

On the Cutting Edge of Globalization¹

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Although globalization is marked by large processes with broad consequences in numerous arenas, it is sustained by concrete and identifiable people---by public officials who frame issues, make choices, negotiate outcomes, and implement policies; by corporate executives who generate resources, sell products, and focus on market shares; by technological specialists who facilitate communications and the analysis of policy alternatives; by consumers who purchase goods and workers who produce them; by tourists and immigrants who travel extensively; and by a host of other individuals who contribute to a vast diversity of transnational processes. Complex as these processes and policies are, however, the rapidly expanding literature on globalization has started to illuminate their dynamics.² But there remains at least one aspect of globalizing processes that remains elusive and unexplored as the focus of systematic inquiries: little is known about the individuals who give direction to and set the limits of the processes---those persons who can properly be described as operating on the cutting edge of globalization. Do Cutting-Edgers, as we call them, conceive of themselves as located on the forefront of globalization? Do they interact often? Do they form coordinated networks or mostly go their own way? Do they travel widely and often, or do they conduct most of their boundary-spanning work electronically? Does their participation in globalizing processes change their orientations toward their country of citizenship and to the very world they are helping to transform? Do their lives on the cutting edge alter their attitudes toward the meaning of “home” and their local communities, toward change and charitable giving, toward the role of government and the rich-poor gap? Are they concerned about the downsides of globalization, about its possible cultural and environmental consequences and its effects on the stability of governments? Has the Battle of Seattle and similar protests given them pause about the transnational activities in which they are involved?

Theoretical Concerns

As these questions imply, our project is founded on the premise that profound changes are at work in the world as the dynamics of globalization and the reactions thereto become increasingly central to the course of events at every level of community. The evidence of rapid and pervasive transformations seems to be everywhere as neoliberal economic policies, vast movements of people around the world, electronic and transportation technologies, and a host of other dynamics have led to what has been described as the relative death of time and distance. We presume that individuals who are deeply involved in the economic, social and political transformations have not simply absorbed the changes into their traditional behavior.³ Rather, our social scientific,

²See the 713 entries in the bibliography listed in Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 318-48.

³For full discussions of the various transformations at work in the present era, see James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, “Global Politics at

theoretical antennae tell us that all peoples---rich and poor, leaders and followers, Northerners and Southerners---are bound to have had their lives, outlooks, practices, and relationships altered by globalizing processes and the backlashes against globalization. More than that, we suspect that some of the most extensive alterations have occurred in the lives of those people in all walks of life who are on the cutting edge of the transformations presently underway. Unlike those who exclusively prefer traditional ways or otherwise resist globalization, Cutting-Edgers seem likely to seize the opportunities afforded by the worlds they are creating and to alter their long-standing practices and orientations to accommodate the dynamics of globalization. Such reorientation may even involve a limited reaffirmation of the value of “the local” in their own hyper-global lives. Conceivably, Cutting-Edgers, not least because of their rootless travel lifestyles, may be all the more connected to “home.”

Hypotheses like the foregoing are implicit in most of the globalization literature. People are seen as being induced by globalizing dynamics to attach loyalties to other collectivities than the nation-state. The explosive growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is but one example. These organizations may be worldwide in presence and scope—such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace—or they may be local both in their organization and their perspective, such as the Zapatistas or other separatist movements. But the local-global distinction is somewhat misleading. While the Zapatistas may be local in their orientation and objectives, for example, they rely upon global communications and the ability to mobilize distant masses in order to compensate for their relatively meager resources. It is one thing, of course, to note the rise of NGOs, but quite another to argue that all or many of them are anti-state or that many people will defy their governments either at the behest of an NGO with which they may identify or on their own initiative. Nevertheless, the marches of anti-globalization protesters in Seattle, Washington, D.C., London and Prague in 1999 and 2000 demonstrate the degree to which some persons are willing to react to globalization either as individuals or as followers of groups that are dramatically and even violently opposed to corporate policies or to the positions espoused by the official representatives of their countries. Ironically, it is the anti-globalization movement that perhaps best exemplifies the willingness of people to place a transnational agenda above the interests of their nation-state; often, however, it may also be at least a partial subnational or local agenda. Are Cutting-Edgers more or less likely to face such loyalty conflicts? Does involvement in globalization induce people, for example, to place professional obligations above those of citizenship? Does globalization make people more selfish or more altruistic, or does its impact vary among individuals?

Research Design and Methodology

The foregoing questions and theoretical concerns are the subject of much speculation and unsubstantiated analysis,⁴ but to our knowledge they have not been

the Turn of the Century: Changing Bases of ‘Us’ and ‘Them,’” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 79-107.

⁴See, for example, Peter L. Berger, “Four Faces of Global Culture,” *The National Interest*, No. 49 (Fall 1997), pp. 23-29; Geoffrey Garten, *The Mind of the CEO* (New York: Perseus, 2001); Ulf Hannerz

pursued in any available systematic surveys.⁵ Here, after first defining what we mean by globalization and its cutting edge, we offer the results of an early and perforce limited survey designed to reduce this important knowledge gap. It is a limited effort because our random sample of possible Cutting-Edgers consists entirely of Americans, of 889 persons listed in leadership compendia such as the CD-Rom edition of *Who's Who in America*, released in the summer of 1998. Our resources for the survey were such that we were unable to administer our research instrument to those on the cutting edge in other countries, a limitation we recognize as serious enough to treat our findings as a pilot study that we hope will lead to a revised and much more extensive, cross-country inquiry.

Globalization and Its Cutting Edge Defined

To employ our research instrument in the service of our theoretical concerns is to pose the questions of what is meant by globalization and its cutting edge. The literature offers a variety of answers, some narrow and some broad, to the questions. We have opted for a broad conception in which globalizing dynamics are conceived to be any processes that underlie the expansion of human activities beyond national boundaries on a scale that has the potential of becoming global in scope. The numerous processes that contribute to this expansivity consist of economic, social, cultural, political, and communications activities that result in flows of people, ideas, goods, money, pollution, norms, authority, and practices across borders.

Individuals who give structure and meaning to these flows are regarded as comprising the ranks of those on the cutting edge of globalization. But Cutting-Edgers are not simply those at the top of their organizations, or those with the highest salaries, or those who regularly attend the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland. Rather we employ a complex and multifaceted conception of Cutting-Edgers as persons who configure the flows through extensive experience abroad, through networking or otherwise maintaining a growing acquaintanceship with counterparts in other lands, and through recognition that their work entails responsibilities for sustaining the processes of globalization. In effect, Cutting-Edgers are conceived as persons highly involved in globalizing processes (or put in operational terms, as will be seen, as those who score high on an Involvement Index).

"Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture," in Mike Featherstone (ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 237-52; Christopher Lasch, *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); Robert Reich, *The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).

⁵For a narrow and partially available survey, see *Inside the Mind of the CEO: The 2000 Global Survey Report* (<http://www.pwcglobal.com>, January 2000). PricewaterhouseCoopers, which "designed and carried out" the survey "with the support of the World Economic Forum," has conducted several surveys of businessmen, but its latest inquiry was confined to 1,020 CEOs worldwide, whereas our inquiry was not confined to a single occupation or to a narrow set of questions about business. For another study that was also confined to business people and employed a very different methodology than the one used here to probe the identity of cutting-edge leaders in Australia, see Leslie Sklair, "Who Are the Globalizers? A Study of Key Globalisers in Australia," *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, No. 38 (December 1996), pp. 1-30.

The Survey

Our primary research instrument consisted of a 56-item, 173 sub-item questionnaire that was mailed on November 17, 1999, to 3,338 persons randomly chosen from leadership compendia. More accurately, on the assumption that persons in the economic realm predominate in globalizing processes, the list of recipients was compiled randomly in two broad occupational categories: those whose brief biographies indicated they were business executives and those lacking any indication that business was central to their accomplishments.⁶ Of the 2,267 comprising the business sample, 592, or 27 percent, returned the questionnaire, while the comparable figures for the nonbusiness sample were 297 and 28 percent. All the recipients were given an alternative of electronically answering the questionnaire or responding through the postal system with a stamped envelope that was provided. Six percent chose to respond online and 94 percent elected to return their questionnaire by mail. The total number of respondents, 889, was 27 percent of the original mailing.⁷

Since the research instrument was prepared prior to the so-called “Battle of Seattle” wherein diverse groups marched to protest globalization during a meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end of November 1999, it did not include items that specifically probed for differences between Cutting-Edgers and those inclined to resist the momentum toward a globalized world. Indeed, since nearly half of the questionnaires were returned during the two weeks prior to the Seattle protests, it did not allow for even an inferential probing for resistance orientations.⁸ However, in an effort to lessen this deficiency, we took advantage of the acceleration of the protest movement when it gathered in mid-April, 2000, on the streets of Washington, D.C. during a board meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to conduct street interviews among a random sample of those who marched. Although this truncated oral survey took a different form than the mailed questionnaire, two questions used in the oral interviews were taken verbatim from the mailed questionnaire. While we cannot account for any possible bias resulting from the use of different research instruments, we can plausibly offer comparisons based on these two identical questions (see Tables 1 and 2 below).

⁶From an initial batch of 4,359 business leaders selected from the compendia, we used a pseudo-random number generator to pare this sample down to 2,267 individuals who received copies of the questionnaire in the mail. Likewise, from an initial sample of 13,041 individuals identified as not being inside the business community, we used a pseudo-random number generator to select randomly the 1,071 individuals who received mailed copies of the questionnaire.

⁷Following the initial mailing of the questionnaire in November 1999, a follow-up was sent in December of 1999. The first wave evoked 93 percent of the total responses and the second wave 7 percent.

⁸We did record the date we received each respondent’s survey, allowing us to compare broadly the responses of those we received before the protests on November 30, 1999 to those we received afterward. We conducted *t*-tests to determine whether respondents who replied before the protests scored higher on either our Involvement Index or an index of orientations (positive/negative) toward globalization. To account for a possible lag in reporting, we tested two separate groups: those who returned their survey before November 30, 1999, and those who returned it before December 7, 1999. The *t* tests show that, using either reporting date, those respondents returning their survey before the protests did not score significantly higher on either index. We thus conclude that the occurrence of the protests in Seattle did not bias our results.

Some Initial Findings

In order to give an initial sense of the richness and subtlety of the materials we have accumulated, we start with a straightforward, brief comparison of the two items that were identical in both the leadership questionnaire and the supplemental oral survey of 149 persons in the streets surrounding the IMF headquarters. One question common to both research instruments concerned the respondents' orientation toward a globalized future. It consisted of identical wording about the degree to which change was perceived as controllable. As can be seen in Table 1, the protesters, in all likelihood because they were surveyed while acting in the service of their own values, were hugely more inclined to believe they could control change than were those in the leadership sample. The second item offered the option of choosing among five alternative characterizations of patriotism and Table 2 reveals that the protest sample is strikingly more dubious about the importance and relevance of patriotism, possibly suggesting awareness that their actions were unlikely to be viewed as patriotic even as the leaders may have viewed such sentiments as undermining globalization.

Table 1: In general, do you feel you that you control change, or does change control you?				
	Leadership sample (n=849) %		Protest sample (n=147) %	
I control change	(295)	35	(100)	68
Change controls me	(232)	27	(11)	7
Not sure	(190)	22	(10)	7
Other	(132)	16	(26)	18
				df=3; $\chi^2=70.72$ p < .001

Table 2: Would you say patriotism is . . . [check all that apply]					
	selected this alternative (n=) %		did not select this alternative (n=) %		Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
. . . an increasingly obsolete sentiment					
Leadership sample (n=878)	(136)	15	(742)	85	df=1; χ^2 =3.53 p = .060
Protest sample (n=132)	(20)	22	(103)	78	
. . . of continuing major importance					
Leadership sample (n=878)	(570)	65	(308)	35	df=1; χ^2 =100.23 p < .001
Protest sample (n=132)	(25)	19	(107)	81	
. . . of largely symbolic or psychological significance					
Leadership sample (n=878)	(322)	37	(556)	63	df=1; χ^2 =1.22 p = .269
Protest sample (n=132)	(55)	41	(77)	58	
. . . no longer relevant to the course of events					
Leadership sample (n=878)	(29)	3	(849)	97	df=1; χ^2 =94.69 p < .001
Protest sample (n=132)	(33)	25	(98)	75	

The Leadership Sample

Of the 889 recipients of the survey who returned their questionnaires, 689 were men compared to 190 women. The respondents included 35 individuals who reported having an annual income greater than \$1 million, 235 respondents reported an annual income less than \$100,000, and 584 indicated an annual income between \$100,000 and \$1 million. Of the respondents who provided a party affiliation, 258 were Democrats and 355 were Republicans. The mean age of respondents was 55 years old; the oldest respondent was 77 while the youngest was 28.

Identifying the Cutting-Edgers

While all the respondents had biographies in leadership compendia, we did not assume they were all Cutting-Edgers. Rather, we presumed that some, perhaps many, were leaders in fields not encompassed by the dynamics of globalization. Accordingly, we used a series of procedures to identify those respondents who could be classified as active on the cutting edge. Elaborated in the Appendix A, one of these was a factor analysis that resulted in the creation of the Involvement Index out of fifteen items in the questionnaire.⁹ Further procedures, also detailed in Appendix A, yielded 741 respondents who answered all fifteen items and led to the presumption that the 187 respondents whose scores comprised the top quartile of the Index could reasonably be assumed to be Cutting-Edgers. We use the label of Other Leaders to designate the remaining 554 whose scores fell in the lowest three quartiles of the Index.¹⁰

Of the Cutting-Edgers, men comprised 84 percent and women 16 percent, compared to the 78 percent of the men and 22 percent of the women among the Other Leaders. This difference in proportions is not significant.¹¹ Likewise, the two groups did not differ

⁹For an index to be regarded as statistically reliable, it had to yield an alpha score over 0.70. The Cronbach alpha score for the Involvement Index was 0.7331.

¹⁰Although 889 people completed the questionnaires, the sum of the Cutting-edgers and Other Leaders is a lesser figure because 148 respondents did not provide enough data to calculate a score on the Index. There is no reason to believe, however, that the inclusion of these 148 the non-scorers would have materially altered our findings. Of 170 comparisons between the responses of the omitted 148 and the 741 who recorded an index score, 142 were not statistically significant; and of the remaining 28 comparisons, 17 differences were significant between the scorers and non-scorers as well as between the Cutting-Edgers and the Other Leaders. In only 11 instances, in other words, did the scorers and non-scorers differ significantly and only one of these was significant at the $p < .001$ level (at that level the non-scorers were more inclined to specify that "certain individuals" constituted "a threat to your well being" than were the scorers---a finding that eludes interpretation and seems essentially random).

¹¹ $\chi^2 = 3.45$, $df = 1$. In order to facilitate comparison between the two groups, throughout the data analysis percentage figures are rounded off to the nearest whole, and chi square and t tests are employed so as to delineate those comparisons that are statistically significant at the .05, .01, and .001 levels of probability. Differences at the .05 level or greater are considered significant. In the tabular results reported for each comparison the abbreviation "df" is used for degrees of freedom and "ns" for not significant. In the case of those items that required the calculation of mean scores to test for significance, alternative responses were assigned weighted scores.

significantly in either their party identification or their political views on a quasi-Likert scale from “far left/very liberal” to “very conservative/far right.” Nor was there a significant difference in the reported levels of education.¹² Over half of the Cutting-Edgers were born before 1945 (80 of the 119 who provided a year of birth), while only six were born after 1955. The Cutting-Edgers averaged 56 years old compared to 55 years for the Other Leaders, a small but significant age difference.¹³ The Cutting-Edgers also reported a significantly higher annual income than did Other Leaders.¹⁴

Finally, it will be recalled that before we mailed the questionnaire to respondents we identified two broad categories: those whose brief biographies indicated they are business executives, and those who lacked any indication their professional accomplishments derive from success in the business world. This allows us to test one of the most common hypotheses in the globalization literature: that businessmen and women are central to the diverse processes of globalization. Surprisingly, however, the test failed: the proportion of the business and nonbusiness Cutting-Edgers is not significantly different than the comparable proportion of Other Leaders.¹⁵ From this we conclude that the Involvement Index performs well in identifying each respondent’s participation in the diverse processes of globalization irrespective of his or her profession. It is a more valid and reliable measure of an individual’s involvement in globalization than simple behavioral traits like profession or income are.

The Involvement Index

Table 3 presents the fifteen items that comprise the Involvement Index. Since the Cronbach alpha score for the Index (0.7331) is statistically significant, just to know its components is sufficient to grasp how the involvement of the Cutting-Edgers is differentiated from Other Leaders. However, given a conviction that our data are so unique as to warrant a full presentation in the event others have occasion to make use of them, we err on the side of completeness by including in Table 3 the responses of the Cutting-Edgers to each of the fifteen items. The same reasoning underlies the inclusion of the distributions for Other Leaders even though the differences between them and the Cutting-Edgers on all the items are, by definition, bound to be huge and thus not appropriately subjected to statistical comparisons. While Table 3 must thus be read with caution, it clearly indicates that involvement in the processes of globalization is founded on a number of diverse factors---behavioral, attitudinal, and experiential. This conclusion

¹²For party identification, $\chi^2=1.50$, $df=4$. For self-identification of political views, $\chi^2=1.73$, $df=5$. For level of education, the $\chi^2=10.39$, $df=9$.

¹³ The t value is 1.8909, $df=470$, $p<.05$.

¹⁴ To maximize our response rate, we elected to ask respondents to indicate their annual income within a choice of ranges rather than to provide a specific figure. For this reason we conducted a chi-square test to compare the income data for the two sub-samples. The Cutting-Edgers reported a higher percentage of millionaires, and a higher percentage in the \$100,000 to \$1 million range, than did the Other Leaders. $\chi^2=17.2174$, $df=2$, $p<0.001$.

¹⁵ $\chi^2=3.1640$, $df=1$.

is amplified in the patterns uncovered in the many items of the questionnaire not included in the Involvement Index and presented in the subsequent analysis.

Table 3: THE FIFTEEN COMPONENTS OF THE INVOLVEMENT INDEX AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO THEM									
1. What are the bases for your contacts abroad? [check if applicable]									
		Cutting-Edgers				Other Leaders			
		check (n=)	%	no check (n=)	%	check (n=)	%	no check (n=)	%
Your professional expertise is in demand		(161)	86	(26)	14	(247)	45	(307)	55
2. To what extent do you feel a sense of identity with professional associates abroad?									
		closely identified		somewhat identified		mildly identified		None	
		(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)		(76)	41	(96)	51	(14)	7	(1)	1
Other Leaders (n=554)		(62)	11	(179)	32	(206)	37	(107)	19
3. To what extent do you feel you have more in common with counterparts in your profession elsewhere in the world than with your fellow citizens in different lines of work? [check only one]									
				Cutting-Edgers (n=187) %		Other Leaders (n=554) %			
I have more in common with my fellow citizens than distant professional counterparts				(28) 15		(246) 44			
I have more in common with professional counterparts abroad than with my fellow citizens				(59) 32		(86) 16			
I feel equal commonality with both my fellow citizens and my professional counterparts abroad				(100) 53		(222) 40			
4. Approximately how many times have you traveled abroad in the past two years for a vacation or other personal matters?									
		Cutting-Edgers average number of trips (n=)				Other Leaders average number of trips (n=)			
		1.23 (187)				0.65 (554)			
5. Is networking with others abroad important to you?									
		Yes				No			
		(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)		(176)	94	(11)	6				
OtherLeaders (n=544)		(334)	60	(220)	40				

6 and 7. Are you inclined to actively promote dialogue in your home or professional community about essential global issues? [check all that apply]					
6. Yes, I feel a sense of responsibility in this regard					
	checked (n=) %		did not check (n=) %		
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(149)	80	(38)	20	
Other Leaders (n=554)	(354)	64	(200)	36	
7. No, my leadership responsibilities do not encompass these issues					
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(32)	17	(155)	83	
Other Leaders (n=554)	(163)	29	(391)	71	
8, 9, and 10. How would you characterize the relevance of your work with respect to the diverse processes of globalization?					
	Cutting-Edgers (n=187) %		Other Leaders (n=554) %		
8. Economic processes					
Continuously relevant:	(143)	76	(252)	45	
Occasionally relevant:	(36)	19	(185)	33	
Seldom relevant:	(7)	4	(86)	16	
Never relevant:	(1)	1	(31)	6	
9. Cultural processes					
Continuously relevant:	(116)	62	(195)	35	
Occasionally relevant:	(59)	32	(223)	40	
Seldom relevant:	(12)	6	(108)	19	
Never relevant:	(0)	0	(28)	5	
10. Political processes					
Continuously relevant:	(101)	54	(129)	23	
Occasionally relevant:	(63)	34	(190)	34	
Seldom relevant:	(20)	11	(169)	31	
Never relevant:	(3)	2	(66)	12	
11. Did you ever study abroad? ¹⁶					
	Yes (n=) %		No (n=) %		
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(103)	55	(84)	45	
Other Leaders (n=554)	(99)	18	(455)	82	
12. How many languages do you read or speak? ¹⁶					
	One (n=) %	Two (n=) %	three (n=) %	Four (n=) %	Five or more (n=) %

¹⁶It is interesting to compare the Cutter-Edgers' data for study abroad and languages spoken or read with comparable figures for members of the U.S. Congress: nearly one-third of the members were reported to have studied or worked abroad and one-fifth said they "speak a foreign language well enough to conduct business beyond America's borders." Eric Schmitt and Elizabeth Becker, "Insular Congress Appears to be Myth," *New York Times*, November 4, 2000, p. A9.

Cutting Edgers (n=187)	(29) 16	(74) 40	(56) 30	(19) 10	(9) 5
Other Leaders (n=554)	(312) 56	(195) 35	(37) 7	(7) 1	(3) 1
13, 14, and 15: Approximately how many times have you resided for more than six months outside the country in which you . . .					
	Cutting-Edgers average number of times (n=)		Other Leaders average number of times (n=)		
13 . . . were born	1.16 (187)		0.22 (554)		
14 . . . are a citizen	1.09 (187)		0.19 (554)		
15 . . . are employed	0.84 (187)		0.12 (554)		

On the Cutting Edge

In turning now to how the conduct, orientations, attributes, and connections of the Cutting-Edgers do and do not differ from Other Leaders, it is important to stress that the differences are marked by subtlety, that the entire sample consists of leaders and thus in some respects the two groups share predispositions inherent in any positions to which leadership responsibilities attach. Put differently, a number of the differences between them proved not to be statistically significant, a finding that highlights those issues on which involvement in globalizing processes matters. We begin by comparing how Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders connect themselves to the world and investigate whether the connections transform their attitudes toward their nation-state. Then we turn to comparisons of the two groups' attitudes toward patriotism, their professional organizations, and their state. Next we compare orientations toward globalization, its consequences and various issues and instruments associated with global processes. The discussion concludes with a comparison of some personal attributes of Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders.

Connectivity with the World

Throughout the globalization literature it is often suggested that an individual's connectivity to the world transforms his or her attitudes toward local, state, and international authorities. Cutting-Edgers are seen as more cosmopolitan and less parochial than are those who are not immersed in global processes. We explored this reasoning by asking the respondents a simple yes/no question: "Do you regard one country as 'home'?" Consistent with Item 3 in the Involvement Index, Table 4 presents a telling finding: although the percentages are small, the Cutting-Edgers answered "no" significantly more than did the Other Leaders. Though the small percentages suggest that this orientation toward one's country may be nascent, the significant difference lend support to the argument that globalization can transform the attitudes of individuals.

Table 4: Do you regard one country as "home"?

	Cutting-Edgers (n=185) %		Other Leaders (n=554) %		Pearson (χ^2) value
Yes	(169)	91	(548)	99	df=1; $\chi^2=27.48$ p<.001
No	(16)	9	(6)	1	

To probe further the potential of such transformations, the respondents were asked to indicate among seven possible close-at-hand locales as many as they considered “home” and among four possible ways in which they regarded the “world” as their home. These probes yielded a sharp and logical discrepancy between the Cutting-Edgers and the Other Leaders. While the two groups did not record any significant differences for any of the seven close-at-hand alternatives---they responded similarly with respect to “where I was raised,” “where I am a citizen,” “where I feel a sense of ethnic, racial, or religious community,” “where I am employed,” “where my immediate family or partner lives,” “where I plan to retire,” and “wherever my professional colleagues may be”¹⁷---in important respects these similarities disappear in the pattern of their choices when they were asked about the more remote world as their home (Table 5). Given a choice of any or all of four conceptions of the world as their home, the Cutting-Edgers differed significantly and substantially from the Other Leaders on the two most specific and positive alternatives, while the differences on the two most general alternatives and the one negative alternative were not significant, presumably because they tap dimensions of leadership irrespective of one’s proximity to the cutting edge. The first two rows of Table 5 display the wide differences between the two groups on the more specific alternatives even as the last three rows highlight the absence of statistical differences insofar as general and negative alternatives were concerned.

Table 5: In what sense, if any, is the world your home? [check all that apply]									
	Cutting-Edgers				Other Leaders				Pearson chi
	check	no check	check	no check	check	no check	check	no check	square value (χ^2)
	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	
In the sense that I have traveled widely	(155)	83	(32)	17	(290)	52	(264)	48	df=1; χ^2 =54.36 p < .001
. . . that I earn my living in many parts of it	(95)	51	(92)	49	(122)	22	(432)	78	df=1; χ^2 =55.92 p < .001
. . . that I feel a connection with humanity everywhere	(116)	62	(71)	38	(336)	61	(218)	39	df=1; χ^2 =0.11 p = 0.738
. . . that I am keenly aware of the large extent to which the world is interdependent	(157)	84	(30)	16	(451)	81	(103)	19	df=1; χ^2 =0.62 p = .432

¹⁷It is noteworthy that among these seven alternatives two-thirds of both groups cited “where my immediate family or partner lives” as home, followed by “where I am a citizen” (roughly 60 percent), “where I was raised” (42 percent), “where I am employed” (30 percent), “where I feel a sense of ethnic, racial, or religious community” (21 percent), “where I plan to retire” (16 percent), and “wherever my professional colleagues may be” (8 percent).

No, the 'world' has no meaning for me	(5) 3 (182) 97	(14) 3 (540) 97	df=1; $\chi^2=0.01$ p = .913
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While we assumed that the Cutting-Edgers would see themselves as having a professional expertise in demand abroad (row 1 of Table 3), this was not the only basis of their foreign contacts. As can be seen in Table 6, they reported significantly greater connectivity to the world than did the Other Leaders along four dimensions. These distributions suggest that the sensitivity to globalizing dynamics of the Cutting-Edgers are more broad-gauged than those of Other Leaders, that a multiplicity of reasons can underlie their movement to and on the cutting edge of globalization.

Table 6: What are the bases for your contacts abroad? [check all that apply]					
	Cutting-Edgers		Other Leaders		Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
	check (n=)	no check (%)	check (n=)	no check (%)	
Your company's or organization's assignments	(117) 63	(70) 37	(257) 46	(297) 54	df=1; $\chi^2=14.64$ p<.001
Your free-lance work involves foreign contacts	(71) 38	(116) 62	(91) 16	(463) 84	df=1; $\chi^2=37.98$ p<.001
Your curiosity leads you to distant places	(121) 65	(66) 35	(275) 50	(279) 50	df=1; $\chi^2=12.76$ p<.001
The continuing globalization of world affairs	(73) 39	(114) 61	(115) 21	(439) 79	df=1; $\chi^2=24.67$ p<.001

Perhaps even more compelling indicators of the large extent to which Cutting-Edgers are connected to the larger world outside the United States is indicated by the findings generated by a list of twelve entities with which they "feel a sense of identity." On ten of the alternatives---family and friends, neighbors, community where you reside, supervisors and/or those you supervise, an ethnic or racial group, political party or philosophy, country of birth, a region, fellow citizens, and humanity at large---the Cutting-Edgers and the Other leaders did not differ significantly. However, although we assumed the Cutting-Edgers would report they "closely" or "somewhat" identified with professional associates abroad (row 2 of Table 3), so did 94 percent record that they identified with counterparts in their professions at home, thus suggesting that networking dynamics are part and parcel of leadership in a globalizing world.

Table 7: To what extent do you feel a sense of identity with professional associates at home ?					
	closely identified		somewhat identified		Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
	(n=)	(%)	(n=)	(%)	
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(102)	55	(73)	39	df=3; $\chi^2=23.33$ p<.001
Other Leaders (n=552)	(204)	37	(256)	46	
	(82)	15	(10)	2	

Connectivity Through Travel

It is a virtual truism to assert that life on the cutting edge requires moving widely around the world. To be sure, on occasion top leaders may be inclined to have their subordinates travel on their behalf, but it is doubtful whether they can exercise their leadership by staying at home and using electronic avenues to establish and maintain their connectivity. More accurately, we reasoned that both face-to-face and electronic connections are prerequisites to the occupancy of global roles and thus included items in the questionnaire that sought to determine the extent to which Cutting-Edgers travel or otherwise interact with counterparts elsewhere in the world. Table 8 presents the findings on the degree and direction of their foreign travels in comparison to the Other Leaders. Although we assumed that Cutting-Edgers vacation abroad more often than do Other Leaders (row 4, Table 3), their responses depict a large gap between the two groups in other kinds of travel, with the Cutting-Edgers making twice as many trips abroad for business purposes than did the Other Leaders. Comparisons of the frequency of their trips to Europe and Asia are also conspicuous.¹⁸

Table 8: Approximately how many times have you traveled abroad on business in the past two years? (comparisons based on two-sample <i>t</i> test with unequal variance)						
	Cutting-Edgers average number of trips (n=)	Other Leaders average number of trips (n=)	<i>t</i>	degrees of freedom	p<	
	2.17 (186)	0.88 (554)	10.23	275	.001	
Approximately how many times have you traveled in the last decade to countries in						
Africa?	1.50 (187)	0.35 (554)	3.10	205	.01	
Asia?	8.53 (187)	1.69 (554)	5.19	195	.001	
Europe?	23.64 (187)	6.37 (553)	3.76	190	.001	
Middle East?	2.61 (187)	0.45 (553)	4.04	194	.001	
South America?	4.11 (187)	0.93 (554)	4.35	205	.001	

On the other hand, while the Cutting-Edgers report more travel to a greater variety of places abroad, they do not travel domestically any more frequently than Other Leaders. Table 9 indicates that, for vacation or other personal matters, the Cutting-Edgers actually travel domestically significantly *less* frequently than do the Other Leaders: whereas the latter report taking an average of eight trips within the United States each year, the Cutting-Edgers averaged five domestic trips. Given this surprising finding, we can only speculate as to the reasons for it. One possibility is that with their extensive international travel, Cutting-Edgers simply do not have as much time to travel domestically.

¹⁸These figures on foreign travel for both groups closely parallel comparable data for members of the U.S. Congress. See Schmitt and Becker, "Insular Congress Appears to be Myth," p. A9.

The synergism of travel and electronic connectivity is further reinforced and facilitated by the Cutting-Edgers' extensive use of laptop computers. As indicated in Table 11, they are much more likely to move around the world with a laptop than are Other Leaders.

	Yes (n=) %	No (n=) %	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
Cutting-Edgers (n=183)	(109) 60	(74) 40	df=1; $\chi^2=15.35$ p<.001
Other Leaders (n=546)	(234) 43	(312) 57	

Table 12: **Approximately how many names do you add to your address book, rolodex, or computer each month?**

	26 or more (n=) %	11 to 25 (n=) %	6 to 10 (n=) %	1 to 5 (n=) %	None (n=) %	Pearson chi-square
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						value (χ^2)
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(19) 10	(36) 19	(67) 36	(65) 35	(0) 0	df=4; $\chi^2=38.29$ p<.001
Other Leaders (n=551)	(22) 4	(70) 13	(136) 25	(297) 54	(26) 5	

Leadership and Loyalties

Having established that our sample contains elites active on the cutting edge of globalization, we wondered whether they viewed themselves as occupying leadership positions and, if so, whether their participation in the processes of globalization lead them to express loyalties to organizations and goals other than those of the nation-state? While the answer to the first question is clear-cut, responses to the second are not. Yes, the Cutting-Edgers do perceive themselves as leaders, as nearly nine-tenths of them reported being at or near the top of their professions. Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 13, these perceptions were significantly greater than those of the Other Leaders.

Table 13: Do you think of yourself as . . .									
	Among the top leaders of your organization or profession (n=) %		Close to the top (n=) %		In the middle range (n=) %		Toward the bottom (n=) %		Pearson chi- square value (χ^2)
Cutting-Edgers (n=184)	(99)	54	(59)	32	(25)	13.5	(1)	0.5	df=3; $\chi^2=18.44$ p < .001
Other Leaders (n=536)	(205)	38	(193)	36	(116)	22	(22)	4	

Although we assumed that Cutting-Edgers would shoulder responsibilities in diverse arenas (rows 6-10, Table 3), they exhibit more complex patterns of allegiances linked to these responsibilities. This complexity is particularly interesting since, as indicated in Table 4, the Cutting-Edgers are significantly less likely to view one country as home, suggesting that they may have different priorities than Other Leaders if their professional or organizational goals and obligations conflict with their civic duties. Unlike the “home” question, however, the results of four queries that more directly addressed broader issues of responsibility and loyalty yielded no significant differences of opinion between the two groups Table 14). On the contrary, and perhaps more important, a negative set of findings on these queries tends to disconfirm the various assertions in the impressionistic literature about the loyalties of leaders on the cutting edge of globalization.¹⁹ Rather, the distribution of responses suggest that the priorities of all elites—not just those on the cutting edge—are inconsistent with the traditional notions of identity and loyalty, that national loyalties are problematic for more than a few leaders,

¹⁹ See, for example, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, *World Class: Thriving Locally in the Global Economy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), chap. 1; and Robert B. Reich, *The Future of Success* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), Chap. 4.

that more than half of both groups value their own well-being ahead of their organizational ties, and that no more than a third of both groups attach unqualified priority to their civic obligations relative to their professional obligations. Accordingly, while these findings say more about leaders in general than they say about those on the cutting edge of globalization, it can be argued that the absence of differences between the two groups hint at two theoretically interesting possibilities: that our sample contains some self-centered leaders from the “baby boomer” generation whose members have difficulty committing to values not encompassed by their narrow self interests (though the mean age of our respondents, 55 years old when we mailed the survey in 1999, may refute this); or that the processes globalization may have consequences for all leaders, irrespective of whether or not they are active on the cutting edge. While the survey lacks a means to distinguish between these possibilities, the responses to the four questions do hint at the presence of self-centered priorities.

One of the four questions directly addressed the question of national loyalties by offering four interpretations of patriotism. As can be seen in Table 14, a widespread consensus was uncovered in the huge proportions of both groups who avoided treating patriotism as “an increasingly obsolete sentiment” or “no longer relevant to the course of events.” On the other hand, the nature of the consensus would appear to be limited by the findings that more than one-third of both groups---hardly a trivial proportion---regarded patriotism as “of largely symbolic and psychological significance” and chose not to view it as “of continuing major importance.”²⁰

Table 14: Would you say patriotism is [check all that apply]				
... an increasingly obsolete sentiment				
	checked (n=) %		did not check (n=) %	
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(28)	15	(159)	85
Other Leaders (n=553)	(94)	17	(459)	83
... of continuing major importance				
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(118)	63	(69)	37
Other Leaders (n=553)	(370)	67	(183)	33
... of largely symbolic or psychological significance				
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(73)	39	(114)	61
Other Leaders (n=553)	(197)	36	(356)	64
... no longer relevant to the course of events				
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(5)	3	(182)	97
Other Leaders (n=553)	(17)	3	(536)	97

The other three questions designed to elicit priorities confronted the respondents with hypothetical conflicts among their professional, organizational, national, and civic obligations. Mixed findings resulted and are presented in Table 15. Interestingly, both Cutting-Edgers and Other leaders are substantially more likely to attach a higher priority

²⁰For a journalistic interpretation along these lines, see William Safire, “The New Patriotism,” *New York Times*, July 2, 2001, p. A19.

to their company or organization than to the interests of their country. By contrast, there is no significant difference in the priority that the two groups attach to their careers, though both are inclined to attach a higher priority to their careers than to their organizational or civic obligations—another possible sign of self-centered orientations. Unfortunately we did not inquire directly into the relative priority of their loyalties to their country and careers, but that fact that only two-thirds rejected putting the interests of their country ahead of those of their company or organization suggests that a country-career comparison might yield more than a few leaders who accord a lower priority to their country. That loyalty issues are problematic is also indicated by the unusually large proportions of both groups who selected the “not sure” alternative in all three parts of Table 15. Indeed, if the responses to the “not sure” and “I avoid such choices” are combined in each of the parts, more than one fifth of both the Cutting-Edgers and the Other Leaders recorded uncertainty as to their loyalties.

Table 15: If a vital choice involving your company or organization could not be avoided, would you put its interests ahead of those of your country?

	Yes		No		I avoid such choices		Not Sure		Pearson chi-square value
	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(χ^2)
Cutting-Edgers (n=186)	(22)	12	(119)	64	(10)	5	(35)	19	df=3; χ^2 =6.01 p = .111
Other Leaders (n=546)	(39)	7	(337)	62	(34)	6	(135)	25	
If a vital choice involving your career could not be avoided, would you put your professional needs ahead of those of your company or organization?									
Cutting-Edgers (n=182)	(100)	55	(45)	25	(7)	4	(30)	16	df=3; χ^2 =2.52 p = .472
Other Leaders (n=545)	(314)	58	(108)	20	(17)	3	(105)	19	
If your professional responsibilities and your civic obligations come into conflict, which are likely to prevail most of the time?									
	Professional obligations		Civic obligations		I avoid such conflicts		Not sure		
Cutting-Edgers (n=183)	(82)	45	(60)	33	(14)	8	(27)	15	df=3; χ^2 =6.02 p = .111
Other Leaders (n=546)	(269)	49	(131)	24	(41)	8	(104)	19	

General Attitudes Toward Globalization

A variety of the questionnaire items sought to probe how life on the cutting edge orients leaders toward the dynamics of globalization. One investigated whether Cutting-Edgers reflect upon their participation in its myriad processes and, if so, whether or not their attitudes differed significantly from other leaders less involved in globalization. Again the results are mixed. On the one hand, Cutting-Edgers recorded a significantly greater sense of responsibility for the course of events in world affairs, an inclination to worry about and try to affect them more, and a sense of being less ineffective in influencing the course of events than do Other Leaders (Table 16). They are also significantly more likely to seek to advance globalization and avoid thinking about its larger consequences than are Other Leaders (Table 17). Both sets of responses along these lines paint a picture of Cutting-Edgers as feeling more empowered and ready to

promote more actively the processes of globalization. On the other hand, the two groups exhibit no significant differences of opinion about whether or not globalization is a “bad” set of processes that should be altered, hindered or retarded (Table 18).

Table 16: With respect to the course of events in world affairs, do you . . .					
	Often (n=) %	Occasionally (n=) %	Never (n=) %	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)	
. . . have a sense of responsibility for them					
Cutting-Edgers (n=185)	(79) 43	(92) 50	(14) 8	df=2; χ^2 =37.02 p < .001	
Other Leaders (n=543)	(112) 21	(344) 63	(87) 16		
. . . worry about them					
Cutting-Edgers (n=179)	(89) 50	(79) 44	(11) 6	df=2; χ^2 =13.21 p < .01	
Other Leaders (n=536)	(186) 35	(316) 59	(34) 6		
. . . try to affect them					
Cutting-Edgers (n=180)	(61) 34	(103) 57	(16) 9	df=2; χ^2 =35.28 p < .001	
Other Leaders (n=536)	(83) 15	(337) 63	(116) 22		
. . . feel ineffective with respect to them					
Cutting-Edgers (n=167)	(41) 25	(88) 53	(38) 23	df=2; χ^2 =18.44 p < .001	
Other Leaders (n=529)	(228) 43	(208) 39	(93) 18		

Table 17: To the extent your work is relevant to the processes of globalization, do you usually:						
	Seek to advance the processes (n=) %	Seek to resist the processes (n=) %	Seek to redirect the processes (n=) %	Not think about its larger consequences (n=) %	My work has no relevance for globalization (n=) %	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
Cutting-Edgers (n=177)	(141) 79.5	(1) 0.5	(27) 15	(5) 3	(3) 2	df=4; χ^2 =30.92 p < .001
Other Leaders (n=524)	(340) 65	(8) 2	(58) 11	(75) 14	(43) 8	

Since the Cutting-Edgers are more inclined to seek to advance the processes of globalization, it is hardly surprising that they are significantly more likely to view these processes as good ones that should be facilitated. Nevertheless, as indicated in Table 18, there are no other significant differences of opinion between the two groups with respect to a series of other judgments about globalization. But these negative results are not without interest. In the case of the characterization of globalization as a “bad” set of processes, it is worth noting that while 99 percent of the Cutting-Edgers and 97 percent of the Other Leaders did not make such a judgment, this finding may reflect the fact that our sample consists entirely of Americans. Hence, because globalization may benefit some nationalities and not others, the finding may reflect sample bias. It may also reflect the

fact that the sample consisted only of those leaders viewed as likely to be involved in globalizing processes. In the future, we hope to correct this deficiency by administering the survey not only to non-Americans who are Cutting-Edgers but to critics of globalization as well.

Table 18: On balance do you believe globalization is . . . [check all that apply]						
		checked (n=) %		did not check (n=) %		Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
. . . a “good” set of processes?						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(103)	55	(83)	45	df=1; χ^2 =5.40 p < .05
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(249)	46	(298)	54	
. . . a “bad” set of processes?						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(1)	0.5	(185)	99.5	df=1; χ^2 =0.06 p = .062
Other Leaders	(n=554)	(16)	3	(531)	97	
. . . a “good” set of processes for some and a “bad” set for others?						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(87)	47	(99)	53	df=1; χ^2 =1.17 p = .279
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(281)	51	(266)	49	
. . . a set of processes that can be facilitated?						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(82)	44	(104)	56	df=1; χ^2 =0.33 p = .566
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(228)	42	(319)	58	
. . . a set of processes that should be facilitated?						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(109)	59	(77)	41	df=1; χ^2 =6.58 p < .05
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(261)	48	(286)	52	
. . . a set of processes that can be altered, hindered, or retarded?						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(58)	31	(128)	69	df=1; χ^2 =0.03 p = .874
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(174)	32	(373)	68	
. . . a set of processes that should be altered, hindered, or retarded?						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(18)	10	(168)	90	df=1; χ^2 =0.67 p = .412
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(65)	12	(482)	88	

Another possible explanation for these mixed findings is that Cutting-Edgers may simply be more optimistic or feel more empowered in general—not just toward the consequences of globalization—than is the case for Other Leaders. However, this reasoning does not hold up in the light of responses to two questions that sought to determine orientations toward change and the future. One asked, “In general, do you feel that you control change, or that change controls you?” Perhaps because the question was not cast in a globalization context, the two groups did not differ significantly in their responses. Interestingly, in sharp contrast to the reaction of protesters set forth in Table 1, only a minority of both the Cutting-Edgers and the Other Leaders felt they exercised control over change (Table 19), with well over one-fourth of both groups indicating uncertainty on the issue either directly or by not answering the question.²¹ Nevertheless,

²¹The number who responded to this question is conspicuously lower than is the case for the preponderance of other items. Indeed, offered a chance to specify in writing an alternative response, many respondents wrote in that they *both* controlled change and were controlled by it.

	Cutting-Edgers (n=148)	%	Other Leaders (n=476)	%	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
I control change	(69)	47	(188)	40	df=2;
Change controls me	(41)	28	(162)	34	$\chi^2=2.81$
Not sure	(38)	26	(126)	26	p = .245

	much better		better		Same		Worse		much worse		Pearson Chi square value (χ^2)
	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	
Cutting-Edgers (n=176)	(28)	16	(94)	53	(26)	15	(23)	13	(5)	3	df=4; $\chi^2=8.32$ p = .080
Other Leaders (n=537)	(56)	10	(261)	49	(111)	21	(96)	18	(13)	2	

²²PricewaterhouseCoopers, *Inside the Mind of the CEO*, p. 5.

Leaders differed significantly on only one alternative: that globalization “sharpens the skills of individuals” (Table 21). One can only guess as to why this is the sole significant difference. Perhaps Cutting-Edgers exceed Other Leaders in this respect because of a greater sensitivity of the role of workers, entrepreneurs, computer specialists and other highly skilled professions play in the processes of globalization. Whatever the reason, however, it is not as if the Other Leaders dismissed the impact on individual skills: more than two-thirds of them checked this alternative, a proportion exceeded only by their assessment of how globalization tends to sensitize people to other cultures. This proportion also stands in sharp contrast to the small proportion who checked the three other consequences involving individuals, their selfishness, their political apathy, and their tendency toward homogeneity. Equally noteworthy is the apparent lack of concern among both Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders for the rich-poor gaps separating both people and nations. Contrary to much of the literature on the subject,²³ two-thirds of both groups did not perceive globalization as a source of the rich-poor gaps even as a majority of both sub-samples also perceived globalization as promoting the power of corporations—a finding that could readily be interpreted as reinforcing the earlier suggestion that the respondents are members of a self-absorbed generation.

Table 21: On balance, do you regard the diverse processes of globalization as . . .				
[check all that apply]				
		checked (n=) %	did not check (n=) %	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
. . . making people more selfish				
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(24) 13	(162) 87	df=1; χ^2 =0.46 p = .499
Other Leaders	(n=551)	(61) 11	(490) 89	
. . . sharpening the skills of individuals				
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(147) 79	(39) 21	df=1; χ^2 =7.55 p < .01
Other Leaders	(n=552)	(378) 68	(174) 32	
. . . fostering political apathy				
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(25) 13	(161) 87	df=1; χ^2 =0.90 p = .342
Other Leaders	(n=552)	(60) 11	(492) 89	
. . . promoting the power of corporations				
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(106) 57	(80) 43	df=1; χ^2 =0.04 p = .844
Other Leaders	(n=552)	(310) 56	(242) 44	
. . . sensitizing people to other cultures				
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(155) 83	(31) 17	df=1; χ^2 =0.96 p = .328
Other Leaders	(n=552)	(442) 80	(110) 20	
. . . widening the gap between rich and poor nations				
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(59) 32	(127) 68	df=1; χ^2 =1.66 p = .197
Other Leaders	(n=552)	(148) 26	(404) 73	

²³ Works that focus on various dimensions of the rich-poor gap include J. Brecher and T. Costello, *Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction From the Bottom Up* (Boston: South End Press, 1994); David C. Korten, *When Corporations Rule the World* (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1995); and Saskia Sassen, *Globalization and Its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money* (New York: The New Press, 1998).

... widening the gap between rich and poor individuals					
Cutting-Edgers (n=186)	(67)	36	(119)	64	df=1; $\chi^2=3.23$ p = .072
Other Leaders (n=552)	(160)	29	(392)	71	
... creating too much homogeneity					
Cutting-Edgers (n=186)	(23)	12	(163)	88	df=1; $\chi^2=0.0003$ p = .987
Other Leaders (n=552)	(68)	12	(484)	88	

A similar, even more upbeat pattern is evident in reactions to another ten consequences frequently discussed in the public arena as well as academic circles. These are presented in Table 22, where again only one significant difference between Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders was uncovered, and again it is not easy to explain why the “creation of jobs” should be the only consequence that differentiated the two groups inasmuch as their similar reactions to the other nine possible alternatives depict a degree of agreement one might call a consensus. Although this lack of agreement itself is an important finding, Table 22 offers another telling pattern: with the exception of ethnic identities, the two groups view nine processes of globalization as enhancing rather than undermining: in eight instances, the respondents recorded at least a three-to-one margin in favor of enhancement; in five of these cases the margin is seven to one or better.

Table 22: On balance, how would you assess the impact of the diverse processes of globalization on ...							
	Undermining		Enhancing		Having no effect	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)	
	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)		%
... local communities							
Cutting-Edgers (n=182)	(43)	24	(97)	53	(42)	23	df=2; χ^2 =1.43 p = .490
Other Leaders (n=529)	(136)	26	(255)	48	(138)	26	
... individual altruism							
Cutting-Edgers (n=181)	(30)	17	(91)	50	(60)	33	df=2; χ^2 =4.87 p = .088
Other Leaders (n=520)	(92)	18	(214)	41	(214)	41	
... human rights							
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(14)	7	(160)	86	(13)	7	df=2; χ^2 =0.60 p = .739
Other Leaders (n=535)	(42)	8	(464)	87	(29)	5	
... political democracy							
Cutting-Edgers (n=181)	(14)	8	(159)	87	(9)	5	df=2; χ^2 =1.88 p = .392
Other Leaders (n=530)	(48)	9	(442)	83	(40)	8	
... economic integration							
Cutting-Edgers (n=184)	(8)	4	(173)	94	(3)	2	df=1; χ^2 =2.08 p = .354
Other Leaders (n=536)	(29)	5	(488)	91	(19)	4	
... creation of jobs							
Cutting-Edgers (n=181)	(10)	6	(167)	92	(4)	2	df=1; χ^2 =10.07 p < .01
Other Leaders (n=529)	(59)	11	(437)	83	(33)	6	
... cultural diversity							
Cutting-Edgers (n=186)	(44)	24	(129)	71	(9)	5	df=1; χ^2 =4.55 p = .103
Other Leaders (n=552)	(91)	17	(410)	77	(32)	6	

... ecological sensitivities					
Cutting-Edgers (n=180)	(37)	21	(122)	68	(21) 12
Other Leaders (n=531)	(88)	17	(361)	68	(82) 15
... ethnic identities					
Cutting-Edgers (n=178)	(77)	43	(78)	44	(23) 13
Other Leaders (n=526)	(222)	42	(212)	40	(92) 18
... capitalism					
Cutting-Edgers (n=182)	(11)	6	(160)	88	(11) 6
Other Leaders (n=529)	(32)	6	(455)	86	(42) 8

We should add, however, a note of caution about these upbeat responses. We mailed the survey, and received nearly half the responses, prior to the “Battle of Seattle” and subsequent anti-globalization protests. Quite possibly the sizable differences depicted in Table 22 may have been different if the respondents had been surveyed after the movement resisting globalization had begun to accelerate and become institutionalized. It would not be inconsistent with findings presented earlier, however, if the difference involved the respondents dismissing the protesters as hooligans and maintaining positive orientations toward the processes of globalization.

Indeed, the responses to the one globalization crisis that did occur prior to the mailing of the survey, the Asian financial crisis precipitated in 1997 by the collapse of Thailand’s currency, provide some hints that the articulation of the resistance movement might have introduced such a difference and heightened the upbeat attitudes toward globalization. As can be seen in Table 23, confronted with four alternative reactions to the financial crisis, nearly three-fourths of both the Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders indicated that it did *not* give them pause as to the virtues of globalization. Only a small minority in both groups responded that it “affirmed their negative orientations” toward globalization. Interestingly, compared to the Other Leaders, a significantly greater proportion of the Cutting-Edgers reported that the crisis actually *reinforced* their positive orientations, while a significantly smaller proportion of them indicated that the crisis had no impact on their views of globalization. These findings suggest that for elites on the cutting edge of globalization, their favorable orientations toward its processes are robust even in the face of so-called “crises” of globalization.

Table 23: Did the advent of the financial crisis that began in Thailand in 1997 and then spread around the world. . . [check all that apply]						
		checked (n=) %		did not check (n=) %		Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
. . . give you pause as to the virtues of globalization						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(51)	27	(135)	73	df=1; χ^2 =1.00 p = .318
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(130)	24	(417)	76	
. . . affirm your negative orientations toward globalization						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(8)	4	(178)	96	df=1; χ^2 =1.11 p = .293
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(35)	6	(512)	94	

The questionnaire also included a nine-part item that sought to uncover how leaders personally experience---i.e., feel threatened by---various dimensions of the current global scene. These are listed in Table 24, in which it can be seen that only two of the nine possible threats resulted in statistically significant differences between the Cutting-Edgers and the Other Leaders: the former are more likely to see nationalism as a threat and less likely to see globalization as a threat than the latter. Forty-eight percent of the Cutting-Edgers viewed nationalism as either a moderate or substantial threat, while the comparable figure for the Other Leaders was only 31 percent. Conversely---and not surprisingly---only 4 percent of the Cutting-Edgers judged globalization to be a moderate or substantial threat, compared to 13 percent for the Other Leaders. For both groups, however, these percentages on globalization are noticeably lower than is the case for the other eight types of threats. Indeed, more than two-thirds of both groups assessed terrorists groups as moderate or substantial threats and roughly half made similar judgments about “certain countries” and the gap between the rich and the poor. In effect, while an upbeat quality marks some of the data presented previously, a more pessimistic set of concerns is also discernible.

Table 24: To what extent do you consider the following a threat to your well being?

	Not a threat at all (n=) %	Mild threat (n=) %	Moderate threat (n=) %	Substantial threat (n=) %	Not sure (n=) %	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
social movements						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=179)	(79) 44	(53) 30	(24) 13	(16) 9	(7) 4	$\chi^2=8.27$
Other Leaders (n=531)	(212) 40	(150) 28	(115) 22	(45) 8	(9) 2	p = .082
professional competitors						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=182)	(76) 42	(56) 31	(35) 19	(13) 7	(2) 1	$\chi^2=3.33$
Other Leaders (n=538)	(244) 45	(143) 27	(120) 22	(28) 5	(3) 1	p = .505
multinational corporations						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=182)	(101) 55	(43) 24	(27) 15	(9) 5	(2) 1	$\chi^2=4.74$
Other Leaders (n=539)	(259) 48	(143) 26	(84) 16	(48) 9	(5) 1	p = .315
gap between rich and poor						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=183)	(36) 20	(56) 31	(45) 25	(42) 23	(4) 2	$\chi^2=2.45$
Other Leaders (n=543)	(121) 22	(143) 26	(133) 24	(139) 26	(7) 1	p = .653
certain individuals						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=178)	(44) 25	(56) 31	(40) 23	(29) 16	(9) 5	$\chi^2=2.17$
Other Leaders (n=531)	(148) 28	(181) 34	(97) 18	(79) 15	(26) 5	p = .705
certain countries						df=4

Cutting Edgers (n=182)	(29) 16	(55) 30	(58) 32	(38) 21	(2) 1	$\chi^2=2.90$ p = .576
Other Leaders (n=536)	(89) 17	(164) 31	(164) 31	(101) 19	(18) 3	
terrorist groups						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=185)	(4) 2	(45) 24	(56) 30	(80) 43	(0) 0	$\chi^2=3.63$
Other Leaders (n=543)	(25) 5	(127) 23	(177) 33	(212) 39	(2) 1	p = .457
Nationalism						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=182)	(40) 22	(50) 27	(64) 35	(24) 13	(4) 2	$\chi^2=17.68$
Other Leaders (n=536)	(169) 32	(186) 35	(118) 22	(50) 9	(13) 2	p < .01
Globalization						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=182)	(137) 75	(34) 19	(1) 1	(6) 3	(4) 2	$\chi^2=15.36$
Other Leaders (n=537)	(357) 67	(99) 18	(46) 9	(24) 4	(11) 2	p < .01

These data highlight again a surprising absence of differences in opinion between the Cutting-Edgers and the Other Leaders as well as a minimum of negative orientations toward the consequences of globalization. In general, both groups express positive attitudes toward globalizing processes and their consequences, even in the face of dire circumstances like the 1997 Asian financial crisis. These strong, positive orientations suggest a consensus in favor of globalization among all elites, not simply those who we have categorized as Cutting-Edgers. But the absence of significant differences of opinion between the two groups again suggests a familiar, more cautious conclusion. Because our sample consists only of American elites, we cannot draw any conclusions about either the degree to which the findings reflect *American* or *elite* opinion. Before we can assess the strength of these findings, we must administer our survey to both non-American elites and non-elites of many nationalities who may be more critical of the consequences of globalization.

Attitudes Toward Issues and Instruments of Globalization

Although both Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders give voice to positive orientations toward globalization and its consequences, the survey probes their attitudes further by asking for their assessments of a variety of current issues high on the global agenda. Table 25 indicates that the Cutting-Edgers exhibit significantly greater concern for only three issues: corruption, ethnic conflict and global governance. Indeed, perhaps with the Balkans in mind, both groups identified the issue of ethnic conflict as essential by larger proportions than any of the other issues. Equally noteworthy, and in sharp contrast to the attention that the academic literature pays to problems of global governance, this issue evokes markedly smaller proportions of concern on the part of both groups than any other issue.²⁴

²⁴ Entries in this exploding literature include David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), *Approaches to Global Governance Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); and Oran R. Young (ed.), *Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997).

Table 25: Which of the following do you regard as <u>essential</u> global issues that need to be addressed in the next decade? [check all that apply]						
		checked (n=) %		did not check (n=) %		Chi square value (χ^2)
climate change						df=1; χ^2 =0.32 p = .573
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(106)	57	(80)	43	
Other Leaders	(n=553)	(302)	55	(251)	45	
ethnic conficts						df=1 χ^2 =5.55 p < .05
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(154)	83	(32)	17	
Other Leaders	(n=553)	(411)	74	(142)	26	
transnational organized crime						df=1 χ^2 =0.91 p = .339
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(121)	65	(65)	35	
Other Leaders	(n=553)	(338)	61	(215)	39	
global governance						df=1; χ^2 =10.38 p < .01
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(70)	38	(116)	62	
Other Leaders	(n=553)	(140)	25	(413)	75	
the stability of the world economy						df=1; χ^2 =0.03 p = .867
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(132)	71	(54)	29	
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(396)	72	(157)	28	
Corruption						df=1; χ^2 =4.76 p < .05
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(108)	58	(78)	42	
Other Leaders	(n=553)	(270)	49	(283)	51	
the disposition of nuclear materials						df=1; χ^2 =0.35 p = .551
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(131)	70	(55)	30	
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(402)	73	(151)	27	
Epidemics						df=1; χ^2 =0.28 p = .600
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(111)	60	(75)	40	
Other Leaders	(n=547)	(342)	62	(211)	38	

Another issue, trade, was singled out as a separate question because of its immediacy to the work of those Cutting-Edgers in the business community. Table 26 presents the responses to the issues and the expectation of its relevance is readily apparent. Unsurprisingly, the Cutting-Edgers expressed pro-trade sentiments significantly more than did Other Leaders, while only one-quarter of them registered a “selectively protectionist” or “protectionist” preference.

Table 26: How would you describe your views on trade issues?					
	pro-free trade (n=) %		selectively protectionist (n=) %		Chi square value (χ^2)
Cutting-Edgers (n=184)	(141)	76.5	(37)	20	
Other Leaders (n=537)	(338)	63	(166)	31	df=3; $\chi^2=12.11$ p < .01

A more qualified support for other kinds of economic issues was recorded in response to a question about the way in which faltering economies of other countries should be handled. As can be seen in Table 27, only two-fifths of the Cutting-Edgers and roughly one-third of Other Leaders indicated a readiness to ameliorate the economic problems of Russia and Brazil. Nonetheless, the two groups did not register a statistically significant different reaction to the question.

Table 27: Do you regard the efforts to bail out countries in economic trouble like Russia and Brazil as . . .						
	necessary (n=) %	worthwhile (n=) %	questionable (n=) %	Futile (n=) %	unsure (n=) %	Chi square value (χ^2)
Cutting Edgers (n=168)	(67) 40	(45) 27	(46) 27	(7) 4	(3) 2	df=4; $\chi^2=7.37$ p = .118
Other Leaders (n=523)	(169) 32	(127) 24	(166) 32	(39) 7	(22) 4	

Turning to the instruments of globalization, the respondents were asked to assess twelve international actors and the role they play in world affairs. Table 28 presents the reactions and here several striking differences emerge. The Cutting-Edgers ascribed statistically significantly greater importance to six of the actors than did the Other Leaders, presumably a reflection of their greater involvement in global affairs. All six of these actors, moreover, are intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), while the differences for three IGOs, two nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Amnesty International and Greenpeace, and one national state (the U.S.) were not significant. Interestingly, among the IGOs that did not evoke significant differences were two of the prime institutions designed to control the international economy, the WTO and the World Bank, and that subsequent to the survey became the focus of street protests. Still other insights can be readily discerned if the degree to which the various instruments of international policy are compared. Most noteworthy perhaps is the huge consensus on the importance of the United States: as might be expected of any single-country survey, virtually every respondent of both groups ranked the U.S. as very or somewhat important, a ranking that also suggests a perception held by American leaders of their country's hegemonic role in world affairs. Contrariwise, only the NGOs evoked substantial proportions of both groups that ranked them as not very important or unimportant. Clearly, leaders tend to put considerable stock in the role of international organizations and institutions and have not been convinced of the efficacy of global civil society.

Table 28: How would you rank the role the following can play in world affairs?						
	Very important (n=) %	Somewhat important (n=) %	Not very important (n=) %	Un- important (n=) %	Not sure (n=) %	Pearson chi- square value (χ^2)
United Nations						df=4 $\chi^2=3.01$ p = .556
Cutting Edgers (n=185)	(93) 50	(68) 37	(17) 9	(7) 4	(0) 0	
Other Leaders (n=546)	(282) 52	(189) 34.5	(60) 11	(12) 2	(3) .5	
World Bank						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(126) 68	(47) 25	(10) 5.5	(2) 1	(1) .5	

Other Leaders (n=542)	(333) 62	(173) 32	(22) 4	(7) 1	(7) 1	$\chi^2=4.21$ p = .378
World Trade Organization						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=184)	(108) 59	(65) 35	(9) 5	(0) 0	(2) 1	$\chi^2=5.01$
Other Leaders (n=538)	(281) 52	(209) 39	(29) 5	(8) 1	(11) 2	p = .286
Amnesty International						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=182)	(40) 22	(70) 38	(45) 25	(21) 12	(6) 3	$\chi^2=4.60$
Other Leaders (n=539)	(95) 18	(216) 40	(146) 27	(49) 9	(33) 6	p = .331
IMF						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=184)	(97) 53	(74) 40	(7) 4	(2) 1	(4) 2	$\chi^2=20.96$
Other Leaders (n=522)	(218) 42	(193) 37	(42) 8	(9) 2	(60) 11	p < .001
G-7						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=182)	(89) 49	(67) 37	(16) 9	(3) 2	(7) 4	$\chi^2=23.63$
Other Leaders (n=519)	(173) 33	(217) 42	(40) 8	(12) 2	(77) 15	p < .001
NATO						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=183)	(95) 52	(69) 38	(19) 10	(0) 0	(0) 0	$\chi^2=9.66$
Other Leaders (n=539)	(235) 44	(242) 45	(46) 9	(11) 2	(5) 1	p < .05
NAFTA						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=183)	(67) 37	(89) 49	(27) 15	(0) 0	(0) 0	$\chi^2=19.83$
Other Leaders (n=528)	(126) 24	(286) 54	(85) 16	(11) 2	(20) 4	p < .01
European Union						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=185)	(126) 68	(52) 28	(6) 3.5	(1) .5	(0) 0	$\chi^2=24.76$
Other Leaders (n=539)	(262) 49	(222) 41	(29) 5	(5) 1	(21) 4	p < .001
United States						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(160) 86	(26) 14	(0) 0	(0) 0	(0) 0	$\chi^2=3.84$
Other Leaders (n=547)	(444) 81	(96) 18	(3) 1	(1) 1	(3) 1	p = .428
ASEAN						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=180)	(47) 26	(87) 48	(32) 18	(1) 1	(13) 7	$\chi^2=33.35$
Other Leaders (n=510)	(73) 14	(216) 42	(86) 17	(12) 2	(123) 24	p < .001
Greenpeace						df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=185)	(17) 9	(49) 26	(78) 42	(37) 20	(4) 2	$\chi^2=4.64$
Other Leaders (n=532)	(40) 8	(132) 25	(206) 39	(127) 24	(27) 5	p = .326

The consensus around the huge importance attributed to the role played by the United States in globalization is mirrored in the responses to fourteen items that focus on American foreign policy. As can be seen in Tables 29 and 30, only one item resulted in the Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders recording statistically significant differences, and there is no obvious explanation why this should be the case for “helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries.” It appears to be an anomalous finding. Or possibly it can be explained on the grounds that it is the only policy alternative that focuses directly on aspects of globalization in the economic realm.

Table 29: This question asks you to indicate your position on certain propositions that are sometimes described as lessons that the United States should have learned from past experiences abroad. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.						
	Agree Strongly (n=) %	Agree Somewhat (n=) %	Disagree Somewhat (n=) %	Disagree Strongly (n=) %	No Opinion (n=) %	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
There is considerable validity in the “domino theory” that when one nation falls to aggressor nations, others nearby will soon follow a similar path						df=4 $\chi^2=3.78$ p = .437
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(20) 11	(84) 45	(61) 33	(20) 10.5	(1) .5	
Other Leaders (n=548)	(65) 12	(253) 46	(148) 27	(73) 13	(9) 2	
Any communist victory is a defeat for America’s national interest						df=4 $\chi^2=0.49$ p = .975
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(31) 17	(59) 32	(60) 32	(32) 17	(4) 2	
Other Leaders (n=542)	(92) 17	(183) 33	(162) 30	(98) 18	(12) 2	
It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes						df=4 $\chi^2=0.91$ p = .923
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(64) 34	(82) 44	(25) 13	(13) 7	(2) 1	
Other Leaders (n=552)	(195) 35	(233) 42	(84) 15	(32) 6	(8) 1	
Russia is generally expansionist rather than defensive in its foreign policy goals						df=4 $\chi^2=3.59$ p = .465
Cutting Edgers (n=185)	(15) 8	(55) 30	(81) 44	(25) 14	(9) 5	
Other Leaders (n=547)	(28) 5	(168) 31	(255) 47	(61) 11	(35) 6	
There is nothing wrong with using the C.I.A. to try to undermine hostile governments						df=4 $\chi^2=4.88$ not significant
Cutting Edgers (n=185)	(29) 16	(51) 27	(58) 31	(44) 24	(3) 2	
Other Leaders (n=546)	(76) 14	(195) 36	(145) 27	(117) 21	(13) 2	
The U.S. should give economic aid to poorer countries even if it means high prices at home						df=4 $\chi^2=7.17$ p = .127
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(25) 13	(80) 43	(54) 29	(23) 12	(4) 2	
Other Leaders (n=551)	(45) 8	(229) 42	(176) 32	(94) 17	(7) 1	
The U.S. should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power						df=4 $\chi^2=4.51$ p = .341
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(32) 17	(91) 49	(50) 27	(11) 6	(2) 1	
Other Leaders (n=546)	(119) 22	(226) 41	(147) 27	(46) 8	(8) 1	
Rather than simply countering our opponents thrusts, it is necessary to strike at the heart of the opponent’s power						df=4 $\chi^2=8.50$ p = .075
Cutting Edgers (n=183)	(31) 17	(75) 41	(46) 25	(18) 10	(13) 7	
Other Leaders (n=543)	(126) 23	(188) 35	(135) 25	(73) 13	(21) 4	

Perhaps because the propositions comprising Table 29 were included to facilitate comparison with the results of earlier surveys in which they were asked during the Cold War, it is noteworthy that neither group indicated much enthusiasm for any of the eight policy questions. Except for the item on the United Nations, none of the questions evoked as much as a quarter of the respondents registering strong agreement. On the other hand, in the case of Table 30 substantial majorities of both groups perceived the

issues that have continued to persist since the Cold War as very or moderately important even though, again, the two groups differed significantly on only one of the questions. Especially noteworthy is the finding that at least two-thirds of both groups perceived strengthening the United Nations as very or moderately important and that at least four-fifths of both groups expressed similar support for improving the standard of living in less developed countries.

Table 30: Turning to more general considerations, here is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. Indicate how much importance you think should be attached to each goal.											
	Very Important (n=)	%	Moderately Important (n=)	%	Slightly Important (n=)	%	Not at all important (n=)	%	Not sure (n=)	%	Pearson Chi- square value (χ^2)
Containing communism											df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=185)	(40)	22	(48)	26	(58)	31	(39)	21	(0)	0	$\chi^2=3.30$ p = .509
Other Leaders (n=548)	(118)	22	(174)	32	(143)	26	(112)	20	(1)	0	
Helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries											df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=185)	(100)	54	(64)	34	(18)	10	(4)	2	(0)	0	$\chi^2=12.38$ p < .01
Other Leaders (n=552)	(222)	40	(221)	40	(96)	17	(13)	2	(0)	0	
Worldwide arms control											df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(124)	67	(50)	27	(7)	4	(4)	2	(0)	0	$\chi^2=4.39$ p = .356
Other Leaders (n=552)	(352)	64	(147)	27	(39)	7	(8)	1	(4)	1	
Combating world hunger											df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=185)	(114)	62	(48)	26	(20)	11	(3)	2	(0)	0	$\chi^2=2.01$ p = .571
Other Leaders (n=550)	(312)	57	(149)	27	(75)	14	(14)	3	(0)	0	
Strengthening the United Nations											df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(50)	27	(86)	46	(28)	15	(21)	11	(0)	0	$\chi^2=7.32$ p = .120
Other Leaders (n=552)	(164)	30	(204)	37	(116)	21	(62)	11	(4)	1	
Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation and energy											df=4
Cutting Edgers (n=186)	(136)	73	(37)	20	(12)	6	(1)	1	(0)	0	$\chi^2=0.89$ p = .927
Other Leaders (n=552)	(401)	72.5	(115)	21	(30)	5	(5)	1	(2)	.5	
ns=not significant											

The questionnaire also contained three domestic policy items or, more accurately, philosophical questions that probed dimensions of cosmopolitanism, especially with respect to the role of government in the economy and diversity in the workplace. Since all the respondents occupy leadership positions in an era dominated by neoliberal economic policies, it is not surprising that the Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders did not record (with one exception) statistically significant differences on these more philosophical items (see Tables 31, 32, and 33). On the other hand, it is clear that both groups of leaders are committed to an open trading regime that provides some governmental

regulation by way of performing service roles and protecting against unfair competition but that does not otherwise protect against foreign competition.

Table 31: Do you believe an organization with a workforce that shares the same background is more productive than one that has diverse backgrounds?					
	Same background		Diverse backgrounds		Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	
Cutting-Edgers (n=167)	(40)	24	(127)	76	df=1; χ^2 =0.33 p = .566
Other Leaders (n=450)	(118)	26	(332)	74	

Table 32: How would you summarize your views on the proper role of government in economic matters?								
	Minimum regulation		Some regulation		Maximum regulation		not sure	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=)	%	(n=) %	
Cutting-Edgers (n=184)	(68)	37	(111)	60.5	(4)	2	(1) .5	df=3; $\chi^2=3.48$ p = .323
Other Leaders (n=545)	(162)	30	(364)	67	(14)	3	(5) 1	

Table 33: What do you regard as the proper roles of national governments with regard to private firms and the global economy? (check all that apply)						
		checked (n=)	%	did not check (n=)	%	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
a service role (providing infrastructure, police protection, health and education, etc.)						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=184)	(171)	93	(13)	7	df=1; χ^2 =7.57 p < .01
Other Leaders	(n=549)	(467)	85	(82)	15	
prevent potential monopolies/cartels and ensure fair and honest competition						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=184)	(148)	80	(36)	20	df=1; χ^2 =1.45 p = .229
Other Leaders	(n=549)	(418)	76	(131)	24	
protect domestic firms and jobs from foreign competition						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=184)	(18)	10	(166)	90	df=1; χ^2 =1.15 p = .284
Other Leaders	(n=549)	(70)	13	(479)	87	
subsidize lagging economic sectors to aid their competitiveness in foreign markets						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=184)	(20)	11	(164)	89	df=1; χ^2 =0.13 p = .722
Other Leaders	(n=549)	(65)	12	(484)	88	
subsidize promising economic sectors to aid their competitiveness in foreign markets						
Cutting-Edgers	(n=184)	(57)	31	(127)	69	df=1; χ^2 =0.73 p = .392
Other Leaders	(n=549)	(152)	28	(397)	72	

Of course, it is not enough merely to note significant differences of orientation between Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders. An important outstanding question is whether or not the behavior of the two groups reflects these differences in orientation toward the issues and instruments of globalization. One query sought to shed light on this question by asking about patterns of charitable giving and the responses suggest that Cutting-Edgers do indeed engage in significantly different behavior than Other Leaders. The data in Table 34 reveal that the Cutting-Edgers give significantly more each year to international charities than Other Leaders and significantly less to local charities. Though popular rhetoric advocates thinking globally and acting locally, our data indicate that the elites on the cutting edge of globalization both think globally and—as far as putting their money where their values are—act globally as well.

Table 34: Approximately what proportion of your charitable donations each year goes to . . . (comparisons based on two-sample <i>t</i> test with *equal or **unequal variance)						
	Cutting-Edgers Mean pro- portion (n=)		Other Leaders Mean pro- Portion (n=)		<i>t</i> value	<i>p</i> < <i>t</i> degrees of freedom
. . . local charities*	54.30	(183)	58.41	(534)	1.65	715 .0497
. . . national charities*	32.03	(186)	30.55	(538)	-0.69	722 .2443
. . . international charities**	14.05	(186)	8.14	(541)	-3.86	247 .0001

Personal Attributes

How do the backgrounds of Cutting-Edgers differ from Other Leaders? Do these differences help explain some of the significant differences in orientations and behavior previously described? While a detailed exploration of the latter question itself requires a survey, a limited review of the respondents' backgrounds provides a few insights. As noted earlier, there are no significant differences in gender, party identification, level of education, or professional categories (business versus non-business) between the two groups. By contrast, significant differences were uncovered in the two groups' age and income: the Cutting-Edgers are both older and wealthier than Other Leaders. Beyond these personal attributes, our data also suggest that some of the roots of life on the cutting edge of globalization are planted at a young age: in addition to their extensive language skills and time spent residing and studying abroad indicated in rows eleven through fifteen of the Involvement Index, the Cutting-Edgers had more contacts with foreign cultures during childhood than did Other Leaders. As indicated in Table 35, they are more likely to have had parents who came from a country other than the United States, who spoke other languages in addition to English, who traveled extensively, and who took the respondents with them on their travels. These data reflect considerable immersion abroad, a pattern that may at least partially explain both the Cutting-Edgers' significantly different orientations toward globalization and their activities on a global scale.

Table 35: Did either or both of your parents . . . [check all that apply]
--

	checked (n=) %	did not check (n=) %	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
... come from a country other than the U.S.?			
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(50) 27	(137) 73	df=1; χ^2 =7.51 p < .01
Other Leaders (n=549)	(96) 17	(453) 83	
... speak other languages in addition to English?			
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(88) 47	(99) 53	df=1; χ^2 =14.73 p < .001
Other Leaders (n=549)	(173) 32	(376) 68	
... travel extensively?			
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(73) 39	(114) 61	df=1; χ^2 =13.96 p < .001
Other Leaders (n=549)	(136) 25	(413) 75	
... take you on their travels when you were young?			
Cutting-Edgers (n=187)	(84) 45	(103) 55	df=1; χ^2 =5.24 p < .05
Other Leaders (n=549)	(195) 36	(354) 64	

Given their more extensive contacts with foreign cultures in their early years, it is hardly surprising that Cutting-Edgers indicate a greater willingness to view themselves as expatriates and as members of an ethnic, racial or religious minority than do Other Leaders (Table 36). One's minority status ironically may be an advantage in life on the cutting edge of globalization. The data hint at another possibility, however. Just as individuals worldwide seek shelter in immediate, local identities in the face of globalizing forces, it is conceivable that Cutting-Edgers likewise may seek psychological comfort in identities that are rooted in concepts of place or locality. Rather than asking the respondents "are you a member of an ethnic, racial or religious minority," perhaps we should have asked "have you ever *thought of yourself* or do you consider yourself a member of an ethnic, racial or religious minority?" In short, it may be that we have uncovered a shift in the Cutting-Edgers' self-perceptions that result directly from their participation in the processes of globalization. They may undertake a psychological "localization" to counteract their participation in the processes of globalization.

Table 36: Minority Statuses				
		Yes (n=) %	No (n=) %	Pearson chi-square value (χ^2)
Have you ever thought of yourself as an expatriate?				
Cutting-Edgers	(n=186)	(71) 38	(115) 62	df=1; χ^2 =70.71 p < .001
Other Leaders	(n=544)	(59) 11	(485) 89	
Are you a member of an ethnic, racial, or religious minority in the country where you live?				
Cutting-Edgers	(n=183)	(48) 26	(135) 74	df=1; χ^2 =9.12 p < .01
Other Leaders	(n=533)	(86) 16	(447) 84	

Conclusions

Several central tendencies emerge from the welter of foregoing findings. Perhaps most noteworthy is that, by and large, the reasoning underlying the design of the research

instrument was upheld. We had presumed, following themes in the literature on the subject, that whatever their profession persons on the cutting edge of globalization tend to be cosmopolitans who move easily and often around the world, who network widely with relevant others around the world, who believe that globalizing processes are desirable and represent a positive turn for humankind, whose activities are greatly facilitated by modern information technologies, and whose loyalties and commitments to their countries, careers, and organizations are diminished by their globalizing and cosmopolitan activities and thus inconsistent with traditional notions of identity and loyalty. On the other hand, while many of the findings along these lines are clear-cut, those pertaining to the priorities Cutting-Edgers attach to their loyalties do not fully affirm our expectations. A slight trace of the expected loyalty shift away from the nation-state is discernible, but it is certainly not pronounced. This finding highlights the danger of casting loyalties in zero-sum contexts. Further research needs to explore the extent to which Cutting-Edgers can alter their horizons in a global direction without corresponding reductions in their readiness to honor long-standing claims on their national and local loyalties and obligations. Indeed, as suggested previously, allowance should be made for the possibility that the local loyalties of globalizing elites may even undergo an increase. Conceivably leaders as well as masses will increasingly seek psychological shelter from the uncertainties of a globalizing world in the near and familiar---in family, in ethnic or religious groups, and in town or neighborhood associations.

This is just one of several dimensions of life on the cutting edge that cries out for further inquiry. We feel compelled to reiterate two others. First, our survey is only an initial effort. Because our technique for identifying elites on the cutting-edge is new (see Appendix A), it requires future surveys to establish the magnitude and direction of change in our findings. Although we uncovered a number of significant differences between Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders—in their connectivity with the world, in their orientations toward “home,” in their travel abroad, in their use of technology, in their sense of empowerment in the face of global processes—these are nevertheless baseline figures. Future survey research should investigate both the magnitude and direction of these differences in orientations and behaviors. As globalization progresses, the Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders are likely to become more alike on some issues while diverging on others—though we cannot anticipate the points of agreement and disagreement themselves. We hope future surveys can measure these changes.

Second, and more importantly, researchers need to test our findings with non-American survey respondents. Our limited resources necessarily restricted our administration of the survey to American elites only. Though we have sought to reflect upon how our American-only sample may bias our findings, undoubtedly there are biases that we have failed to consider.²⁵ Do European, Asian, African, South American and Australasian elites express similar orientations to the American elites we have surveyed? Are there significant differences between American and non-American Cutting-Edgers?

²⁵Some might argue that because the four researchers are all American, our sample bias is compounded by observation bias. We have sought to be reflexive in our consideration of this issue, but welcome commentary and criticism from non-American researchers who share our interest in identifying and understanding the orientations and behavior of cutting-edge elite.

Answers to such questions, whether affirming or disconfirming the findings we have uncovered, undoubtedly will shed light on a number of issues in the literature on globalization. One is the degree to which the very idea of “globalization” is a culturally grounded concept. Another is whether or not the idea of globalization is a hegemonic one; indeed, the surprising lack of disagreement among Cutting-Edgers and Other Leaders in our survey suggests a surprising support among American elites for the processes of globalization. The degree to which our findings hold when researchers survey counterparts from beyond the United States is perhaps the most important next step.

Finally, it is worth noting the extent to which Cutting-Edgers do not differ from Other Leaders. Of the 158 comparisons made between the two groups, 100 were not statistically significant and 58 were, a pattern that suggests both the complexities of globalization and the constancies of leadership. Most of the 58 significant differences affirmed the foregoing reasoning derived from the globalization literature, but the fact that 100 comparisons were not significant points to the common expectations and orientations that attend occupancy of any leadership posts in the present era.

In sum, we conclude that, thorough and lengthy as our reported findings are, they also make the case for further inquiry. We believe we have accomplished our goal of demonstrating that a pilot project focused on the individual agents of globalization is both relevant and insufficient insofar as advancing understanding of the dynamism of globalization is concerned. However, future studies should investigate and compare leaders in a broad range of countries and in more lines of work as well as focus more fully on the priorities they attach to their various affiliations. Those priorities may continue to shift in interesting ways as leaders have additional experiences with globalizing processes---and the backlash against them.

APPENDIX A:

Procedures for Identifying Elites on the Cutting Edge of Globalization

Although we sought to construct a sample of elites who we might reasonably assume were deeply involved in the processes of globalization, from the outset we recognized that it was unlikely all respondents could reasonably be called “Cutting-Edgers.” For this reason we sought to construct a quasi-experimental group identifiable as Cutting-Edgers, with the remainder of the sample serving as a quasi-control group. To do so, we classified respondents according to six configurations of survey responses that we hypothesized might characterize an individual who is on the cutting edge of globalization. These six configurations included individual responses to three questions (“Networking with others abroad is important to me” is sub-sample I; “I control change” is sub-sample II; and “I am at the top of my profession” is sub-sample III), and two items which combined these responses (“I control change” and “I am at the top of my profession” is sub-sample IV; and “Networking with others abroad is important to me,” “I control change” and “I am at the top of my profession” is sub-sample V).

To these five configurations of responses we added a sixth: those who scored in the top quartile of an index we constructed to measure each respondent’s involvement in global processes (hereafter sub-sample VI). To offset the unwieldiness of respondents’ answers to the 170 items in the survey, we reduced these data to six indices that we hypothesized measure various aspects of each respondent’s attitudes toward and involvement in global processes. To construct each index, we identified survey questions that measured either a respondent’s behavior or attitudes and then conducted a factor analysis to identify those questions to eliminate from the index. Three of our indexes proved to be statistically significant (i.e. have Cronbach alpha scores greater than 0.70). We call these three indices the “Involvement in Global Processes” index (or the Involvement Index), the Positive/Negative Attitudes Toward Globalization index (Orientations Index), and the Interconnectivity in the Wired World index, a measure of each respondent’s usage of telecommunications technologies (or Interconnectivity Index). After factor analysis, we awarded points for each specific response to each question in an index. For example, one question in the Involvement Index asked, “How would you characterize the relevance of your work with respect to the diverse processes of globalization?” and offered respondents four options: continuously relevant, occasionally relevant, seldom relevant, and never relevant. Respondents indicated the relevance of their work to four options: economic processes, cultural processes, political processes and “other processes.” Each respondent received a score of +2 points for a “continuously relevant” response, a +1 for a response of “occasionally relevant,” –1 for “seldom relevant” and –2 for “never relevant.” We used similar scoring for each question in an index and aggregated scores for all items in each index. The 15 survey questions that comprise the Involvement Index are listed in Table 3 (an additional seven questions were dropped because they loaded negatively on the factor), whereas the factor analysis, alpha values and scoring for the Index is provided at the end of this Appendix.

We proceeded to test each of these six sub-samples against six hypothesized behaviors that characterize an individual who is on the cutting edge of globalization.

Since our survey asked respondents about their travel patterns, we tested the six sub-samples against two hypotheses about the movements of those on the cutting edge of globalization: (1) Those who are “cutting edgers” will travel abroad on business more often than will those who are not involved in globalization; and (2) those who are on the cutting edge of globalization will vacation abroad more often than those who are not. To account for the possible distorting effects of outliers in the above two hypotheses, we developed a third that measures the ratio of a respondent’s international to domestic travel: (3) Those who are Cutting-Edgers will undertake international travel more than domestic travel than will Other Leaders (that is to say, those on the cutting edge of globalization are more likely to travel *across* sovereign borders more often than they travel *within* them). This is simply the ratio of the number of times a respondent has traveled internationally in the last two years to the number of times the respondent has traveled domestically in the last two years.²⁶ Because the survey provides data for both business travel and personal travel, furthermore, this third hypothesis allows us to test two separate but related questions: do the members of the proposed sub-sample travel internationally more frequently for business than they travel domestically? And do the members of the proposed sub-sample travel internationally more frequently for personal reasons than they travel domestically?²⁷

The three indices offer three additional hypotheses against which to test our six proposed ways to identify those respondents on the cutting edge of globalization. We hypothesize that cutting-edgers (4) will score higher on the involvement index; (5) will score significantly differently (either positive or negative) on the orientations index; and (6) will score higher on the interconnectivity index. We should note that it is tautological to test the top quartile of the involvement index against the index itself; for this reason we conduct only five hypothesis tests on the top quartile of the involvement index.

We present the results of these tests in Table 37. To test each of the six samples against the six hypotheses, we started by conducting an *F*-test to compare the variances of each sub-sample and the remaining respondents. If the *F*-test failed to disconfirm the hypothesis of equal variances for the two samples, we conducted a *t*-test to see if the

²⁶These ratios themselves offer a quick glimpse at the travel patterns of our respondents, since a value greater than 1 indicates the respondent has traveled internationally more than domestically. Forty-two respondents had a business-travel ratio greater than one, while 75 respondents had a personal-travel ratio greater than one.

²⁷One possible criticism of these three hypotheses is that an individual’s travel patterns—or other behaviors—may not say anything meaningful about his or her involvement in the processes of globalization. For example, the business executives we sampled, one might argue, are more likely to delegate to subordinates many of the more tedious or onerous activities we asked about in our survey, such as international travel. Fortunately, our survey allowed us to test this hypothesis using the respondents’ answers to our question “Do you consider yourself (a) among the leaders of your organization or profession; (b) close to the top; (c) in the middle range; or (d) toward the bottom?” Using respondents’ professional self-identification to conduct *t*-tests, we found that respondents who identified themselves at the top of their profession score significantly higher on all three indices, while those who identify themselves as being toward the bottom of their profession score significantly lower on all three indices. Assuming that our indices are valid measures, we believe that the presumption that Cutting-Edgers will travel more than other respondents is a reasonable one.

hypothesized sub-sample scored significantly higher on each of the six tests. If the *F*-test indicated unequal variances, we conducted a modified *t*-test to account for the possibility of unequal variances. In Table 37, those tests significant at the 0.05 level are indicated by a single asterisk; those significant at the 0.01 level are indicated by a double asterisk.

Table 37: T-tests of Hypothesized Measures of Respondents on the Cutting Edge of Globalization

As the table shows, three of the six proposed sub-samples of cutting-edge elite

	Sub sample I: "Network with others abroad is important" (n = 605)	Sub sample II: "I control change" (n = 295)	Sub sample III: "Top of my profession" (n = 364)	Sub sample IV: "I control change" and "top of profession" (n = 164)	Sub sample V: "Networking with others abroad is important"; "I control change"; and "top of my profession" (n = 125)	Sub sample VI: Index 1 top quartile (n=187)
<i>Test 1:</i> Do those in the sub sample travel internationally on business more often than those not in the sub sample?	Yes**	Yes**	Yes**	Yes**	Yes**	Yes**
<i>Test 2:</i> Do those in the sub sample travel internationally for personal reasons more often than those not in the sub sample?	Yes**	No	Yes**	No	Yes*	Yes**
<i>Test 3:</i> Do those in the sub sample on average travel more internationally than domestically than those not in the sub sample?	Yes** (on both business and personal travel)	No	No	No	Yes* (on personal travel only)	Yes** (on both business and personal travel)
<i>Test 4:</i> Do those in the sub sample on average score higher on the involvement index?	Yes** ¹	No	Yes**	No	Yes** ¹	N/A
<i>Test 5:</i> Do those in the sub sample on average score higher on the orientation index?	Yes**	Yes*	Yes**	Yes**	Yes**	Yes**
<i>Test 6:</i> Do those in the sub sample on average score higher on the interconnectivity index ?	Yes**	No	Yes**	Yes**	Yes**	Yes**

*Significant at the .05 level

**Significant at the .01 level

¹These hypotheses were tested against a revised Involvement Index, which excluded the question on the importance of networking with others abroad in order to eliminate autocorrelation. After excluding this question, the revised index has an alpha score of 0.7109.

generate significantly different results for each of the six hypothesis tests. One of the sub samples has weaker results, however. The reader will recall that the third hypothesis includes two *t*-tests, on the ratios of international-to-domestic *business* travel and international-to-domestic *personal* travel. Of these two ratios in hypothesis (3), sub sample V scored significantly higher than the remainder of the sample on only the personal travel ratio. This sub-sample also scored at a lower level of confidence (0.05) on hypothesis (2) as well. For these reasons we considered the fifth proposed sub sample to be inferior to the other two sub-samples that met all six tests at a higher level of confidence, and that passed both elements of hypothesis (3).

Given that both sub-sample I and sub sample VI score significantly higher on all six hypotheses, which one should we use to identify those respondents on the cutting edge? We opt for the sixth sub-sample, which the reader will recall consists of those respondents in the top quartile of the involvement index. The top quartile offers the best quasi-experimental group for two reasons. First, because the involvement index purports to measure a respondent's involvement in global processes, the six hypotheses tests seem to establish the validity of the index. Second, we constructed the involvement from fifteen questions from the survey. For this reason the sixth sub-sample is based upon more data than the first sub-sample, which we constructed using responses to a single survey question. We therefore concluded that the top quartile of the involvement index provides a group of Cutting-Edgers with face validity as well as being more reliable than the other measures. To be sure, to have selected the top quartile of the involvement index is to have used an arbitrary value, but one that yields a manageable sub-sample of 187 of the 741 respondents who provided enough data to receive an overall score on the involvement index and who are sufficiently numerous to allow for meaningful comparisons with the 554 Other Leaders.²⁸ That the top quartile produces a manageable sub-sample of 187 respondents (versus over 600 respondents from the first sub-sample) is an additional advantage to using this sub-sample as our group of Cutting-Edgers.

²⁸ Because 148 respondents failed to answer one or more of the 15 questions used to construct the involvement index, only 741 respondents received a score on the Involvement Index; of these 187 were classified as cutting-edgers, while the remaining 554 become our control group. This accounts for the total number of respondents received: $554 + 187 + 148 = 889$.

APPENDIX B:

Factor Analysis for Index on Involvement in Global Processes

(obs=729)

Factor	(principal factors; 11 factors retained)			
	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
1	3.52240	1.46671	0.4333	0.4333
2	2.05569	0.73707	0.2529	0.6861
3	1.31862	0.40617	0.1622	0.8483
4	0.91245	0.17661	0.1122	0.9606
5	0.73584	0.32244	0.0905	1.0511
6	0.41340	0.09290	0.0509	1.1019
7	0.32051	0.09063	0.0394	1.1414
8	0.22988	0.09056	0.0283	1.1696
9	0.13932	0.08418	0.0171	1.1868
10	0.05514	0.03852	0.0068	1.1936
11	0.01662	0.02812	0.0020	1.1956
12	-0.01150	0.01494	-0.0014	1.1942
13	-0.02644	0.02465	-0.0033	1.1909
14	-0.05109	0.01002	-0.0063	1.1846
15	-0.06112	0.01936	-0.0075	1.1771
16	-0.08048	0.03470	-0.0099	1.1672
17	-0.11518	0.02473	-0.0142	1.1531
18	-0.13991	0.04240	-0.0172	1.1359
19	-0.18231	0.00711	-0.0224	1.1134
20	-0.18942	0.01304	-0.0233	1.0901
21	-0.20246	0.04422	-0.0249	1.0652
22	-0.24668	0.03688	-0.0303	1.0349
23	-0.28357	.	-0.0349	1.0000

Variable	Factor Loadings					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
i2econom	0.28770	0.34889	0.10058	0.38641	-0.14923	-0.00070
i2cultur	0.24254	0.37836	0.06869	0.44147	0.11389	0.06812
i2politi	0.22522	0.30913	-0.06335	0.53544	-0.06990	0.09367
ii2	0.43144	0.26408	0.30471	-0.11292	0.06495	-0.02475
*ii4busin	0.49528	0.20169	0.37598	-0.13179	-0.23209	-0.04851
ii4vacat	0.22285	0.02704	0.08178	0.01844	-0.06073	0.01611
ii7born	0.73588	-0.50235	-0.21352	0.05553	-0.09593	-0.05595
ii7citiz	0.72778	-0.52523	-0.22239	0.08472	-0.11309	-0.05695
ii7emplo	0.63198	-0.44392	-0.17479	0.09525	-0.06912	-0.02890
ii9exper	0.45582	0.14459	0.26069	-0.16631	-0.03999	0.05555
*ii9assig	0.25628	0.20815	0.24073	-0.04648	-0.32062	-0.20769
*ii9freel	0.25196	0.05676	0.07726	-0.06235	0.18955	0.14677
*ii9curio	0.16739	-0.01886	-0.03645	0.06963	0.28710	0.07021
*ii9globa	0.26090	0.07837	0.06930	0.09426	0.14633	-0.04535
iii3asso	0.54400	0.22865	0.30380	-0.14834	0.14906	-0.04302
*iii3huma	0.02838	0.11676	-0.09359	0.09867	0.35471	-0.08825
iv5yes	0.32032	0.59824	-0.58765	-0.19399	0.00409	-0.12205
*iv5nofru	-0.02875	-0.09455	0.05886	-0.01114	-0.11876	0.25379
iv5nores	-0.28231	-0.53615	0.54566	0.23531	0.18363	-0.22387
*iv5noobl	-0.10684	-0.14549	0.13711	-0.00118	-0.23357	0.36771
iv10	0.28030	0.07420	0.16849	-0.22550	0.12322	0.09212
vi3	0.40924	-0.17685	0.01524	-0.04436	0.19572	0.14020
vi9	0.45610	-0.08193	-0.01584	-0.08137	0.24307	0.11132

Variable	Factor Loadings					Uniqueness
	7	8	9	10	11	

i2econom		0.01678	-0.05178	0.00704	-0.01926	0.00115	0.61042
i2cultur		-0.05654	0.07943	-0.03793	-0.00561	-0.03087	0.56887
i2politi		-0.09933	-0.08756	0.00286	-0.02153	0.01110	0.53121
ii2		0.00700	0.08409	-0.07711	0.05491	-0.01619	0.61734
*ii4busin		0.09889	-0.06814	-0.03458	-0.01452	0.03398	0.48208
ii4vacat		0.36358	-0.07483	-0.09249	0.00130	-0.02856	0.79147
ii7born		-0.02841	0.01540	0.01663	-0.02317	-0.02852	0.14245
ii7citiz		-0.04831	0.05814	-0.06107	-0.01005	0.01563	0.11202
ii7emplo		-0.01748	0.07955	-0.01886	0.03967	0.02502	0.34911
ii9exper		-0.14805	-0.03863	0.04305	-0.03044	0.00325	0.64482
*ii9assig		0.09714	0.07405	0.07020	0.03169	-0.00839	0.66403
*ii9freel		-0.00883	-0.09024	-0.12597	0.01393	0.07996	0.83529
*ii9curio		0.23881	0.09970	-0.09037	-0.02038	0.00104	0.80254
*ii9globa		0.10215	0.00056	0.21972	0.04934	0.04871	0.82511
iii3asso		-0.12116	0.10381	0.00803	0.01884	-0.02292	0.48700
*iii3huma		0.03550	0.22173	0.04105	0.03634	0.01013	0.77993
iv5yes		0.00532	-0.04577	-0.00476	-0.01401	0.00162	0.13929
*iv5nofru		-0.09159	-0.02251	-0.05802	0.16252	-0.02041	0.86904
iv5nores		-0.03204	-0.07271	-0.02225	-0.02332	-0.00045	0.18854
*iv5noobl		0.10671	0.20471	0.09356	-0.06586	0.00979	0.69237
iv10		-0.14239	0.05367	-0.02604	-0.08961	-0.00373	0.78114
vi3		0.05457	-0.17445	0.14838	0.03427	-0.02144	0.68402
vi9		0.05271	-0.13363	0.03990	-0.03861	-0.03414	0.68203

*Variables dropped from index