

The situation in the Middle East (Yemen)

by Nikita Lumijoe

Old Dominion University Graduate Program in International Studies

Introduction

According to the UN, the situation in Yemen is the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. The nation of 30 million people has suffered from war, hunger, and epidemics for decades. Since 2015, over three million people have been displaced. Today, 80 percent of the 24 million-people population of Yemen needs humanitarian aid and protection.¹

Even before the current civil war, Yemen was the poorest country of the Middle East. National institutions systemically failed to provide basic services for the population, more than half of which lived in extreme poverty. Possibly because they lacked access to education, food, drinking water, people became vulnerable to the spread of extremist movements and separatism, which undermined efforts to establish a sustainable peace.

Threatened by the spillover of the crisis, regional leaders such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE launched a military operation in 2015 to support the internationally accepted government of Yemen in its fight against the Houthi rebel movement and other extremist groups. The Houthi rebels, with the support of Iran, stalemated the foreign Arab intervention, resisted the Yemeni government and international coalition. They already control much of the country's territory, regularly launch ballistic and cruise missile attacks against neighboring countries, and continue to fight for complete control of Yemen.

In April 2022, the conflicting parties reached a truce facilitated by the United Nations, assuring the security of a key port for food distribution. The Arab League support truce diplomacy, but acts cautiously, at the urging of Saudi Arabia, UAE and the Internationally recognized government of Yemen, which also is a Member States of the Arab League. Although the truce alleviates the tensions and lessens the effects of the humanitarian crisis, it offers little hope of resolving the conflict.



Pro-government soldiers on the move in Yemen, 2016.
Photo: Reuters.

History

Modern Yemen appeared on the map divided during the Cold War, with the Yemen Arab Republic in the north, and pro-Soviet People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the south. They were united in 1990 as the Republic of Yemen.. However, the peace did not last long. Both sides were highly suspicious of each

¹ United Nations, n.d. 'Yemen', United Nations, n.d.
<https://yemen.un.org/en/about/about-the->

[un#:~:text=Yemen%20is%20in%20the%20midst,hu
manitarian%20crisis%20in%20the%20world](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemen-soldiers-move-2016-04-04/)



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
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Humanitarian situation

The UN has estimated the **war has killed 377,000 people** by the end of 2021, both directly and indirectly through hunger and disease. **Children account for 70 percent of deaths.**



Source: World Bank | 2020

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
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other and tried to enforce their own military and political power.²

The attempt to restore the independence of South Yemen led to a Civil War in 1994. Yemen remained united under the President Saleh administration, however, threatened by growing extremism in the face of Al-Qaeda and regional rebels.

The Houthis, a Shi'ite Islamist political group, emerged in the 1990s in the North of Yemen opposed President Saleh, blaming him in corruption and national economic problems. In



The Economist

September 2004, their leader, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, was killed by national armed forces, which radicalized the group. The Houthis took an active part in the revolution of 2011. As a result of the revolution, Saleh stepped down as the President of Yemen. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring in Yemen did not bring peace and stability.

The new administration of President Hadi failed to meet the expectations of the population. The Houthis were still unsatisfied with the lack of political power they had in the region. In 2014, they launched a full-scaled armed rebellion and gained control over the northern territories and the capital, Sana. They established their own government and issued a new constitutional declaration, which was condemned by the international community.

The United Nations called on the Houthis to withdraw from the government, but with the support of defected national armed forces, they continued to expand the controlled territories. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Yemen rebels, demanding all parties resume UN-backed talks.³ The Houthis, however, did not stop and soon reached the strategic port city of Aden in the South of the country. Hadi escaped to Saudi Arabia. Threatened by the unrest in the region, Saudi Arabia established an international coalition of nine mostly Sunni states to reinstate Hadi's government. This coalition received support from the United States, which wanted to stabilize the region and secure free passage in the Bab el-Mandeb, one

² Mohammad, Widad Salim, 2015. 'Yemeni civil war in 1994.' The Arab Gulf 43, no. 1-2 (2015), p. 1.

³ United Nations, 2015. 'Security Council Imposes Arms Embargo On Yemen Rebels, Demands All

Parties Resume Un-Backed Talks', UN News, 14 April 2015
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/04/495802-security-council-imposes-arms-embargo-yemen-rebels-demands-all-parties-resume>

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of the most important oil transportation points in the world.⁴

The Saudi-led coalition relied heavily on the airstrikes, which often caused many casualties among civilians. In addition to this, the coalition started the blockade of the ports and airports controlled by the Houthis, which escalated the humanitarian crisis and forced millions of people to migrate. Meanwhile, in the South, separatists united into the Southern Transitional Council. With the support of the UAE, they quickly gained control over Aden in 2019.

After the assassination of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 and airstrikes on civilian objects in Yemen, the United States' support of the Saudi-led coalition declined. In an effort to resolve the conflict, the Trump administration initiated talks with the Houthis. In 2020, the Hadi-led forces united with the Southern Council to establish a new government. The UAE and Sudan significantly reduced their presence in Yemen. Also, Biden's administration announced the United States was ending support for a Saudi-led military offensive in Yemen.⁵ After an exchange of air strikes and missile attacks, the Houthis and the Coalition reached the truce brokered by the United Nations in April 2022.

Current situation

During a two-month nationwide truce reached between the parties to conflict in March 2022, civilian casualties fell to the lowest level in

months. It also helped to address the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, argues Martin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.⁶



Mazrak camp in the mountainous scrublands of Yemen's north-west border with Saudi Arabia. Photo Annasofie Flamand/IRIN.

According to the Norwegian Refugee Council, the number of civilians killed and injured in Yemen dropped by over 50 percent in the first month of the truce. Moreover, the truce allowed some displaced people to return to their homes. The truce also allowed the partial reopening of Sana'a airport and Hodeidah port to fuel ships, which helped to address Yemen's ongoing energy crisis.⁷ During the truce, the Coalition established an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council. The Council, welcomed on an international level, was not accepted by the

⁴ Laub, Zachary, and Kali Robinson, 2016. 'Yemen in crisis.' Council on Foreign Relations, 19, 2016, pp. 1-7.

⁵ Knickmeyer, Ellen, 2021. 'Biden ending US support for Saudi-led offensive in Yemen', Associated Press, 4 February 2021 <https://apnews.com/article/biden-end-support-saudi-offenseive-yemen-b68f58493dbfc530b9fcfdb80a13098f>

⁶ United Nations, 2022. 'The situation in the Middle East (Yemen) - Security Council, 9017th Meeting', UN Web TV, 14 April 2022

<https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1h/k1h71yvg>

⁷ NRC, 2022, 'Yemen: Truce must now lead to lasting peace', Norwegian Refugee Council, 2 August 2022

<https://www.nrc.no/news/2022/august/yemen-truce-must-now-lead-to-lasting-peace/>

Houthis. They see it as an instrument of Saudi intervention.

The Houthis demand to lift the blockade and withdraw foreign troops from Yemen.⁸ Nevertheless, in August this year, with the support of the United Nations in negotiations, the truce was renewed for another two months. Even though the extension is a good sign and an opportunity to move forward, the U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, finds that there is more to achieve. The current truce includes a commitment by the Government and the Houthi rebels to intensify negotiations to reach an expanded agreement, which would be the next step in development of sustainable peace. Besides Yemen itself, among the leading nations that are involved and able to affect the situation are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the US, and Iran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the major external actors supporting the Yemeni government.⁹

Even though Biden's administration in 2021 announced an end to U.S. military support for offensive operations against the Houthi rebels and suspended some munition sales, it still maintenance contracts fulfilled by both the U.S. military and U.S. companies involved in the military operations, providing arms, training, or maintenance support to the air force of the

Coalition.¹⁰ On the other side, Iran, being the biggest supporter of the Houthis, has also a certain leverage of power in the situation.¹¹ Only constructive communication with the involvement of both internal and external actors can lead to the establishment of sustainable peace.

Role of the United Nations

The United Nations facilitates dialogue between the conflicting parties and sanctions the perpetrators of peace. In February 2022, the Security Council renewed an arms embargo, travel ban, asset freeze imposed on those threatening peace in Yemen. In the resolution 2624 (2022) condemning the cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia the Security Council characterized the Houthis as a terrorist organization, which caused disagreement among the members.¹²

In Yemen, the United Nations Secretary-General is represented by the Special Envoy, Hans Grundberg. Grundberg briefs the UN Security Council members on the situation and facilitates negotiations. Currently, one of his major goals is to promote the expanded agreement between the Yemeni government and the Houthis.¹³

⁸ Ardemagni, Eleonora, 2022. 'Yemen's Post-Hybrid Balance: The New Presidential Council', SADA Middle East Analysis, 9 June 2022, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/87301>

⁹ Bennett, Christina. 2013. "The Importance of Regional Cooperation: The GCC Initiative in Yemen." Planning Ahead for a Post Conflict Syria: Lessons from Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. International Peace Institute, 2013. 10.

¹⁰ Lee, Joyce Sohyun, 2022. 'Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen have been called war crimes. Many relied on U.S. support', The Washington Post, 4 June 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/inter-active/2022/saudi-war-crimes-yemen/>

¹¹ Juneau, Thomas, 2021. 'How War in Yemen Transformed the Iran-Houthi Partnership.' Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2021, pp. 1-23.

¹² Security Council, 2022. 8981ST Meeting (AM), SC/14810, 28 February 2022, <https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14810.doc.htm>

¹³ United Nations, 2022. 'Yemen: UN envoy underscores need to 'end the conflict, not merely manage it'', UN News, 15 August 2022 [https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1124682#:~:text=Hans%20Grundberg%20\(on%20screen\)%2C,on%20the%20situation%20in%20Yemen](https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1124682#:~:text=Hans%20Grundberg%20(on%20screen)%2C,on%20the%20situation%20in%20Yemen)

Following the Stockholm Agreement, reached in Sweden in December 2018 the United Nations established a Special Political Mission, the United Nations Mission to support the Hedaydah Agreement (UNMHA), which brings together civilian, military and police personnel, to support the Yemeni parties in delivering their obligations under the agreement.¹⁴

Among other United Nations agencies, the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) plays an important role in alleviation of the humanitarian crisis, assisting those most in need in Yemen. It remains one of the few agencies addressing the protection and well-being of refugees and asylum-seekers across the country, focusing primarily on protection interventions, shelter support, cash assistance, peaceful coexistence, and social cohesion projects.¹⁵

In general, the United Nations' resolutions and sanctions in relation to the conflict in Yemen are based on the Responsibility to Protect principle. If a state fails to protect its own residents, the international community must intervene to protect the civilians. Guided by this principle, the United Nations supported the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council intervention.

The United Nations Security Council is in power to give international legitimacy to military

operations and influence the conflict by sanctions, embargos and normative categorization of the conflicting parties (e.g. the Houthis is referred as a terrorist organization). In addition to this, the United Nations can deploy troops and police from around the world, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers in frames of the UN Peacekeeping and with a mandate set by the UN Security Council and General Assembly.¹⁶

Landmark UN resolutions

The United Nations Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions on Yemen since 2011. Some of them are especially significant. The resolution 2014(2011) was the first one welcoming the engagement of the Gulf Cooperation Council in efforts to resolve the political crisis in Yemen. The resolution condemned the excessive use of force against peaceful protestors by the Yemeni authorities under Saleh's administration.¹⁷ It was adopted unanimously.

Further Security Council resolutions 2140, 2201 and 2204 adopted in 2014-2015 imposed sanctions against those threatening peace, security or stability of Yemen. These resolutions strongly opposed the Houthis' actions to dissolve parliament and take over government institutions.¹⁸ Another landmark resolution 2216

¹⁴ UNMHA, 2022. 'Hedaydah Agreement, Political and Peacebuilding Affairs', DPPA, 16 January 2022 <https://dppa.un.org/en/mission/unmha-hedaydah-agreement>

¹⁵ The UNHCR Representation in Yemen, n.d., 'Yemen', UNHCR, n.d., [https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/yemen.html#:~:text=Yemen%20remains%20one%20of%20the,internally%20displaced%20persons%20\(IDPs\)](https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/yemen.html#:~:text=Yemen%20remains%20one%20of%20the,internally%20displaced%20persons%20(IDPs))

¹⁶ United Nations, n.d. United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d., <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>

¹⁷ United Nations. Security Council Resolution S/RES/2014 (2011) (New York: United Nations, 21 October 2011), <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/YEMEN%20S%20RES%202014.pdf>

¹⁸ United Nations, n.d., UN Documents for Yemen: Security Council Resolutions. Security Council Report, n.d., https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-

(2015) called on all Member States to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel of all types to the Houthis and Saleh-led forces.¹⁹ This arms embargo is still in force.

After the Stockholm Agreement between the Yemeni government and the Houthis made in 2018, the United Nations authorized the Secretary-General to establish and deploy an advance team for monitoring and facilitating implementation of the agreement. In 2019, the United Nations established the Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) to monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire in the Hodeidah region, which ports play a crucial role in allowing food to be imported into the country.²⁰

In February this year, the Security Council adopted resolution 2624 that added the Houthis as an entity to the Yemen sanctions list and called them a terrorist group.²¹ Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, and Norway expressed their concern about the definition of a terrorist group and abstained.²²

[resolutions/page/2?ctype=Yemen&cbtype=yemen#038;cbtype=yemen](https://www.un.org/press/docs/2022/220202.yemen.scr.res.2624.docstxt.html)

¹⁹ United Nations. Security Council Resolution S/RES/2216 (2015) (New York: United Nations, 14 April 2015), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2216.pdf

²⁰ United Nations. Security Council Resolution S/RES/2452 (2019) (New York: United Nations, 16 January 2019), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2452.pdf

Country and bloc positions

In 2015, the Arab League and the member-states supported the Saudi position on Yemen. The establishment of the Arab coalition against the Houthis initiated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE went unopposed in the League and, at first, included participation from Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco which later opted out of the coalition, at least in terms of sending ground troops, but continued to support the war effort verbally and lent it some air assistance. Most Arab League member-states support the Saudi-backed internationally recognized administration in Yemen.²³

China: China has no national stake in the outcome of events in Yemen, but will stress action that enhances the sovereignty of the government there. China always stresses UN action that enhances the legitimacy of states in international law, and strengthens its claims for full control over Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade territory, somewhat like the Houthi Movement of Yemen.

Being a close strategic partner with Saudi Arabia, Beijing backed the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen. China supported the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council to mitigate the

²¹ United Nations. Security Council Resolution S/RES/2624 (2022) (New York: United Nations, 28 February 2022), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_RES_2624.pdf

²² Yemen: Sanctions Resolution. *Security Council Report*. 28 February 2022, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/02/yemen-sanctions-resolution.php>

²³ Al-Qassab, Abdulwahab, 2020. 'The Arab League's Many Failures', Arab Center Washington DC, 8 October 2020, <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-arab-leagues-many-failures/>

conflict and the peace talks led by the United Nations. China is currently Yemen's major trade partner and therefore can affect the situation in the region.²⁴ Now China advocates the enforcement of the arms embargo advocating the use of all necessary measures to conduct inspections of cargos in the Yemeni territorial sea and high seas off the coast of Yemen extending to the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman.²⁵

European Union (EU): The European Union tries to work with all parties, in full support of the United Nations, to reach a political settlement to the conflict in Yemen. The EU and its 27 Member States oppose the Houthi Movement and contribute to international naval patrols aimed at stopping the flow of weapons to the Houthis from Iran. However, it does not support the Saudi-led intervention.

Instead, the EU focuses on ways to reduce the humanitarian suffering caused by the fighting. Being a major humanitarian donor in Yemen, the European Union strongly supports the truce reached in 2022. In 2022, the EU allocated EUR 135 million in humanitarian aid addressing the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

Iran and allies: The strongest international supporter of Yemen's Houthi Movement is Iran, the source of much of its weapons, especially its small arms, ballistic missiles, and drones. Iran is committed to a sister Shi'ite religious movement, an ally in its efforts to eliminate the State of Israel. Supporting the Houthis, Iran projects its power in the region.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): For the 120 Member States and 20 observers of the United

Nations' largest voting bloc, maintaining the central role of the states is a principal policy goal. Since most are former-colonial states who gained their interdependence through revolutionary struggles, they can be sympathetic toward separatist and revolutionary movements, especially when those target the rule of former colonial powers. But maintaining the sovereign power of their young states is their highest goal. Therefore, they tend to look away from anything that would create a precedent undermining their own governing legitimacy and power.

The Houthi Movement appeals to many NAM Member States—especially those aligned with Iran—but not its specific goal of taking power by force. The NAM will not aggressively criticize the Houthis, preferring often to join its criticism of Western former colonial masters and, especially Israel, but they will not be quick to support it. They will favor measures like humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping that do not force them to choose between rival sides in the war.

Russia: Russia will approach the Yemen issue with an eye on precedents, as its primary foreign policy goal is to protect its conflict and claim territory in Ukraine. Russia will favor proposals that strengthen the importance of outside actors making claims, and oppose proposals that could be interpreted as a basis for opposing its 'Special Military Operation' in Ukraine.

Russia does not openly support the Houthis but maintains a strategic partnership with Iran, who arms the group. In April 2015, Russia abstained on Security Council resolution 2216, which imposed an arms embargo on the Houthis and a

²⁴ Chang, Jennifer, 2018. 'China and Yemen's Forgotten War', United States Institute of Peace, 16 January 2018,

<https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/01/china-and-yemens-forgotten-war>

²⁵ United Nations, 2022. 'Yemen: Sanctions Resolution.', Security Council Report. 28 February 2022
<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2022/02/yemen-sanctions-resolution.php>

travel ban on its leader.²⁶ In February 2018, Russia blocked a resolution at the United Nations Security Council that blamed Iran for providing missiles for the Houthis and extended the arms embargo.

Instead of the resolution drafted by Britain and backed by the United States, the Security Council unanimously approved a Russian-drafted version that avoided the issue of Iranian weapons in Yemen. Even though, after the assassination of Saleh, Lavrov argued that the Houthis were radicalized, Moscow opposed the designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization.²⁷ In 2022, Russia voted in favor of the U.N. arms embargo imposed on the Houthis after abstaining on the council vote a year ago to renew the sanctions. Some diplomats, however, accused the UAE of winning Russia's support by abstaining on Security Council votes on Moscow's invasion of Ukraine.²⁸

United States: Along with its allies in NATO and elsewhere around the world, the United States leads international support for the established government of Yemen and supports its war against the Houthi Movement. But the United States, and its allies, have not supported all aspects of the war against the Houthis.

In 2015, when Saudi Arabia with allies launched a military operation in Yemen, Obama's

administration supported the Arab coalition with logistical and intelligence aid. The United States endorsed the resolution 2216 (2015) that demanded the Houthis immediately and unconditionally end violence and refrain from further unilateral actions that threatened the political transition.²⁹ However, the growing number of civilian casualties and deepening humanitarian crisis in Yemen enforced opposition to the war in Washington.³⁰

The Trump years saw the United States acting with less clarity, supportive of Saudi Arabia and its de facto ruler Prince Mohamed bin Salman. Under President Biden, the US strongly supports international efforts to reduce the humanitarian consequences of the fighting, and has acted to restrain Saudi intervention, but it also remains strongly opposed to a Houthi victory.

Some proposals for action

The main purposes of the United Nations are to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, achieve international co-operation in solving international problems, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the

²⁶ Katz, Mark, 2021. 'Russia is friendly with the Houthis in Yemen. But it's complicated.', *Atlantic Council*, 9 April 2021, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/russia-is-friendly-with-the-houthis-in-yemen-but-its-complicated/>

²⁷ Gladstone, Rick, 2018. 'Russia Vetoes U.N. Resolution to Pressure Iran Over Yemen Missiles', *New York Times*, 26 February 2018 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/26/world/middleast/iran-yemen-security-council.html>

²⁸ Nichols, Michelle, 2022. 'U.N. arms embargo imposed on Yemen's Houthis amid vote questions',

The *New York Times*, 28 February 2022.

<https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/un-security-council-imposes-arms-embargo-yemens-houthi-group-2022-02-28/>

²⁹ Security Council, 2015. 7426TH Meeting (AM), SC/11859, 15 April 2015, <https://press.un.org/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm>

³⁰ Alamer, Sultan, 2021. 'Biden and the War in Yemen: the Larger Context of the Shifts in the American Position', *SADA Middle East Analysis*, 14 April 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/84326>

attainment of these common ends.³¹ Among the tools that the United Nations implements in Yemen are the sanctions, humanitarian aid, monitoring, and diplomatic support, international statements. But the range of proposals available to the UN Security Council is potentially endless, limited only by resources and the ability of the Member States to achieve agreement. Below are some well-known possibilities for further action:

Peacekeeping: The Security Council is best known for authorizing peacekeeping missions to end fighting. Peacekeeping is especially valuable when humanitarian needs are at stake, as they clearly are in Yemen. But peacekeeping requires the cooperation of the parties to the conflict. Neither the government of Yemen or the Houthis seem willing to accept freezing the conflict, which peacekeeping usually requires.

Alternatively, the Security Council could create a large and powerful peacekeeping force to enforce the peace, regardless of the parties. This would require a mandate (resolution) from the Security Council, troops and support from countries willing to donate, financing for what promises to be a very large peacekeeping mission, and the willingness of the international community to become party to the conflict.

Sanctions: In February 2022, the United Nations Security Council adopted the resolution 2624 (2022), which renewed the Yemen sanctions regime for one year. This resolution added the Houthis as an entity to the Yemen sanctions list. According to the resolution, the Houthis are the subject to the measures of the targeted arms embargo for having engaged in acts that threaten

the peace, security, and stability of Yemen.³² In terms of sanctions, the United Nations can either expand the sanctions list, extend the current terms, or lift the sanctions. The option depends on the situation and the actions of the conflicting parties. Currently, all the Houthis are in the sanction list for their trans-border strikes on Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, the Saudi-led coalition was often criticized by the international community for causing many casualties among civilians.

In case of the escalation of the conflict, if one or both sides are found to be impeding humanitarian assistance, the sanction list may be expanded. Sanctions might be expanded to include countries supporting one or both sides fighting in the conflict, Iran and/or Saudi Arabia.

Humanitarian Aid: One thing the Member States of the UN generally can agree on is humanitarian assistance, usually provided through the UN World Food Programme (WFP). But getting the Member States to agree on how to pay for aid is much tougher, especially with rival problems like the war in Ukraine and the flooding disaster in Pakistan making massive demands on the international community.

The United Nations Humanitarian Country Team in Yemen estimates that USD 4.3 billion annually is needed to halt the worst suffering caused by the Yemen crisis. However, two-thirds of major UN programs in Yemen were forced to scale back or close due, according to David Gressly, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen.³³ In August 2022, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported that the Yemen

³¹ United Nations, n.d. 'U.N. Charter. Chapter I: Purposes and Principles.', United Nations, n.d. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1>

³² Office of the Special Envoy Of The Secretary-General for Yemen, n.d. Security Council Resolutions, OSESGY, n.d.,

<https://osesgy.unmissions.org/security-council-resolutions>

³³ United Nations, 2022, 'UN humanitarians say \$4.3 billion is needed to halt 'worsening' Yemen crisis', UN News, 30 April 2022 <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1117332>

Humanitarian Response Plan is only 42 percent funded. The United Nations can encourage the nations to help in alleviation of the humanitarian crisis.³⁴

One of the urgent priorities to address is the threat posed by the decaying SAFER oil tanker. The vessel moored off Yemen's Red Sea coast that holds more than a million barrels of oil and is at risk of breaking apart or exploding. The United Nations estimates that USD 144 million is needed to address the problem.³⁵

Monitoring: One of the most important United Nations monitoring initiatives in Yemen is the Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), the truce to allow food distribution. In July 2022, the Security Council renewed the mandate of the UNMHA for one year until 14 July 2023. The mission supports implementation of the Hudaydah governorate-wide ceasefire and a mutual redeployment of forces from the city of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ras Isa.³⁶

The Security Council can consider an extension of the UNMHA mandate in 2023. Alternatively, it can make an extension of the truce conditional on specific actions by the warring parties, with an eye to solving the conflict.

International statements: The United Nations Security Council can also issue statements reflecting the position of the international community. Although this approach falls short of the aggressive action demanded by many activists, it often is the best the Member States

can agree on. Statements are especially important for shaping global moral norms and expectations.

According to the statement issued by the Security Council on 12 September 2022, the United Nations urges warring parties in Yemen to urgently intensify negotiations towards expanding the truce announced in April. The expanded truce must be translated into a durable ceasefire. The parties were also urged to work towards implementing measures to tackle the economic and financial crises.

Among more particular statements, the United Nations called on the Houthis to cooperate with UN-led efforts to identify a durable solution to ensure the flow of fuel and immediately open the main Taiz roads. In addition to this, the Council expressed deep concern over the catastrophic ecological, maritime, and humanitarian risk posed by the decaying *Safer* oil tanker.³⁷

The Security Council can continue to call the parties for actions and express concern with the most critical issues to demonstrate the position of the international community.

Diplomatic support: In 2012, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Envoy to the Secretary-General on Yemen. The Special Envoy helped to facilitate numerous rounds of negotiations to resolve the political

³⁴ OCHA, 2022. 'Yemen Humanitarian Update', OCHA, Issue 8/ August 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-update-issue-8-august-2022-enar>

³⁵ United Nations, 2022. 'Yemen: UN envoy outlines achievements and challenges in truce implementation', UN News, 11 July 2022 <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1122302>

³⁶ United Nations, 2022. 'Yemen: UN envoy outlines achievements and challenges in truce implementation', UN News, 11 July 2022 <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1122302>

³⁷ United Nations, 2022. 'Security Council calls for intensifying efforts to expand Yemen truce', UN News, 12 September 2022 <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1126481>

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impasse.³⁸ The Special Envoy helped to reach the current truce that is in force until October 2022. The Security Council can support the

efforts of the Special Envoy to reach an expanded agreement between the conflicting parties.

³⁸ Office of the Special Envoy of The Secretary-General for Yemen, n.d., Background, OSESGY, n.d., <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/background>

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