity during the mid-1980s. FARC’s position as the primary voice of the cocaleros created a natural role for them as distributors of said

---

2 Ibid.
3 Lee, Chris. "The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?." Latin American Perspectives (2011):
product, quickly becoming the main economic driver of the conflict. The second largest enterprise that FARC made its money from was the collection of ransom from kidnapping. In 2012 the group decided to end its kidnapping activities, yet they still held hundreds of people as hostages though no new kidnappings have been reported. As an article of the 2016 peace deal, all hostages held by FARC have been released.

Throughout the group’s existence FARC has conducted diplomatic talks with the government, and at times even declared peace for terms such as being allowed to be elected to office. During their revolution, the FARC, while simultaneously fighting for the downfall of the government, repeatedly called for reformation of the government in areas such as agrarian reform, wealth distribution, and the inclusion of leftists in the Colombian political process. Peace conferences with the government often yielded no fruit, however sometimes the rebel delegation would find what it thinks to be a deal they wish for.

In 1985 FARC agreed to a government offer to be allowed to participate in the political process. The group accepted without disarming, formed the Union Patriótica (UP), and participated in the subsequent election. After the party’s creation, the UP won 14 seats in the National Congressional elections in 1986. Shortly following, thousands of the FARC guerilla forces put their weapons down as a sign of willing peaceful cooperation, participants in the UP became targets of rightist paramilitary groups, who carried out a systematic assassination of between 2,000 and 4,000 UP political activists. The FARC claims the paramilitary forces were often affiliated with the government.

FARC began an era of dominance in the mid-1990s that extended into the mid-2000s. After increased public calls for peace, and the cocalera strikes of 1994, the government and FARC representatives began a peace process that ended with the cession of a large demilitarization zone to FARC in 1998. For approximately one year the FARC governed this portion of Colombia as the only force in the region. The government ceded this land for the purpose of conducting peace talks in the region as a safe space. The peace talks fell apart in July of 1999, and the government subsequently invaded and retook the DMZ from FARC.

This ceding of land on a temporary basis is an unbelievable precedent: the Colombian government had, for at least a short while, de facto recognized the rebels as a legitimate co-belligerent in the conflict. Matched with this peak in power the FARC experienced its closest shot yet at victory. The country was at the verge of collapse during the intense fighting of the mid/late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, with FARC at its peak of dominance in terms of territory, funding and reach from drug money, and terror from targeted killings and kidnappings. The government’s response, with the assistance of the United States, was called Plan Colombia.

Though its activities in narcotics began in the mid 1980s in much smaller terms, by the time the United States and Colombia initiated Plan Colombia, FARC made most of its money from the protection of and smuggling of narcotics. Beginning in the early 2000s the United States

---

5 Vargas, Ricardo. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the illicit drug trade. Acción Andina, 1999.
8 Ibid.
government after the 9/11 attacks greatly increased spending on anti-guerrilla and drug war efforts internationally, particularly in Colombia. Out of this peak in spending came Plan Colombia. Through the Pastrana, Uribe, and Santos administrations, Plan Colombia was the main tactic for combating drug cartels and guerrillas at the same time with massive US spending on equipment and other forms of assistance.

The program pledged over 1 billion US dollars to bolster the Colombian armed forces, police, and associated paramilitary organizations for fighting guerrillas and cartels, and instituted a policy of aerial coca crop eradication. Police and military planes would be loaded with herbicides and aerially dumped over coca fields to destroy the crop without direct confrontation. The program sprayed hundreds of thousands of hectares, but its effects are disputed.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in a report indicated that despite the coca destroyed in Colombia, the crop shows a high potential for migration, meaning that growers simply relocate, that in many provinces coca cultivation has actually increased since 1998, and that the herbicides used can cause a host of skin and other health issues. Despite these setbacks, both the United States and Colombia claim this program as a success, particularly in its beginning years, and credit this program as the reason Colombia was returned to being a fully functioning state. Plan Colombia ended in 2015 and was replaced with a new US aid program to support the peace process that was then ongoing.

Successful Talks

In September of 2012 renewed peace talks between the Santos government and FARC began in Havana, Cuba. In attendance for the main belligerents were leaders of the government led by the Santos appointed chief negotiator Humberto De la Calle and the FARC delegation of 9 headed by their chief negotiator Iván Márquez rather than its leader Rodrigo Londono Echeverri, known as Timochenko.

In addition to the main belligerents, other international players joined either on behalf of one of the sides, or because of their renown as an international mediators. These additional international actors were chosen in two separate groups: main hosts who remained neutral parties, and one accompanying party chosen by each side. The two host/neutral parties agreed upon were Cuba as a main hosting site because of proximity as well its role in previous discussions, and Norway because of its renown as a conflict negotiator and force for peace in the International community. Venezuela was chosen as the accompanying party by the FARC, and Chile was chosen by the Colombian Government.

In the later portions of the talks included other actors, including the United States and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. Once these parties were chosen and the delegations were set, key points for the agenda were set, and negotiations began. As a showing of good faith, FARC called off all hostage taking activities and agreed to a year-long ceasefire with the government to invest entirely into the peace process. The agenda agreed to in these preliminary talks set the roadmap that would take from 2012 to August 2016 to complete as, topic by topic, the agreement was written. The agenda’s topics (in order discussed) were comprehensive rural development, political participation, illicit drugs, victims, and ending

---


https://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3787
the conflict (focusing on ceasefire, disarmament,
and safety guarantees). All along the way FARC and the government would sign, or order unilaterally in FARC’s case, periodical ceasefires. These ceasefires, though, would end periodically during the talks as well. On a few occasions, fighting plunged the peace talks into peril. Each year of the process, diplomatic crisis came about through tit-for-tat fighting. In 2013 the government launched a bombing campaign on FARC targets. Once the first unilateral FARC ceasefire ended on January 20th, a series of coordinated attacks on police targets threw the peace into turmoil. After days of heated discussion, FARC signed a new unilateral ceasefire for another year.

In 2014 a FARC attack against police and several civilian communities, and its kidnapping of a major general for longer than a week nearly ended the peace talks altogether. The FARC claims these actions were in retaliation for attacks against their fighters. However, following the talks after the incident, FARC unilaterally initiated an indefinite ceasefire, and the following year instructed members and its fighters to stop in the further purchasing of arms and ammunition as a show of good faith.

The Deal

The outcome of the peace talk is the final document, signed by both parties in September of 2016. The final document is nearly three hundred pages long, with a host of compromises and reforms each representing the major qualms held on each side throughout the conflict.

The first agenda item, agricultural reform, has been FARC’s championed cause throughout its existence. Agreements in agriculture include increased access to land and land rights for the lowest classes, repatriation of illegally seized land to the lowest classes, and programs to aid in the development, education, and food security of rural Colombians. One of the most robust and controversial sections of the agreement, the agenda item of political participation is the second major item in the agreement. FARC’s major goal since its founding, and the goal of its precursor guerrilla groups, has been around the issue of being able to formally engage in national politics without the fear of repression and violence.

Most of the agreements of the section are dedicated to changing the exclusionary political culture of Colombia through guarantees of opposition, education programs, agreed to allow easier formation of political parties, protection of rights of social movements and protesters, and a guarantee of a creation of a committee to create a framework for electoral reform.

The rest of the section is where the controversy sets in. The parties agreed to the creation of several temporary constituencies in areas most harmed by the conflict (which are mostly controlled by FARC), the FARC’s newly incorporated political party accepted 10% of political party budget from the government (the percentage decreases each election cycle), and the FARC is guaranteed 10 total seats in the


legislature with five in each chamber through 2026 not including any seats they may win through election\textsuperscript{12}.

The next two major agenda items were two of the main points sought by the government in the deliberations. First of the two, the topic of illicit drugs. Many of the agreements in this portion go hand in hand with the first agenda item of agricultural reform as a result of FARC’s influence over the precursor crop, coca’s, cultivation. The international approach taken for much of section is known as alternative development. The process is the idea of providing funding, education, subsidies, and other forms of assistance to cocaleros to substitute their coca crops for legal ones. In order to make this attempt successful, the parties agreed to establish several initiatives to combat not just the drug cultivation, but also poverty and lack of food security facing communities that need to turn to coca cultivation in order to make a living. Much of the rest of this section concerns limiting substances introduced to the coca in order to make cocaine, as well as setting up ways in which drug producers and traffickers can be prosecuted and held accountable.

Another significant agreement within the agenda item is the agreement to push for UN level dialogue about the nature of the War on Drugs and the potential of replacing this standard with a more modern approach. The second, and most extensive portion of the public driven dialogue, was victims. During this phase victims of both sides of the conflict met with the deliberators to share their experiences and pain, and helped to endorse some of the plans discussed.

The peace process followed the UN’s example from other peace processes in the establishment of a truth commission. The purpose of a truth commission, according to the International Center for Transitional Justice (an organization specializing in them), is operate as “non-judicial inquiries established to determine the facts, root causes, and societal consequences of past human rights violations. Through their focus on the testimony of victims of atrocity, truth commissions provide acknowledgement and recognition of suffering and survival to those most affected.”. Truth commissions may also aid criminal investigations with information they uncover. Built around this truth commission, are several other agreements worked alongside using the findings. First of which was a search party for missing persons of the conflict for both sides. The commission then tackled the issues of reparations for those wrongly ruined by the conflict and those particularly heinously harmed.

The agreements also allowed for conviction of those known to have violated human rights, which the truth commission and other criminal investigations will assist with. The second major program in this section of deliberations is the establishment of a “Special Jurisdiction for Peace”. This program sets all of the things discussed above into motion, and in addition to additional criminal proceedings, establishing a temporary court named the Peace Tribunal, and lastly to provide amnesty for fighters eligible\textsuperscript{13}.

The final section of the agreement is about the actual ending of the conflict. Terms of ceasefire, disarmament, and guarantees of safety post-disarmament are the three major components. The FARC agreed to disarm within a program designed in the agreement, and the national police and other state-run or aligned forces agreed to not target violence towards former fighters and instead extend them the same


\textsuperscript{13} "Final Agreement To End The Armed Conflict And Build A Stable And Lasting Peace." November 24, 2016.

political protections as other political parties. In this process of incorporation of the FARC, in addition to the political participation guarantees in the earlier sections, the agreement establishes temporary zones where FARC fighters can go to disarm and receive government funded assistance in return. A monitoring and verification mission comprised of a small number of government and FARC personnel, and principally the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the United Nations was created, called the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, in order to oversee this process on every level.  

The Referendum

Once the deal was signed at the end of August, 2016, one final step remained before the deal would go fully into effect: public approval via a country-wide referendum. This vote would directly ratify or decline the peace deal on behalf of the Colombian people. Heavy campaigning, between both a “yes” and “no” camp, began immediately. The campaign in support of the peace deal was headed by President Santos with a massive coalition of Colombian civil society, political parties across the political spectrum, and other prominent Colombians from around the world backing up the campaign with various forms of solidarity with the mission of passing the deal.

The “no” campaign was largely fronted by former president Álvaro Uribe, who had been a staunch critic of the process its entire existence. Backed by the Democratic Centre, the political party which he founded, Uribe had limited additional support from big-name Colombians, though some did speak out against the process. Much of the grievances the “no” camp had with the agreement were based around wanting to see harsher punishments for fighters, more reparations from FARC to victims, and imprisonment of much of the FARC leadership. Campaigning went on for a little over a month, with most polls conducted calling for the “yes” camp to prevail, usually by a large margin. On October 6th the referendum took place, and the outcome shocked the world. The final vote tally was 50.2% no - 49.8% yes, rejecting the peace deal. Turnout rates were low, hovering at approximately 38%, regardless of that rate, the vote answered the process with a very close no.

Following the failure of the referendum, President Santos accepted the outcome, but declared he would continue to work towards peace. Five days later President Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in ending the Colombian Conflict. Following the agreement’s failure in the public vote, FARC and the government sat down once more to revise the deal to answer some of the “no” camp’s grievances. Once the revisions were finished in late November, both parties again signed the agreement. This time, however, rather than putting the agreement to a referendum for ratification, the document was ratified through the Colombian congress. The deal passed unanimously through both houses of congress for ratification, but former president Uribe and his Democratic Centre supporters boycotted the proceedings, declaring that the revised peace deal ultimately ignored the no camp’s demands.

Peace Goes Into Effect

Following this fast track through congress, the Colombian peace deal went into effect. FARC and paramilitary fighters followed the outlined plan, and FARC formed their political party, assumed their seats in Congress, and began

---

14 Ibid

preparations for the general election to be held in the summer of 2018. This process did not go as smoothly as hoped, as a group of FARC dissidents formed in protest of the agreement, comprised of mostly mid-level commanders and fighters numbering slightly above 1,000 fighters.

In addition to this group, the other armed groups in Colombia besides FARC, such as the ELN, continued their conflict against the government until January of 2018. Through this period prior to the first election since the referendum, armed dissidents caused a huge problem for the security of the deal as a whole, and various security issues caused the occasional disruption of FARC political events. Despite these setbacks, the peace deal continued. The truest test would be the election beginning in May of 2018.

2018 Elections and Fallout

A large field distilled down to two main candidates in the presidential election: Iván Duque, candidate for the Democratic Centre (Uribe’s political party), and Gustavo Petro from the Humane Colombia party. The FARC intended to place a campaign bid on their leader Timochenko, but for health reasons the bid was withdrawn. After a long and polarizing campaign, Duque, seen as a right wing protégé of Uribe, won the presidency against his leftist opponent by a healthy 2 million vote margin in the runoff vote. This election of Duque, paired with the Democratic Centre’s surge in congress in the accompanying parliamentary elections (the party gained 13 seats in the House of Representatives while losing only one in the Senate), along with a huge electoral hit to Santos’ former party, places the future of the peace agreement as it stands into question. Much of the campaign platform of Duque and of the Democratic Centre as a whole was directed at the deal extremely critically, hinting at the potential for extreme changes.

On the campaign trail Duque promised major changes, particularly to the Special Peace Jurisdiction Courts, and the various assistance programs afforded to the FARC for purposes of reintegration. In protest of these promises, FARC Senate member Ivan Marquez announced that in he will not be assuming his Senate seat and stating in an open letter "There is no record on planet earth in which a peace agreement, after signed and celebrated by the plenipotentiaries of the parties, has been modified at the whim of interested people that were not involved in the initial negotiation.". In the parliamentary elections, the FARC’s political wing won no seats in either house of congress, but will assume the five seats in each house guaranteed to them in the agreement.

Since election, Duque’s administration has already clashed with the UN and independent organizations established by the agreement as having encroached on the organization’s independent operation. For example, on October 4th of 2018, government representatives of the Chief Prosecutor at the offices of the Special Peace Jurisdiction demanded the ability to immediately inspect files of the independent court’s largest ongoing case, which they were able to obtain information due to the hasty nature of the imposition. Statements by FARC, the court itself, and the UN condemned this move against the independence of the court. In response to this and other similar actions, and the disappearance of key former guerillas in the last few months, many former FARC guerilla

---

leaders have gone into hiding, occasionally making public announcements.\(^{17}\)

**Conclusion**

Many members of the FARC and of the Colombian public now fear the worst for this peace treaty, while still committed to seeing peace. The new Duque government’s stances and promises call this possibility into serious question, but, what is promised is still alteration of the deal, not outright abandoning of the peace. Perhaps compromise can still prevail for Colombia, and the hemisphere’s longest conflict can remain closed. That is exactly what this committee is tasked with.

**The Characters**

This committee now meets at a serious crossroads in the peace process. The gathering of International mediators, Colombian government officials in the Duque administration, and FARC members and allies, is for the purpose of re-visiting the peace deal, potentially to find a compromise between the former combatants and the government’s new demands. This committee is a hypothetical meeting, and may never take place in real life. Therefore, the framework of the previous peace talks were taken as a guideline and amended to reflect the drastic changes in the composition of the Colombian government. Many positions appointed by the government for the purposes of the agreement’s original drafting would be replaced by members of Ivan Duque’s and the Democratic Centre’s circle, and that has been reflected in the character list.

---

17 Ibid.

Bernard W. Aronson, United States Special Envoy for the Colombian Peace Process - Aronson was appointed as special envoy during the Obama administration, but since the position has yet to be vacated or reappointed, he resumed his role for these new talks. Aronson’s career stretches back to the Cold War, where he served for both Democrats and Republicans in Washington and abroad. After leaving government work in the early 1990s, Aronson worked for, or ran his own, investment companies up until his appointment to this post. He still holds many contacts on Wall Street, and still owns his private equity firm, which controls the Igloo Cooler company.

Raúl Benítez, Representative of Cuba - A career diplomat and mediator, Benítez is returning as Cuba’s member of the peace talks. Benítez was present from the beginnings of the last talks, serving as Cuba’s eyes, ears, and gracious host in the country’s most ambitious diplomatic effort in decades. The resulting peace effort catapulted Cuba into the international stage as a major mediator in conflicts, and greatly advanced Benítez’s position within the foreign ministry. Benítez with these renewed talks holds greater freedom than before, and is in charge of all of the facilities used for the talks within Cuba. Benítez also maintains a close friendship with Norwegen Dag Nylander after working so closely with one another in the previous talks.

Pablo Catatumbo, FARC Secretariat member and Senator - Catatumbo is a former commander and secretariat member of FARC, and assumed office with the ten other representatives in July in the Senate. He served on the negotiation team in the peace process, contributing major portions of the final document. During his time as a war leader and commander, Catatumbo did most of his fighting against government aligned paramilitary groups, remaining one of his sore spots against the government. This includes a personal grudge, coming from the assassination of his sister at the orders of a paramilitary group.
**Roy Chaderton, Representative of Venezuela** - A former foreign minister and a current member of the Latin American Parliament, Chaderton is a career diplomat with the Bolivarian Republic. Venezuela held, and now once again holds, the position of an accompanying country for the FARC in the peace talks. In addition to being Venezuela’s voice during these talks, Chaderton also is the head of the international politics wing of the government’s political party, and helps to run an international think tank in the capital.

**Rodrigo Granda, International Spokesperson of FARC** - Granda has been an international spokesperson for the FARC, attending events in an official capacity in Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador, since the early 2000s. He was arrested and held for several years by the Colombian intelligence forces, and was released in 2008 in the lead up to the peace talks in a process known as the humanitarian exchange. Granda in his travels has accumulated many contacts abroad, particularly in Mexico and Venezuela. He is in charge of FARC’s media and diplomatic presence, with a staff that works closely with him.

**Iván Márquez, Chief Negotiator for FARC** - Márquez is a former commander and secretariat member for the FARC, now a senator for the FARC’s political party. He served as the chief negotiator of the previous talks, and has returned to this role. He has been seen as a leader of an increasingly disenfranchised wing of the FARC, who feels the new Duque government is abandoning the peace deal entirely. In a series of open letters Márquez has come to the conclusion that he and other FARC politicians are unsafe or being misled, and is currently leaving his seat empty in protest and living in hiding.

**Jorge Hernando Nieto, General Director of the Colombian National Police** - A lifetime cop and trained lawyer, Nieto was appointed as the director of the national police after a sex scandal
shook the institution and ended with the ousting and its previous director. Earning his stripes first on the streets of Bogotá, Nieto specialized in drug trafficking and narcotics police work in the early 1980s. After a lifetime of police work, Nieto gradually moved his way up the commanding ranks heading a array of different programs and initiatives until eventually becoming the director in 2016.

The National Police of Colombia (PNC) are the main policing body in Colombia, and currently comprise of approximately 170,000 uniformed police. The PNC are under the authority of the president, but operate from orders from the general director, Nieto, within the Defense department. As a result of the PNC’s active role and Nieto’s personal experience combating narco trafficking, President Duque requested his presence at these renewed talks.

**Dag Nylander, Representative of Norway** - Nylander was the Special Envoy for Norway for the entire Colombian peace process. Working with Norway’s position as a Guarantor country, Nylander was a major mediating force from the beginning of the process. In 2010, during the preliminary agenda setting phase, he traveled between Havana, Cuba and Oslo, Norway piecing together the process. After the process ended, Dag went to work within the UN in the same field. He currently serves as the UN Secretary General’s mediator between Guyana and Venezuela for their ongoing border dispute. He is retaining this post, despite being at these meetings. Nylander also maintains a close friendship with Cuban Raúl Benítez after working so closely with one another in the previous talks.

**Marta Lucía Ramírez, Vice-President of Colombia** - Ramírez is the first woman vice-president of Colombia, and currently serves in Iván Duque’s administration in that role. She was a candidate for president in her own right, coming in second place in the Democratic Centre primaries, landing her the VP bid. Ramírez has led a storied career, beginning in law and spanning years of civil and political service. She began her government work in the ministry of Foreign trade, which she eventually rose to lead under President Pastrana.

She then served briefly as a diplomat to France, until the election of Álvaro Uribe to the presidency in 2002. She was then appointed the first female minister of National Defence, a title she held for slightly longer than a year. In mid 2000s she won election to the Senate of Colombia, holding office from 2006-09, leaving her position to attempt several unsuccessful runs for president through both the conservative and the Democratic Centre parties. She is an
ambitious political player and well known in national politics, with connections to several former conservative presidents.

**Victoria Sandino, FARC Senator and Negotiator** - Sandino is an ex-guerilla and member of the Senate for FARC. She was a member of the original peace dialogue, and was the only woman to participate in the process. Sandino is a rising political star of the party, championing the gender equality as a key component of the new party’s platform. Sandino also serves on the peace implementation committee for the process, an incredibly important role in Colombia, and is the only member of these new talks that actually serves directly in the transition process.

**Enrique Santiago, FARC Law Advisor** - Santiago was a member of FARC’s legal team during the peace process, and is a renowned international lawyer from Spain. Since the peace process Santiago has found success at home in the political arena, and now is the Secretary General of the Spanish Communist Party. Santiago has ties to international lawyers across the globe, and extensive contacts within refugee organizations as well. He has once again joined the FARC delegation as a legal advisor, but now also with greater personal power.

**Francisco “Pancho” Santos, High Commissioner of Peace & Former VP** - Santos, also known by his nickname Pancho, is the former Vice-President who served in both Uribe governments. Santos comes from a storied political family, his great uncle was president before La Violencia, and his cousin is Juan Manuel Santos, former president of Colombia, Nobel Peace Laureate, and the architect of the peace process in question. Despite his familial connection to the former president, his political life is very much involved with the Uribe affiliated right wing faction. Santos is an advocate for the tactics used in Plan Colombia, his hardline stance potentially stemming from his kidnapping at the hands of Pablo Escobar in 1990. President Duque appointed Santos to the
role of commissioner of peace because of his human rights advocacy in the past, and his close relationship with the other members of the government negotiating team. While not currently serving public office, Santos remains an active party man, and writes for publishing frequently.

**Milenko Skoknic, Representative of Chile** -
After the accompanying countries for each side of the conflict were chosen, Skoknic was appointed to represent then president Sebastián Piñera in the talks. Skoknic is a trained lawyer and career diplomat, having served as the representative for Chile to Argentina, several countries in Europe, International Organizations in Vienna, and most recently as Chile’s UN delegate. Skoknic was the first of two representatives to the peace process for Chile, the second replacing him upon the election of President Michelle Bachelet. Now that Piñera is back in office, Skoknic has resumed his role. Skoknic will remain in his position with the UN during these renewed talks.

**Álvaro Uribe, Senator, Former President of Colombia, and Colombia’s Chief Negotiator** -
Uribe is one of the most influential political figures in all of modern Colombia. He began his political career in the early 1980s in his hometown of Medellín, eventually ascending to mayor. After which, he was elected to his first run in the Senate, which he maintained for nearly a decade. He then moved onto the executive branch, holding office as the governor of Antioquia for one term. He then moved on to be elected president of Colombia in the elections of 2002.

Within his terms (he successfully crafted an amendment to the constitution to allow for multiple terms), he launched a campaign jointly with the US called Plan Colombia, waging a larger scale war against the FARC and the ELN. Following his terms in office he was a vocal opponent of the peace process with the FARC, and was the main orator of the “no” campaign in the referendum. Uribe is a trusted mentor and advisor of the current president Duque, and is the man founder of their political party the Democratic Centre. As a result of this close relationship, Duque appointed Uribe to be the chief negotiator for the renewed talks. Uribe is also currently a member of the Senate.

**Óscar Iván Zuluaga, Former Presidential Candidate and President of Democratic Centre** -
Zuluaga is a longtime loyalist of Uribe, and nearly won the presidency in the 2014 elections. Zuluaga started in local politics in the early 1990s, and from then until the beginning of the 2000s he worked running several different banks
including the Bank of the Republic. From his original involvement with Uribe's presidential campaign in 2001, his national political career launched. He served first in the senate in 2002, until 2006, where a year later he was appointed the minister of finance in Uribe’s cabinet, which he held for two years.

After a break from office for a few years, Zuluaga helped to found the Democratic Centre with Uribe, and became its first presidential candidate. In the 2014 elections he won the first round, but in the runoff against the sitting president Santos he lost the majority. After this run, Zuluaga moved to an administrative role within the new party, assuming the role of its President, which he currently holds. Zuluaga was chosen by President Duque because of his leadership within the party as a negotiator, and while in the renewed talks he will still control much of the on goings of the party.
Bibliography


Lee, Chris. "The FARC and the Colombian Left: Time for a Political Solution?" Latin American Perspectives (2011)


Vargas, Ricardo. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the illicit drug trade. Acción Andina, 1999.