From Disaster to Lessons Learned:
What Went Wrong in the
Response to Hurricane Katrina?
By John C. Morris

The Storm of the Century
In late August 2005, a small but powerful hurricane made landfall near Miami, Fla. This storm, named Katrina by the National Hurricane Center, killed six people as it made its way across the Florida peninsula and into the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico. Steered by upper-level winds, the storm turned northward toward the Florida Panhandle. Within a couple of days, it became apparent that the storm would make landfall west of the original prediction, and a hurricane warning was issued for a stretch of the Gulf Coast from Pensacola, Fla., to Beaumont, Texas. The storm was also strengthening considerably, with its top winds measured at more than 125 miles per hour.

On the morning of Aug. 29, 2005, the storm made its final landfall at Pass Christian, Miss. The resulting tidal surge, estimated at over 20 feet, leveled structures all along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The water also breached a series of protective levees in New Orleans on the east and north sides of the city, flooding more than 70 percent of the area.

The story of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina is multifaceted and complex. Nearly all observers concluded that government, and governance, had failed badly in this case. The net result was a tremendous loss of life and property. A more important question, however, is: Why did the official response seem so haphazard? That question is the subject of research published by the author in several leading journals. This article summarizes that research, examining lessons drawn from what worked (and what didn’t work) in the response.

Complex Structures and Confusing Goals
The systems in place to respond to disasters are as complex as the intergovernmental structures tasked with action. Disaster response in the United States, according to Coast Guard Commandant Thad Allen, is based on a system of “cascading failures.” Disaster response is addressed first at the local level; if the problem proves too big or difficult for local governments, state government is called in. If the state government is in turn overwhelmed, the national government steps in with its significant resources. The key, however, is that responsibility moves up the chain only as lower levels fail in their response.

Historically, the threat of a major hurricane has spurred action to issue a federal disaster declaration. This action allows the national government to begin to pre-position both people and materiel in the area prior to the storm. State governors make the request to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which studies the request, makes a recommendation and passes the documents to the White House. The president is the official charged with issuing the declaration of disaster.

When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed in 2003, FEMA was one of the agencies relocated to the new department. Formed in 1979, FEMA had for many years been the victim of poor leadership and presidential ambivalence. A kind of political “football,” FEMA had seen 15 different directors come and go in a period of 14 years. In 1993 President Bill Clinton appointed James Lee Witt as director, who enjoyed an unprecedented eight years as director. During this period FEMA experienced several years of relative success and stability. In 2001 President George W. Bush appointed his 2000 campaign director, Joseph Allbaugh, as FEMA director; Allbaugh was succeeded by his hand-picked protégé, Michael Brown. Neither Allbaugh nor Brown was a professional disaster manager.

The formation of DHS, and the inclusion of FEMA in the new federal department, signaled an important shift in priorities for FEMA. Since 1979 the primary mission of FEMA has been to respond to natural disasters, and to engage in pre-disaster mitigation programs, such as the national flood insurance program. In the days following the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the focus changed from natural disaster to manmade disaster (terrorism). This change directed critical resources, including agency personnel, away from the traditional core mission of the agency.

Responding to the Storm
As the storm strengthened in the Gulf of Mexico, the governors of Louisiana, Florida and Mississippi asked the White House for a disaster declaration, which was quickly granted. Almost immediately, FEMA contractors began moving supplies of water, ice, generators and other critical supplies into the region. At the same time, the Coast Guard began to shift helicopters, airplanes and small boats into areas just outside the storm’s predicted path. The Navy began loading specialized ships based in Norfolk, Va., with food, water and other supplies, and sent the ships toward the Gulf of Mexico. The governors of Louisiana and Mississippi moved to activate their National Guard units, and the U.S. Army’s Northern Command began to draw plans for a response by active-duty troops, should the president request them.

Meanwhile, mandatory evacuation orders were issued for the Mississippi Gulf Coast, coastal Louisiana and the city of New Orleans. The mayor of New Orleans, Ray Nagin, hesitated for several hours before issuing the evacuation order; when the order came, it was implemented haphazardly. Many residents left the city, but many who remained were those without the means to leave on their own. Other residents in the path of the hurricane ignored the mandatory order and chose to stay in their homes.

In the immediate aftermath of the storm, it was not clear that the levees around New Orleans had been breached. One of the first reports came from a FEMA official at the New Orleans Superdome, who used his satellite telephone to inform his superiors in Washington, D.C., about the flooding. Rather than act immediately, FEMA officials in Washington tried to confirm the flooding reports with the Army Corps of Engineers, which was out of contact with its people in New Orleans and thus responded that it had received no reports of flooding. A delay of several hours ensued, even though anyone with a television could see satellite news video of the rising waters. By the time Washington acknowledged the reports, the water had already flooded large portions of the city.

Saviors From Above
However, not all government agencies were inactive. As soon as the winds calmed enough to allow flight, the Coast Guard launched several helicopters from its air station at Mobile, Ala., to survey the damage from the storm. The first reports received detailed the devastation along the Mississippi coast; as the helicopters made their way toward New Orleans, the tragedy unfolding in the city became more apparent. The Coast Guard immediately began to launch its helicopters to begin search and rescue operations in the city. For many residents, the first visible sign that help was on the way was the sight of the white-and-orange helicopters hovering overhead. Over the next seven days, the Coast Guard would airlift more than 4,700 people from rooftops, and rescue thousands more using a flotilla of small boats deployed throughout the city. Before long, additional military helicopters joined in the rescue efforts, as did boats from the Louisiana Fish and Wildlife Service, and even private boats.

Prior to the storm, thousands of the residents unable to evacuate the city had made their way to the New Orleans Superdome. Originally conceived as a “shelter of last resort,” the facility quickly filled. The same scenario played out at the New Orleans Convention Center several miles away. As the city began to flood, and power, water and wastewater systems shut down, conditions in the facilities quickly became untenable. With the city now flooded, there was nowhere else to go, and no way to get there.

The Dissolution of Government
As noted earlier, disaster response in the U.S. is predicated on a system of “cascading failure,” in which successively higher levels of government are called in as lower levels are overwhelmed. However, the system requires some government to be in place. When the storm hit, local government in New Orleans, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. Both politicians and administrators had evacuated prior to landfall, and what little structure was in place was immediately rendered ineffective. The severity of the disaster also paralyzed state government and stunned federal government officials. A period of many hours passed before coherent calls for help began to travel up and down the system; even then, they were generally unfocused and nonspecific. Mayor Nagin’s media appeals for the federal government to “send everything” were heartfelt, but were so general they were difficult to act upon.

Meanwhile, at higher levels of government, a political showdown was brewing between the White House and Gov. Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana. Louisiana’s National Guard was heavily deployed to Iraq at the time of the storm, and the governor had activated pre-existing agreements with other states to “borrow” National Guard troops prior to landfall. These troops were quickly moved to the area, but the White House wanted to federalize the troops, while Gov. Blanco wanted to keep them under state control. The White House also disputed the timing of the governor’s request to release active-duty military troops into the area, although later evidence showed that the request had come much earlier than initial White House claims.

An Ounce of Prevention …
So what can be done to prevent a similar performance? Congress held a series of hearings in the wake of the storm, and concluded that the proximate causes of failure were professional incompetence and poor execution. While these were contributing factors, the organizational structures in place prior to the storm, along with the mindset of public officials from New Orleans to Washington, were also important elements.

FEMA was conceived as a directive agency – that is, it was given authority to direct other agencies and organizations to accomplish certain tasks in response to the storm. FEMA itself is often mischaracterized; it is a very small agency that has few resources of its own. Instead, FEMA acts as a coordinating body to direct the resources of others as needed. Bureaucracies are notoriously selfish with their resources, however, and FEMA spent as much time cajoling behavior as it did coordinating behavior. In addition, the significant mission change in FEMA as a result of moving to DHS – away from natural disasters and toward terrorism response – had many officials “looking the wrong way” when the storm hit. While natural disasters were not ignored, they were de-emphasized in an agency that was given a new threat to ponder.

On the other hand, the Coast Guard was on the scene and operating without waiting for orders. It was able to do this in part because search and rescue is a core mission of the Coast Guard, and in part because its organizational culture encourages collaboration and cooperation with other agencies. It was no surprise to many observers when the Coast Guard’s then chief of staff, Vice Adm. Thad Allen, was named Principal Federal Official to replace FEMA chief Michael Brown several days into the response. Allen demonstrated that collaboration and cooperation were effective means to organize the response.

The active-duty military services also acquitted themselves well. Although many blamed the delayed response on the military, long-standing federal law prevents the active-duty military from performing certain functions without the express consent of the president and the governors of the affected states. Various military organizations began planning a response and pre-positioning assets before the storm made landfall; the delay in deploying those forces was political rather than operational.

To prevent future problems like the ones experienced during Katrina, a comprehensive review of our country’s disaster response system is required. While several changes have since been made to the National Response Plan, the changes are largely superficial. The challenge is to balance the need for effective response while respecting the authority of state and local governments. Likewise, state and local governments need to develop comprehensive plans not only to protect their citizens in times of disaster, but also to maintain the continuity of government to ensure that duly constituted authorities are in place to act. Finally, additional attention needs to be focused on how to make existing organizations more amenable to collaborative activities, and to break down traditional “stovepipes” that tend to fragment action.

Ongoing research by the author, as well as other faculty and students in Old Dominion University’s Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration, focuses on how public organizations can better prepare for the next disaster, whether natural or man-made. These approaches include studying organizational design, policy implementation, collaboration, contracting and federalism. By carefully analyzing past actions, we can offer prescriptive guidance to policymakers at all levels of government to assure the continuity of the administrative functions of government in times of disaster. Likewise, by avoiding narrow partisan political agendas, we can offer sensible solutions to improve the performance of our critical public agencies, and build theory that is applicable to other public functions.

John C. Morris is an associate professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration, where he serves as graduate program director for the Ph.D. program in public administration and urban policy.